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In the U.S. and worldwide, runway incursions are widely acknowledged as a critical
concern for aviation safety. However, despite widespread attempts to reduce the
frequency of runway incursions, the rate at which these events occur in the U.S. has
steadily risen over the past several years. Attempts to analyze runway incursion
causation have been made, but these methods are often limited to investigations of
discrete events and do not address the dynamic interactions that lead to breaches of
runway safety. While the generally static nature of runway incursion research is
understandable given that data are often sparsely available, the unmitigated rate at which
runway incursions take place indicates a need for more comprehensive risk models that
extend currently available research.
This dissertation summarizes the existing literature, emphasizing the need for
cross-domain methods of causation analysis applied to runway incursions in the U.S. and
reviewing probabilistic methodologies for reasoning under uncertainty. A holistic
modeling technique using Bayesian Belief Networks as a means of interpreting causation
even in the presence of sparse data is outlined in three phases: causal factor identification,
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model development, and expert elicitation, with intended application at the systems or
regulatory agency level. Further, the importance of investigating runway incursions
probabilistically and incorporating information from human factors, technological, and
organizational perspectives is supported. A method for structuring a Bayesian network
using quantitative and qualitative event analysis in conjunction with structured expert
probability estimation is outlined and results are presented for propagation of evidence
through the model as well as for causal analysis.
In this research, advances in the aggregation of runway incursion data are
outlined, and a means of combining quantitative and qualitative information is developed.
Building upon these data, a method for developing and validating a Bayesian network
while maintaining operational transferability is also presented. Further, the body of
knowledge is extended with respect to structured expert judgment, as operationalization
is combined with elicitation of expert data to create a technique for gathering expert
assessments of probability in a computationally compact manner while preserving
mathematical accuracy in rank correlation and dependence structure.
The model developed in this study is shown to produce accurate results within the
U.S. aviation system, and to provide a dynamic, inferential platform for future evaluation
of runway incursion causation. These results in part confirm what is known about
runway incursion causation, but more importantly they shed more light on multifaceted
causal interactions and do so in a modeling space that allows for causal inference and
evaluation of changes to the system in a dynamic setting. Suggestions for future research
are also discussed, most prominent of which is that this model allows for robust and
flexible assessment of mitigation strategies within a holistic model of runway safety.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A runway incursion (RI) is defined by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) as, “any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect
presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for
the landing and takeoff of aircraft” (EASA, 2011, p. v; ICAO, 2007, p. vii). Effective
October 1, 2007, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), also adopted the current
ICAO definition of a runway incursion in an effort to harmonize global efforts to identify
and reduce RI incidents. In the U.S., RIs are classified by four severity categories as
shown in Table 1 and by type, as shown in Table 2 (FAA, 2009).

Table 1. FAA Runway Incursion Severity Classification.
Category D

Category C

Category B

Category A Accident

Increasing Severity

Incident that meets the
definition of runway incursion
such as incorrect presence of a
single vehicle/person/aircraft on
the protected area of a surface
designated for the landing and
take-off of aircraft but with no
immediate safety consequences.

An incident
characterized
by ample
time and/or
distance to
avoid a
collision.

An incident in which
separation decreases and
there is a significant
potential for collision,
which may result in a
time critical
corrective/evasive
response to avoid a
collision.

A serious
incident in
which a
collision
was
narrowly
avoided.

An
incursion
that
resulted
in a
collision

Note. Adapted from http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/news/runway_incursions.

Runway incursions were recently identified as one of aviation’s most critical
challenges in the 2011 FAA NextGen Implementation Plan, the FAA National Runway
Safety Plan for 2012-2014, and in the 2011 National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements (FAA, 2011a, 2011c;
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Table 2. FAA Runway Incursion Factors.
Operational Errors (OE)

Pilot Deviations (PD)

Action of an Air Traffic Controller that
results in: Less than required minimum
separation between 2 or more aircraft, or
between an aircraft and obstacles,
(vehicles, equipment, personnel on
runways) or Clearing an aircraft to take
off or land on a closed runway

Action of a pilot that
violates any Federal
Aviation Regulation
Example: a pilot crosses
a runway without a
clearance while enroute
to an airport gate

Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviation
(VPD)

Pedestrians or vehicles entering
any portion of the airport
movement areas
(runways/taxiways) without
authorization from air traffic
control

Note. Adapted from http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/

NTSB, n.d.). Despite their explicit identification as a target for mitigation strategies, the
rate at which RIs occur continues to escalate as shown in Figure 1 (note that while count
decreased in FY 2009, rate increased as a function of reduced traffic volume). Data from
the FAA Runway Safety website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/) and from
FAA Annual Runway Safety Reports describe an increase in RI rate from 12.3 to 18.9
occurrences per million surface operations over the past six years of available data (FAA,
2010a).
Although the increasing rate of RI occurrence in the U.S. is disconcerting in and
of itself, its continued escalation in combination with the substantial growth of air traffic
indicates an urgent need to address the rise in RI events. In their Aerospace Forecast for
FY2012-2032, the FAA projects annual growth of the domestic aviation sector at
between two and three percent per year, with passenger numbers expected to rise from
731 million in 2011 to 1.2 billion in 2032. Extrapolation of present air operation totals
over the next ten years results in a calculated estimate of 1,125 RI annual events in 2020,
ten years from the last publicly available totals in 2010 (FAA, 2010a). This assumes that
RI rate remains static, when in fact it has increased steadily in the past several years, and
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Figure 1. U.S. runway incursion count and rate FY2005 to FY2010 (http://www.faa.gov/
airports/ runway_safety/).

that air traffic will grow only modestly as it recovers from the current economic
downturn. Although these assumptions render the example given here difficult to
generalize, the likely result of increasing or even static RI rate alongside increasing air
traffic volume is more frequent RI occurrence. Cognizant of this, the FAA issued a Call
to Action in late 2007, prompting not only an internal FAA challenge to address runway
incursions, but a focused industry response as well (FAA, 2011b). Though the Call to
Action prompted an initial decrease in pilot deviation type incursions, the trend reversed
and the rate of RI events has continued its upward trend (FAA, 2011c).
In search of meaningful reduction of the RI rate, many strategies for RI mitigation
have been presented, tested, and implemented. While some of these solutions have been
met with success, the persistently increasing rate tempers premature declarations of
successful widespread reduction of RI events by regulators and others. Rankin II (2008)
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reviewed a number of these initiatives and objectives with particular focus on those
implemented by or at the direction of the FAA. On the whole, and as illustrated in the
analysis by Rankin II (2008), RI reduction plans generally fall into three categories: those
that address RI events from a human factors perspective, those that assume an
organizational perspective, and those that identify technological or engineering solutions
to the problem. Within these broad categories, individual research is often limited to a
particular domain, examples of which are embodied by organizational, psychological,
physiological, and technological or engineering-based theories and models (FAA, 2010a,
2011c; McLean and Monro, 2004). Schönefeld and Möller (2012) suggest that
effectively addressing RI occurrences relies upon removing the human from the system to
the greatest extent possible. Evidence shows that this approach can be effective (Dabipi,
Burrows-McElwain, & Hartman, 2010; McLean and Monro, 2004; Torres, Metscher, &
Smith, 2011); however, technological solutions must also be developed in conjunction
with the fullest possible understanding of the nature of the problem (Rankin II, 2007).
Given that the rate of RIs has not decreased in spite of these efforts is indicative that this
level of understanding has yet to be achieved.
The existing research investigating RI data is important and meaningful, but it
falls short in some respects beyond a failure to address RIs through a holistic, crossdomain approach. In addition, many studies of the modes by which RIs occur do not
account for the substantial uncertainty involved in the investigation of rare events such as
runway incursions, which is operationally evident in the lack of high-resolution RI data.
In other areas of safety research, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) has been
successfully utilized in numerous applications characterized by uncertainty, such as that
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found in investigating RIs. PRA, pioneered in large part by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) in the 1960s, seeks to provide answers to three basic
questions: What can happen? How likely is it to occur? If it is to occur, what are the
consequences? (Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). PRA has
seen widespread use in the nuclear, chemical, energy, aerospace, and financial industries,
all of which share the common trait of high consequences of failure despite relative rarity
of events (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). After the Challenger accident in 1986,
NASA once again became a strong proponent of PRA, strengthening its position as a
powerful tool for the prediction of risk where a system or systems are highly variable
(NASA, 2002). As previously discussed, PRA often involves the study of rare events for
which data are sparsely available, and while it provides a probabilistic alternative to
deterministic point estimation of risk, PRA also has shortcomings in the context of
complex, rare events such as aviation accidents. Zio (2009) argues that the complexity of
systems such as those in which RIs occur renders event sequence-based techniques such
as found in traditional PRA of limited utility. To this end, complex, multidisciplinary
systems require safety risk assessment approaches that can dynamically model the
complex interactions of actors and events (Stroeve, Blom, & Bakker, 2013). Even more
advanced PRA methods such as Monte Carlo simulation in its naïve form – wherein
simplified sampling methods do not support higher-order uncertainties – cannot capture
the conditional or state-dependent nature of an event sequence leading to an accident or
incident. The distinction between causal factors and what are often referred to in this
study as causal paths (also causal sequences) is more than a semantic argument. Whereas
the methods principally used to investigate RIs to date are focused on individual
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contributors to RIs, or static sequences, this research proposes a method of evaluating and
understanding the interactions of causal factors that result in dynamic causal interactions
that form paths or sequences.
As noted previously, PRA is used to answer three basic questions with respect to
the nature of risk. Issues arise, however, in adequately doing so in the presence of both
epistemic and aleatory uncertainty while relying solely on a frequentist view of
probability estimation. Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) is a means of describing the
successive probabilities of events in relation to the immediately preceding occurrence. As
an extension to the classical PRA methods described previously, it offers insight into the
conditionality inherent to a complex sequence of events (Gamerman & Lopes, 2006).
From a practical standpoint considering the variability that almost always accompanies
complexity, Bayesian inference exhibits more widespread utility as a risk assessment tool
given its treatment of probability as a measure of degrees of belief and inherent
assignment of epistemic distributions to model parameters. This subjective view reflects
on partial belief as a function of behavior choice and consequence. Only the subjective
interpretation of probability allows for the integration of epistemic uncertainty in its
analysis. Bayesian parameter estimation also accommodates a variety of data types, most
notably expert elicitation in addition to classical statistical information (Siu & Kelly,
1998).
The proposed method in this study capitalizes on the ability of Bayesian methods,
specifically probabilistic graphical models, and advanced sampling techniques to allow
evaluation of causal factors to RI events across domains. Steadily increasing rates of RIs
highlight the need for a more complete understanding of the complex interaction of
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factors and systems that contribute to RIs, and Bayesian belief network models allow for
a novel means of examining the problem. This proposal outlines the use of Bayesian
Belief Networks and stochastic sampling to effectively capture the interdependencies that
characterize the chain of events that lead to an undesired state – “the incorrect presence
of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the
landing and takeoff of aircraft” (EASA, 2011, p. v; ICAO, 2007, p. vii). In conjunction
with a holistic theoretical basis for discovery, this method will allow for prediction of RI
events, evaluation of mitigation strategies, and identification of key causal paths in the
face of substantial uncertainty and across areas of knowledge.

In the discussion to

follow, these elements are synthesized into a method by which RI events may be
dynamically modeled such that causal paths – the interaction of those components that
lead to an undesired state – can be stochastically modeled and evaluated for more
complete understanding of the problem and of how mitigation efforts are best applied to
address it.
Statement of the Problem
The catastrophic collision of two Boeing 747 aircraft on the runway at Tenerife,
Spain in 1977, which resulted in the deaths of 583 passengers and crew, elevated runway
incursions in the public psyche (Tarrel, 1985). As a matter of public interest in aviation
safety, this concern remains pervasive even today. In the U.S., runway incursions (RI)
have been a topic of intense scrutiny by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) for at least the past three decades. During
this period, each agency has addressed RIs in its strategic planning as well as through a
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variety of initiatives designed to meaningfully reduce the frequency with which such
incidents occur.
At present, strategies aimed at reducing RI threats have primarily been those that
independently implement training and engineering protection by way of proposals to
modify airport lighting, surface markings, signage, ground-based monitoring displays,
and cockpit display devices (FAA, 2007, 2010a, 2011b; Moertl & McGarry, 2011). In
contrast to the concrete engineering solutions identified by Rankin II (2008),
comparatively little research has been conducted with a focus on understanding the covert
errors that inform, or should at least be considered, in the design of effective mitigation
strategies (Hendrickson, 2009). Even fewer studies appear in the literature addressing the
dynamic interaction of causal factors as they combine resulting in undesired events,
especially when those factors exist across domains of knowledge such as human factors,
mechanical systems, or organizational dynamics (Luxhøj, 2003). This paucity of
research is conceivably a function of the uncertainty that results from the small number of
data points and relative infrequency of RI events acting in combination with a lack of
cross-disciplinary research, presumably because of the complexity that often
accompanies it. The research that does exist is not without merit; however, its narrow
scope often fails to capture the dynamic conditionality of the sequence of events and
states that lead to incidents such as RI events. In light of these apparent gaps in research
and understanding, it is proposed here that the key to effective reduction of RI events is
not in the application of independent solutions, but in a holistic understanding of the
causal structure of RIs and the identification of pivotal interactions where mitigation
strategies will be most effective.
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Purpose Statement
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of
Bayesian belief network models, supported by structured expert elicitation, as a tool to
examine causal factors and dynamic causal paths to RI events (regardless of Federal
Aviation Regulations under which an aircraft is operated) in the U.S. This study employs
techniques from many domains, and it is guided by the proposition that Bayesian
inference and associated modeling techniques offer a robust and natural inferential
platform for understanding RI events and the complex dynamics that influence them
under the uncertainty of sparse data. The elicitation protocol and resulting BBN are tools
intended for implementation at the regulatory level to assist in design and evaluation of
RI mitigation and causation. Although probable end users are agencies such as the FAA
or Department of Transportation, this study also provides tools for operationalizing BBNs
at the airport level where sufficient sophistication in data availability and analysis is
accessible.
Research Questions
The present research addresses two principal questions, the first of which informs
the latter. First, what are the interacting causal factors that lead to RIs in the U.S.?
Second, can runway incursions in the U.S. and their dynamic causal factors and
interactions be modeled through the use of a Bayesian belief network supported by
expert-elicited data?
Significance of the Study
This study is significant in its use of a novel means to investigate dynamic causal
interactions across many domains. Modeling RI events in this way offers the potential
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for insight into why RIs occur, and what events or event interactions present the most
promising prospect for substantial reduction of incursions. To date, the increasing rate
and growing numbers of RIs in the US over the past several years reveals that this has not
yet been accomplished. The combination of methods investigated in this research
provides a unique opportunity to eliminate this considerable knowledge gap.
Delimitations
This study does not attempt to address RI incidents around the globe. Rather, it
focuses only on RIs within the U.S. because of the infeasibility of obtaining
homogeneous data across many countries. Although other countries are excluded, U.S.
data are likely representative of RIs experienced worldwide, given that ICAO standards
are nearly universally applied.
RI data for this study are limited to those years where the definition of RI is
consistent with ICAO and with the definition used today. This purposively limits data
collection to a five-year period (2008-2012) inclusive only of the data collected under the
presently-used RI definition and severity categorization scheme, which substantively
changed in 2007 to align with the ICAO definition of runway incursion. This change is
addressed in more detail in the review of literature to follow. Although data from years
prior to the definition alignment may be revised to the new standard by estimation, as has
been done in some FAA reports (FAA, 2010a), the benefit to the additional data points is
unlikely to be so great as to outweigh the liability of approximated figures given that
variation can be observed even in the FAA figures.
While the model discussed and developed in the present study will have the
capacity to support sensitivity analysis and evaluation of mitigation strategies via
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inference algorithms, this is beyond the scope of the research. These methods, which
include influence diagrams, are extensions of Bayesian networks that can be used to
evaluate strategies to achieve optimal utility and support decision making (Darwiche,
2010). The results of the current study will allow future researchers to extend the
network to achieve just such results.
Limitations and Assumptions
As mentioned briefly in the preceding section, it is assumed, based on
commonality of air and ground navigation procedures as well as aerodrome design in part
because of general adherence to ICAO standards, that the findings of this study can be
reasonably generalized to other populations. Nevertheless, the purposely constrained
scope of this research is a potential limitation to the application of results found therein.
Although RIs have the capacity for catastrophic results, they do not occur in that
mode with frequency such that large numbers of data points are available. Small
numbers of some data may affect the power of the study, which may also affect broad
application of results. This scarcity of data is frequently a limitation to studies of RI
phenomena, but in the present research, sparse research is supplemented with expert
elicitation. Given the state of knowledge of RIs, and the spread of that knowledge
across domains, expert elicitation is well-supported in its role in this study (Mosleh, Bier,
& Apostolakis, 1988).
Definitions of Terms
Aleatory Uncertainty: Aleatory uncertainty is due to the natural, unpredictable
variability of a system or a process. With respect to Bayes’ theorem, aleatory uncertainty
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is that about which one cannot or chooses not to learn. Though it cannot be resolved
through expert knowledge or judgment, it may be quantified (Bedford & Cooke, 2001).
Bayesian: Referring to the methods of inference based on Bayes’ Theorem and
made in terms of probability statements that are updates as additional evidence is made
available.
Causality: The relationship between states or events such that one is understood
as the consequence of the other. One implication of causality is that a model must
demonstrate more than correlation in the classical statistics sense.
Conditional Probability Table: A tabular representation of the conditional
probability distributions for variable relationships.
Decision Maker (DM): The weighted combination of expert judgments under
Cooke’s Classical Model. In the Classical Model, the DM is used in place of individual
assessments, and is based on the aggregation scheme outlined by Cooke (1991).
Deterministic: Pertaining to exactly predictable (or precise) processes, the
outcome of which is known with certainty if the inputs are known with certainty. This
type of model is the antithesis of aleatory (Kelly & Smith, 2011).
Directed Acyclic Graph: A structured flowchart with parametric relationships
connected by line segments (edges) in order to map out the paths of priors used to
illustrate causal structure in a Bayesian network (Gill, 2008).
Edge: The connecting lines between nodes in a graph, which may be either
directed or undirected.
Emic: Assuming the viewpoint or perspective of a cultural insider.
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Epistemic: Pertaining to the degree of knowledge about models and their
parameters.
Epistemic Uncertainty: The uncertainty in the model of a system or a process
that arises through a lack of knowledge of the system. Epistemic uncertainty relates to
those things about a system that can be learned. In this way, epistemic uncertainty may
be resolved, at least conceptually, via sufficient study such as through the use of expert
elicitation (Bedford & Cooke, 2001).
Etic: Assuming the viewpoint or perspective of a cultural outsider.
Frequentist: With respect to probabilistic reasoning, the long-run expected
frequency with which a phenomenon will occur. Frequentist refers to the inferential
framework within which common statistical methodologies such as hypothesis testing
and confidence intervals function.
Informative Prior: A prior distribution function that expresses some positive
information or knowledge, by way of the selected distribution, about an unknown
parameter.
Joint Distribution: A probability density function that involves more than one
random variable (Lynch, 2012, p. 19).
Markov Chain: A stochastic process that deals with the characterization of
random variable sequences where given the present state, past and future states are
independent (Gamerman & Lopes, 2006).
Markovian: A Markov process is a stochastic process that is considered to be
memory-less in that the future states of such a process depend only on the present state.
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Monte Carlo: A statistical approximation technique that uses computer
algorithms and random number generation to produce probabilistic inputs in a prespecified manner to solve problems and gain insight to phenomena that have some
random component (Shonkwiler & Mendivil, 2009).
Moral Graph: The undirected graph equivalent of a directed acyclic graph
(Koller & Friedman, 2009).
Naïve: As used to describe probabilistic reasoning, naïve refers to methods that
do not account for interdependence or uncertainty. Naïve (or standard, or crude) Monte
Carlo methods consider a sample of n independent copies of a random variable, and
estimate event probability based on the proportion of a rare event occurrence over the
sample (Rubino & Tuffin, 2009).
NP Hard: Referring to the complexity of an algorithm, NP-Hard indicates a
problem at least as hard as the hardest problems in NP (non-deterministic, polynomial
time).
Node: Values and variables in the model as specified by the model builder (Gill,
2008).
Posterior: When data are combined with the prior, an updated probability
distribution is mathematically computed and is called the posterior distribution or
posterior.
Prior: What is currently known about parameters within the model is expressed
as a probability distribution on those parameters, called the prior distribution or simply
the prior.
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Probabilistic Graphical Model: A graphical declarative representation of the
conditional dependence or independence between model variables (Koller & Friedman,
2009).
Probabilistic Risk Assessment: a comprehensive, structured, and logical analysis
method aimed at identifying and assessing risks in complex technological systems for the
purpose of cost-effectively improving their safety and performance (NASA, 2002).
Runway Incursion: Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect
presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for
the landing and take-off of aircraft (FAA, 2007, para. 2).
Stochastic: A reference to the randomness of a system. The opposite of
deterministic.
Surface Incident (Deviation): Any event where unauthorized or unapproved
movement occurs within the movement area, or an occurrence in the movement area
associated with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of flight
(FAA, 2009a).
List of Acronyms
AMASS

Airport Movement Area Safety System

ASDE-3

Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model Three

ASDE-X

Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X

ASIAS

Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing

ASRS

Aviation Safety Reporting System

BBN

Bayesian Belief Network

DAG

Directed acyclic graph
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EASA

European Aviation Safety Agency

ET

Event tree

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FTA

Fault tree analysis

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

MITRE

The MITRE Corporation

MTBF

Mean time between failures

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

OE

Operational error

PD

Pilot deviation

RI

Runway incursion

RITA

Research and Innovative Technology Administration

RSO

Federal Aviation Administration Runway Safety Office

RWSL

Runway Status Lights

VPD

Vehicle/pedestrian deviation
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
This chapter examines the literature that informs this research, discussing not only
the current state of RI research and mitigations in the U.S., but also the relevant practical
and theoretical considerations of investigating RI causation through BBNs and structured
expert judgment. The complex systems found in aviation organizations are dynamic in
their behavior, and the response of these systems to perturbation from a desired or
normative state is an intricate and varied series of interactions with the environment as
well as between the components, including humans, of the system itself. Generally
accepted guidance within the sphere of safety management points to a requirement for
probabilistic risk assessment as a set of methods for predictive analysis in systems
characterized by uncertainty and high reliability (Stolzer et al., 2008). However, such
methods are frequently limited to discrete event simulation and do not often behave
dynamically. This limitation is apparent when considering the increasing rate of runway
incursion incidents despite concerted efforts to reverse this trend. Bayesian Belief
Networks (BBNs) enable probabilistic estimation that more accurately reflects the
interaction of each state of an event sequence and the end state frequencies associated
with the simulation of events while retaining the ability to classify risk importance as in
classical probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) (Darwiche, 2009; Gamerman & Lopes,
2006; Kelly & Smith, 2009; Koller & Friedman, 2009). Bayesian Belief Networks
(BBNs) can seamlessly incorporate expert opinion in the face of uncertainty, and they are
flexible to systems that change over time. In the context of runway incursions, the
incorporation of BBNs allows a more complete inferential and predictive analysis of risk
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and better informs choices between alternative safety interventions in a causal framework
(Darwiche, 2009; Darwiche, 2010; Napoles, 2010; Pearl & Russell, 2003).
Runway Incursions
As was previously discussed, RI events remain one of aviation’s most critical
challenges, and remain a prominent fixture in the annual plans and reports issued by
organizations including the NTSB and FAA (FAA, 2010a, 2011c; NTSB, n.d.). Despite
the efforts of these groups and others, the rate at which RIs occur in the U.S. continues to
escalate. Records from the FAA Runway Safety website (http://www/faa.gov/airports/
runway_safety/), illustrated previously in Figure 1, point to an increase in RI rate from
12.3 to 18.9 occurrences per million aircraft operations over the past six years of publicly
available data (FAA, 2010a). In its most recent Annual Runway Safety Report, the FAA
cites a “drop by 50 percent over the previous year” (2010a, p. 1), a position repeated in a
2010 press release announcing “terrific progress in the area of runway safety” (FAA,
2010b, para. 2). While these proclamations are encouraging, a closer look at the data
indicates that RIs are not declining on the whole in rate or in number. To some extent,
this discrepancy may be attributed to constraints on the data analyzed in reports as well as
to the evolving definition of RIs.
Defining runway incursions. Through its publicly available reports (FAA,
2010a; 2010b), the FAA has in some ways defined the RI problem into success by
constraining data to include only those incidents that fall into the most serious RI
categories, but the risk posed by RIs has continuously trended upward over several years.
Changing definitions of RIs affect more than the way they are represented in news
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releases. Prior to October 1, 2007, RIs were defined differently in the U.S. than by
ICAO:
Any occurrence in the airport runway environment involving an aircraft, vehicle,
person, or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss
of required separation with an aircraft taking off, intending to take off, landing, or
intending to land (FAA, 2004, p. 9).
With the 2007 change, the FAA aligned its definition to that adopted by ICAO in
an effort to standardize RIs, which were previously described by “at least 20 definitions”
(FAA, 2007, para. 7) in countries around the world. The definition currently in use by
the FAA and ICAO is:
Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft,
vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and
take-off of aircraft (FAA, 2007, para. 2).
This change to the definition of an RI not only aligned the U.S. to the international
standard, it meant that events previously classified separately as surface deviations would
be categorized as a Category C or D (refer to Table 1) runway incursion. This change is
evident in the FAA’s reported numbers of RIs, which increase dramatically after the
definition alignment as illustrated in Figure 2. Also illustrated in Figure 2 is that runway
incursion figures were retroactively estimated in concordance with the updated definition
for FY 2006 through 2007.
Runway incursion data. In spite of FAA reports (FAA, 2010a; 2010b) that
indicate runway incursions are decreasing, Figure 3 illustrates that the opposite is true for
all but the most serious of RIs. Returning to Figure 2, it can be observed that the reported
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Figure 2. Comparison of U.S. runway incursion count FY2005 to FY2012 (Oct. 1 –
Sept. 30) by definition (data from http://www/faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/).

count of RIs in FY 2012 as of July 31 are nearly equal the total of RIs in the entirety of
FY 2011 despite there being three months of unaccounted data remaining in FY 2012.
Also shown by Figure 3 is that even those severe RI events categorized as A or B have
begun to show a rise in rate once more. Examined in greater detail, as in Figure 4, it is
apparent that the trend for each category of severe runway incursions is increasing, as
count for severe RIs has nearly doubled over the two previous years through only the
third quarter of 2012.
The focus on severity rating in FAA Annual Runway Safety Reports (FAA,
2009b, 2010b) as a measure of success in mitigation of RIs is somewhat misleading as an
indicator of the magnitude of the problem associated with RIs. Recalling the categorical
definitions outlined in Table 1, it becomes evident that the severity ranking schema in use
by the FAA and by ICAO is less a function of the manner in which an RI occurs as it is a
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Figure 3. Trend of RI rate, 2005-2007 data estimated to reflect definition change
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Figure 4. Category A and B runway incursion trend by count, 2000-2007 data estimated
to reflect definition change (data from http://www/faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/).
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product of the time separation between aircraft, vehicles, or pedestrians occupying the
same protected surface area.
Considering this, gleaning causal information based solely on RI severity strata
may be difficult if not altogether misrepresentative of the underlying structure that
contributes to RI causation because of the artificiality of the separation-based severity
ranking (Dr. K. Cardosi, personal communication, November 9, 2012). Nevertheless,
increasing rates of RIs are clear, and point to a growing need to address the problem
utilizing dynamic analytical methods in order to account for the full depth and breadth of
existing knowledge with respect to the safety of aircraft surface operations. A number of
studies have been conducted in attempts to shed light on the growing issue of RIs.
Review of runway incursion research and study of causal factors. The
figures in the preceding discussion use data from the FAA Runway Safety Office (RSO),
which is available via the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing database, the
FAA Runway Safety Program website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/), or
via the RSO directly. As the regulatory body charged with oversight of air traffic
operations, including those on the surface, the FAA has a keen interest in researching the
causes of and potential solutions to RIs. FAA research on RIs began in earnest in the late
1980s, when the FAA Assistant Administrator was “directed to identify the causes of
runway incursions and formulate measures for alleviating this problem” (NTSB, 1990, p.
44). The NTSB issued a report in 1986 that encouraged this action by the FAA and
included 33 recommendations concerning RI prevention, many of which had previously
been issued by the Safety Board as early as 1973 (NTSB, 1986). Table 3 summarizes the
relevant literature addressing RI causation.
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Table 3. Summary of Reviewed Runway Incursion Causal Factor Literature.
Year
Author(s)
1981 Bellantoni &
Kodis
1985 Tarrel
1986 NTSB
1989 Bales,
Gillian, &
King
1991 Steinbacher
1995 Koenig
1994 Adam &
Kelly
1996 Adam &
Kelly
2000 Knott,
Gannon, &
Rench
2001 Cardosi &
Yost; Cardosi
2005 Cardosi
2008 Rankin II
2011 Torres,
Metscher, &
Smith
2012 Chang &
Wong

Summary of Factors
No causal patterns aside from human errors

Domain(s)
Human Factors

Communication breakdown and the
influence of taxiing aircraft highlighted
Disorientation and communication
breakdown noted as well as ATC training
An analysis of ATC-related runway
incursions, with some potential
technological solutions
An analysis of ATC-related runway
incursions in the national airspace
Cockpit procedures and unfamiliarity with
airport layout compound pilot error
Catalogued RI contributing factors based on
pilot surveys with focus on communication
and navigation errors
Catalogued RI contributing factors based on
pilot surveys with focus on procedures and
factors affecting pilot performance
Literature review highlighted numerous
human factors-related contributors to RI
causation
Reviewed previous data with analysis
focused on aids to memory and situational
awareness for pilots and air traffic
controllers
Human factors effects on ATC
Review of causation and FAA mitigation
efforts noting that ground vehicle training
was a common causal factor to RIs
A study of the relationship between human
factor errors and RI occurrence identified
loss of flight crew situational awareness and
miscommunication as common causes
Summary of human factors research and
factors associated with RI events

Human Factors
Organizational,
Human Factors
Technology,
Human Factors
Human Factors,
Organizational
Human Factors
Technological
Human Factors,
Organizational
Human Factors
Human Factors

Human Factors
Human Factors,
Organizational
Human Factors

Human Factors

In its role as the agency responsible for runway incursion study and mitigation in
the U.S., the FAA is a primary contributor to research that seeks to understand RI
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phenomena. On the basis of data analysis conducted by the FAA and through its partner
agencies (such as MITRE, RITA, NTSB, and others), the 2002-2004 FAA Runway
Safety Blueprint identified five points that defined the agency’s view of RI events:
•

Operational performance in the airport movement area must be further
improved to reduce runway incursions.

•

Runway incursions are systemic, recurring events that are unintentional byproducts of NAS operations.

•

Operations must be standardized to reduce risk at a time when growth is
challenging runway and infrastructure expansion.

•

Collision-avoidance safeguards need to be developed for the high-energy
segment of runways, where aircraft are accelerating for take-off or
decelerating after landing.

•

Human factors are the common denominator in every runway incursion (FAA,
2001).

From a research perspective, most notable of these points is that human factors are
identified as pervasive to RIs. As early as 1981, Bellantoni and Kodis (1981) began
investigating RIs, noting, “there does not appear to be any pattern to the causes of
runway/taxiway transgressions other than human errors on the part of both air traffic
controllers and pilots” (p. v). Some of the underlying factors identified by Bellantoni and
Kodis (1981) as contributing to system error were: deficiencies in attention, judgment,
and phraseology (p. 11). Within these categories, a number of specific human errors
were identified for pilots and controllers based on analysis of ASRS, NTSB, and ATC
report data (Table 4). The researchers found that within the runway and surface incidents
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Table 4. Errors in Factors in RI Causation.
Pilot
Proceeded without clearance
Failed to see and avoid
Failed to display proper lights
Lost/disoriented
Failed to understand message
Failed to follow instructions

Controller
Directly conflicting clearances
Insufficient separation
Cleared to obstructed runway
Provided inadequate information
Erroneous instruction
Faulty GC/LC coordination
Failed to track aircraft
Poor supervision
Note. Adapted from Bellantoni and Kodis (1981).

studied roughly 95 percent were due to an element of human error, with the error lying
approximately evenly-distributed between pilots and controllers. Though it was a first
step toward understanding RI data, Bellantoni and Kodis’ (1981) research could not
explore the underlying nature of the errors it identified because of a lack of detailed data.
Tarrel (1985), in one of the earliest studies of the causes of what are referred to in
the subject study as runway transgressions, sought to “uncover patterns of behavior that
lead to these incidents” (p. 2). Citing work by Billings and O’Hara (1978), and utilizing
NASA ASRS reports to obtain information through a bi-directional analysis procedure,
Tarrel noted two critical characteristics of RI events: that the breakdown in information
transfer between parties was an important factor, and that taxiing aircraft were a major
contributor to RIs. On the flight deck, this analysis showed that forgetfulness,
distraction, disorientation, and misunderstanding of an ATC clearance were most
commonly observed. Tarrel noted factors quite different from those in pilot-enabled RIs
when assessing ATC-enabled incidents. Misjudgment of aircraft spacing, coordination
between ground and local controllers, non-standard phraseology, and high-workload
conditions were often indicated in instances of ATC error. Tarrel concluded that both
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pilot and ATC-enabled RIs carried unique risk profiles, and that the task of reducing
them would fall to the proper identification of those operational areas where the greatest
effects might be achieved. This proper identification is the impetus for the use of more
dynamic means of investigating RI events, such as through BBNs.
The NTSB, in a 1986 Special Investigation Report, investigated 26 runway
incursions at control tower-equipped U.S. airports in an attempt to discern their
“underlying causes and to recommend appropriate remedial actions” (p. 1). Failure to
identify traffic, inconsistent supervision, memory failure, boredom, and coordination
between controller positions were all cited as factors from an ATC standpoint. While
each of these factors is well-supported, the Special Investigation does not address the
means by which these causal elements interact and manifest as an RI event.
Koenig (1995) reviewed the results of MITRE Corporation survey studies
sponsored by the FAA in 1993 and 1994 that gathered survey data from U.S.-based
airline pilots. Though the questionnaire was not structured such that it could be used for
formal statistical analysis, a number of factors were identified as potential precursors to
RIs, most of which fall within the definition of human error. MITRE’s reports (Kelley &
Steinbacher, 1993) emphasized the insight that could be gained through plain-text
operational reports of RI events.
An examination of human error was central to the work completed by Cardosi and
Yost (2001) and Cardosi (2001), which noted a number of areas for improvement in
communication and memory aids for ATC controllers. Their research also reviewed
previous work by MITRE analyzing operational errors in the ATC system (Bales,
Gilligan, & King, 1989; Steinbacher, 1991) as well as the surface incident study that was
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the subject of Kelley and Steinbacher (1993), Adam and Kelley (1994), and Adam and
Kelley (1996). As in a number of other studies, including those conducted by MITRE,
NASA ASRS reports were evaluated. In particular, Cardosi and Yost’s research
evaluated nearly 250 reports submitted to the ASRS system by ATC controllers to
analyze causal factors affecting controller error. In the same study, over 75 reports
submitted by pilots were also evaluated. While the analysis of ASRS reports was
undoubtedly enlightening, the reports selected for study were done so on the basis of
recency, which may have affected the representativeness of the sample.
Rankin II (2008) approached RI causation from the perspective of personnel and
airport vehicle transgressions into the runway environment. Rankin II focused on
ranking effectiveness of FAA initiatives aimed at RI reduction using a survey instrument
to collect operational data. Rankin II’s survey achieved only modest responses, with a
reported response rate of 35 percent. As such, the responses that indicated driver training
was a common cause and that FAA efforts should refocus on such programs may have
been limited in their generalizability.
Torres, Metscher, and Smith (2011) also attempted to identify common human
factors causes of RIs with a focus similar to the present research: that a better
understanding of causation would allow the FAA and others to gain greater success in
mitigating RI events. The researchers noted that in reviewing nearly 300 ASRS reports,
the most common causal attribution in RI events was to a loss of situational awareness on
the part of the flight crew, followed closely by miscommunication. However, no further
analysis of the underlying causes of these two contributing factors was conducted, with
recommendations limited to a broad suggestion for increased focus on the human in the
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loop (Torres, Metscher, & Smith, 2011). The authors acknowledge this limitation, noting
that further research is necessary so that a “positive impact on the reduction of the loss of
situational awareness that leads to runway incursions” may be realized (Torres, Metscher,
& Smith, 2011, p. 24).
This closing statement points to an apparent shortcoming in the understanding of
what were referred to previously as covert errors in the context of RI causation. It is an
increased focus on these errors and their complex, diverse interactions with “interrelated
system components” that the present research suggests is critical to a fuller understanding
of RI causation and mitigation (Luxhøj, 2003, p. 17). Despite this gap in understanding
on which interventive measures are based, a number of strategies directed at reduction of
RI incidents have been developed and implemented over the past several years.
Review of runway incursion mitigation strategies. Runway incursion
mitigation efforts generally fall into categories that can be classified by the domain on
which they focus. For the purposes of discussion here, those domains are:
infrastructure/organizational factors, human factors, and technological/engineering
factors. Certainly, some research incorporates elements of more than one of these
domains, and those that do are discussed herein. Because of the regulated nature of air
transportation, a number of mitigation strategies aimed at the reduction of RIs have been
implemented or directed by the FAA. Table 5 provides a brief overview of the relevant
literature addressing RI mitigations.
As Table 5 indicates, a substantial amount of research to date has focused largely,
and in many cases wholly, on technological improvements to reduce the contribution of
human-in-the-loop systems to RI causation and avoidance. Systems such as ASDE-3,
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Table 5. Summary of Reviewed Runway Incursion Mitigation Literature.
Year
1998

Author(s)
Kelly &
Jacobs

Summary of Mitigations
Recommended changes to memory tools
for ATC as well as improvements to
ASDE-3 and stop bar lights
Review of technological barriers to
human error, including IMAGE and
TARMAC systems

Domain(s)
Human
Factors,
Technological
Organizational,
Technological,
Human Factors

2000

Knott,
Gannon, &
Rench

2004

Runway ASDE-3, ASDE-X, and
AMASS
RIPS system and HUD symbology for
situational awareness

Technological

SMASS for wrong-runway departure
avoidance

Technological

2007

McLean &
Monro
Jones, Jones,
and Jones &
Prinzel
Vernaleken,
Urvoy, &
Klingauf
CAST

Numerous recommended safety
enhancements across domains

2010

Dabipi et al.

Low cost alternative to FAROS and
RWSL systems
Cockpit display of traffic information
with indicators and alerts
Runway Status Light technical
requirements and use
Parts 91, 121, 125, and 135 flight crew
procedures during taxi operations / Parts
91 and 135 single pilot, flight school
procedures during taxi operations

Human
Factors,
Technological
Technological

2002,2005,
and 2006
2007

2011

Moertl and
McGarry
2006,2011b FAA
2012b,
2012c

FAA

Technological

Technological
Technological
Human
Factors,
Organizational

ASDE-X, AMASS, RWSL, and others have undoubtedly been met with success (Dabipi
et al., 2010; FAA, 2006, 2011b, 2012b, 2012c; Kelley & Jacobs, 1998; Moertl &
McGarry,2011); however, that success is tempered by the knowledge that little
improvement in RI rate has been realized as demonstrated in the foregoing discussion. In
much of the reviewed literature, mitigation strategies are approached as domain-specific,
rather than as a cross-domain effort to combat the dynamic causation of RIs. The
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research proposed here is intended to address this shortcoming by providing a modeling
environment that supports cross-domain mitigation investigation and implementation,
which has to date been generally lacking. Perhaps the most structured example in
aviation using probabilistic, interdisciplinary mitigation of RI events has come from the
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST).
CAST, which was formed in 1998 to bring together industry and FAA
stakeholders in an attempt to reduce the air travel accident rate, has also addressed the
issue of runway safety. CAST is primarily responsible for identification and
prioritization of mitigation strategies based on its consensus review of event sequences
that lead to accidents. Although the CAST methodology is based principally in a panel
review of accidents, and is therefore limited by the relatively small number of RI
occurrences, the process does include some elements of probabilistic reasoning. Of note
in discussing the methods used in the CAST process is that they are inherently
deterministic, utilizing single-point estimates in all, or nearly all cases. However, the
methods employed in the CAST process produce several inputs critical to effective
probabilistic risk modeling: some estimation of the severity or probability of an
occurrence, an estimated probability of severity or probability, estimated effectiveness of
proposed controls, and some knowledge of the cost of such controls (Stolzer, Halford, &
Goglia, 2008). These products of the CAST methodology make it ideally suited for
application of more robust probabilistic and decision-making modeling than is presently
employed, specifically through the applied use of more dynamic and flexible probabilistic
methods as are presented here.
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As has been previously discussed, methods such as those that utilize probabilistic
reasoning are called for because the causation and associated mitigation strategies
discussed here have generally failed to achieve the intended result of substantially
reducing the incidence of RIs in the U.S (FAA, 2010a). As the volume of U.S. air traffic
is forecast to rise, this gap in mitigation efficacy carries with it a growing potential for
disastrous results and the associated need for more robust analysis under uncertainty.
Probabilistic reasoning offers the capacity for analysis and decision making under
uncertainty, and methods such as Bayesian network modeling do so while remaining
flexible to the dynamic interaction of factors across domains.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment
As the aviation industry experiences accident rates that are among the lowest in
history, identification of threats or new approaches to mitigate consequences has become
an increasingly difficult task (International Air Transport Association, 2011). Risk
assessment methods in an aviation safety context are often focused only on reactive and
proactive efforts, and when predictive modeling is employed, it is frequently limited in
scope by addressing only discrete event probabilities rather than viewing outcomes as a
sequence of conditionally-dependent events. Regulators and operators are encouraged by
current research to implement infrastructure that fosters not only proactive, but predictive
identification of hazards, and guidance provided by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) points to the need for
robust risk assessment programs (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).
Programs such as the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) have
demonstrated the effectiveness of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) as a tool for
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identifying causal structures in aviation accidents and for developing and prioritizing
mitigation strategies; however, these methods rely heavily on deterministic point
probability estimates gained primarily through subject-matter expert (SME) consensus.
Institutional knowledge is often the primary tool for identification of hazards and
assignment of probability estimates (as in the CAST model discussed previously).
Brooker (2011) points to a potential shortcoming in this regard, asking “what are the
mechanisms by which experts ‘know’ such probabilities?” (p. 1154). In a frequentist
paradigm, this argument is more concerning; however, in the context of structured
Bayesian inference for risk assessment, the model is capable of learning as additional
information and expertise is gained, and in any event, probability remains bound by the
fundamentals of probability theory.
Predictive safety modeling. In its manual on the subject, the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) offers the following brief explanation of the purpose of
predictive analysis, the scope of which includes probabilistic modeling such as discussed
herein:
Predictive safety data collection systems are essentially statistical systems,
whereby a considerable volume of operational data, which alone are largely
meaningless, are collected and analyzed, and combined with data from reactive
and proactive safety data collection systems. The aggregation of data thus leads to
the development of a most complete intelligence that allows organizations to
navigate around obstacles and currents and position themselves optimally within
the drift (2009, p. 3-11).
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Modeling is one means of achieving the level of predictive analysis detailed by ICAO’s
description. Modeling by BBNs works with and within the concept of probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) to provide answers to three basic questions: what can happen? How
likely is it to occur? If it is to occur, what are the consequences?” (Bedford & Cooke,
2001; Stolzer et al., 2008). PRA and its associated modeling techniques are not the sole
means by which the pivotal task of safety management may be achieved, but as Figure 5
illustrates, they are necessary tools as organizations seek to move beyond proactive
management of safety risks. PRA often involves the study of rare events for which data
are sparsely available, and while it provides a probabilistic estimation of risk, PRA has
shortcomings in the context of complex, comparatively rare events such as aviation
accidents. Rubino and Tuffin (2009) cite mean time between failure (MTBF) rates of
10-9 as a representative example of aviation system reliability requirements. Given this
low probability of occurrence, traditional PRA tools such as Monte Carlo simulation
become infeasible due to sample size requirements unless other techniques are
introduced. Additionally, PRA in its simpler forms is unable to accommodate evolution
of risk estimates as a process changes or as updated information enters the system by
investigating events as they occur. In the discussion to follow, an approach is proposed
that allows the effective use of probabilistic risk modeling while providing robustness to
the dynamic uncertainty inherent to complex systems while also accommodating the
totality of knowledge of a domain. More importantly, this approach captures these
elements in a truly predictive approach, providing an elegant means of addressing the
truism cited by Stolzer et al., that “you can’t expect to meet the challenges of today with
yesterday’s tools and expect to be in business tomorrow” (2008, p. 219).
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Figure 5. Safety management continuum (Stolzer et al., 2008, used with permission).

Bayesian Reasoning
Bayesian estimation of conditional probabilities is important in a subjective
estimation of risk as it allows for the epistemic distributions of the aleatory model
parameters in a model to be updated as new knowledge becomes available. In PRA,
where uncertainty is often supplanted by expert elicitation, Bayesian inference is
especially appropriate given its treatment of expert judgment simply as another source of
evidence. Using Bayes’ theorem (given in Equation 1), discrete as well as continuous
probability distributions are addressed.

where:

𝑃(A|B) =

𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵)

P(A) is the prior, or a priori, probability of A in that it does not account for any
knowledge about B;
P(A|B) is the conditional, or posterior, probability of A given that B is true;

(1)
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P(B|A) is the conditional probability of B given A; and
P(B) is the prior, or marginal, probability of B.
Bayesian belief networks.

Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) illustrate composite,

conditional probabilities in the form of directed acyclic graphs very similar to the
illustration of a Markov chain. In these graphs, univariate random nodes, representative
of variables of interest, are linked by arcs representative of influences between nodes.
The acyclic requirement of BBNs simply means that there is no directed path that returns
to its own starting point, a logical premise given the present application of the method
Bedford and Cooke (2001) describe. Equation 2 specifies the joint distribution, and
Figure 6 illustrates an example of the simplest form of a belief net.
𝑝(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 ) = 𝑝(𝑥1 )𝑝(𝑥2 |𝑥1 )

(2)

Figure 6. Simple BBN.

In the foregoing figure and equation, the probability specification is the marginal
distribution of x1 and the conditional distribution of x2 given x1 for every value of x1.
This expression is in the simplest possible form, and does not account for Markovian
properties. However, rather than discuss notation of Markov chains here, their
representation by BBNs are addressed in the discussions that follow. Figure 7 illustrates
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Figure 7. Undirected (left) and directed graphs.

basic undirected and directed graphs, with the latter as an example of the type utilized by
BBNs.
The differentiation in BBNs comes from the inclusion of belief as a means of
establishing subjective probability distributions in the dependency model. As in a typical
Markov Chain, each node in the BBN can assume any one of its possible states, the belief
in which is associated directly with the preceding node state probabilities. In a PRA
application, BBNs serve to limit variable interaction to those nodes that have direct
interaction, simplifying the updating process and contributing to the computational
efficiency of the model.
Support for Bayesian belief nets. Though it is not necessarily unique in this
regard, aviation, and especially aviation safety, is often regarded as a field comprised of
varying degrees of art and science. In this context, it is often the case that art is used as a
euphemism for uncertainty, implying that practitioners rely on wit and experience to
reach successful outcomes. This paper does not fully address the particulars of expert
opinion in comparison to strictly stochastic techniques, but worth noting is that this
dichotomy of knowledge can lead to substantial gaps in organizational understanding. In
pursuit of safety improvements, the unification of knowledge toward process
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understanding and quality management is a central tenet (see FAA, 2010c; ICAO, 2009;
and Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008); BBNs can leverage organizational knowledge in
qualitative and quantitative forms to support more accurate prediction and decisionmaking through a single form of representation. In representing the multifaceted
knowledge that describes a domain, Bayesian networks amalgamate this knowledge
consistently and completely given that the constraints of the network are satisfied by only
one probabilistic distribution per node (Darwiche, 2010). Because BBNs rely on both
probabilistic and causal semantics, they are a natural platform for the representation of
this combination of prior knowledge and new data (Nadkarni & Shenoy, 2004). Modern
propagation algorithms allow this unification of knowledge through BBNs to occur in a
computationally efficient format, and even in topologically complex networks such as
may arise in aviation, BBNs can compactly provide a robust inferential tool.
Unifying knowledge is one matter, but communicating it is another. In domains
characterized by uncertainty, as in risk assessment in high reliability fields such as
aviation, capturing and communicating the complex behaviors of a system to many and
varied stakeholders is a daunting process when undertaken in conventional frequentist
reasoning. BBNs represent causal connections and dependencies while also capturing
uncertainty to intuitively communicate the state of a domain, even in the face of a
dynamic operating environment. Conrady and Jouffe (2011) refer to the effectiveness of
BBNs in this regard as creating a “portable knowledge format” that succinctly
encapsulates the state of a domain of knowledge and the multifaceted interaction of the
variables within that domain (p. 3).
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As Pearl and Russell (2003) assert, the most remarkable feature of BBNs is that
“they are direct representations of the world, not of reasoning processes” (p. 158). It can
be argued that human cognition follows a general pattern of solving probabilistic, rather
than logical, inferential challenges (Oaksford & Chater 2009). Instead of relying on
instinctual, undefined expert opinion to perform risk analysis and subsequent mitigation
evaluation and selection, BBNs provide a means of identifying what is already known
and what will result from future processes and circumstances. Dynamic networks allow
propagation of reasoning processes to flow naturally and in closer harmony with
perceptions of reality, as opposed to the rule-based systems one may otherwise encounter
(Pearl & Russell, 2003). Naïve PRA methods identify only discrete events, often outside
their operational context, and many advanced methods operate in an operational vacuum,
far removed from the dynamic world in which they function. In contrast, BBNs can
capture not only conditional probability and uncertainty over time, but can also allow for
dynamic assessment of interventions, such as safety improvements, within the
conditionally dependent model.
Bayesian networks and causality. As a means of understanding RI events, a
chief advantage to the use of BBNs is that causal inference is possible. Conrady and
Jouffe (2011) note that one reason Bayesian networks have seen a rise in popularity in
recent years is the possibility that they may allow discovery of causal structures
otherwise hidden within raw statistical data. BBNs construct a causal structure as a
function of formalizing causation through identification of direct interactions from a
given variable set, something experts and people on the whole are good at (Darwiche,
2010). The nature of the directed graphs central to BBNs is both a feature of and a
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foundational element of the idea that causal structure can be revealed by these methods.
The directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), as in Figure 7, are inherently a system of processes
that lead to causal interpretation. When a BBN is constructed such that the directed
structure is consistent with causal theory, the network is capable of updating probabilities
based on the interaction of an intervention inserted into the model (Darwiche, 2009).
Nadkarni and Shenoy (2004) suggest a causal mapping approach to the
construction of Bayesian networks as an intuitive and systematic means of building a
BBN. BBN construction is generally a function of either a data-based or a knowledgebased approach. The former is a function of deriving independence relationships from
the data; however, in the context of runway incursions, the availability of data is
questionable. While a data-based approach alone may produce a defensible network
structure, adding elicitation of expert judgment, especially in the present framework of
rare events, is critical to maintaining network sensitivity toward a more complete domain
understanding and greater effectiveness. Causal maps provide a starting point for the
representation of knowledge necessary to create a BBN. As cognitive maps, causal maps
capture causal knowledge of experts that is otherwise difficult to ascertain, and they do so
more descriptively than regression or structural equation methods (Nadkarni & Shenoy,
2004). Causal maps are made up of three components: a node representing causal
concept, a link representing the causal connection among concepts, and strength
representing the causal value of a connection Nadkarni and Shenoy (2001). Figure 8
illustrates a simple causal map of expert opinion in the context of prediction of an aircraft
runway overrun. In the Figure 8 example, the unidirectional arrows indicate causal
connections, with a positive or negative influence. A high level malfunction in an aircraft
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Figure 8. Causal network.

braking system, for instance, increases the likelihood that the auto-braking system will
not function (positive relationship). This continues along the causal path to a higher
probability of runway overrun. Pearl (2009) refers to the utility of causal BBNs as
“oracles for intervention”, a reference to the distinct parent-child node relationships and
modular characteristics of the network that facilitate the evaluation of relationships with a
minimum of changes to the network structure (p. 22). In essence, a causal network is a
Bayesian network, with “the added property that the parents of each node are its direct
causes” (Conrady & Jouffe, 2011, p. 10).
Practical application and considerations of BBNs. On the surface, employing
Bayesian inference in PRA seems logical enough; and when presented in terms of a
practical aviation example, this is even more apparent. Before suggesting a review of an
exemplar scenario, it is first appropriate to mention that PRA, and by virtue of
association, MCMC and BBN, are not always the best tool in every application. This is
not to imply that probabilistic modeling is not a powerful means of inference, but rather
that the time and resources involved may not be appropriate for every situation. As an
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Figure 9. Continuum of PRA tools.

example, and as illustrated in Figures 5 and 9, deterministic point estimation of risk
remains a useful tool for relatively simple processes, and even as a first step for scenarios
that will eventually utilize more complex methods. In aviation, however, as previously
discussed, the complexity of operations and rarity of failure provides ample opportunity
for application of PRA in the Bayesian framework.
As has been discussed, the probability estimates in many attempts to assign rare
event probability (shown also in Tables 12 and 13 in the example scenario in Appendix
A) are simply contrived point estimates, and as such do not account for uncertainty.
What this example expresses is how correctly integrated random sampling can in fact
allow for the uncertainty that characterizes rare, but high-consequence events such as
aviation accidents. By treating the network as a Markov chain, similar distributions and
node correlations, either through Monte Carlo sampling or other methods such as the
junction tree sampling algorithm (as in Borsotto et al. (2006)) or incorporation of the
copula-vine approach (Bedford & Cooke, 2002), can be created from which an expected
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conditional value may be approximated from the sample mean of a function of simulated
random variables for each node.
Whereas sampling in a naïve Monte Carlo method via importance sampling or
rejection sampling is possible and will produce results reducing variance, both methods
are limited in their applicability for the approximation of joint distribution. In the context
of the model described above, and for similar network models where the joint distribution
is unknown but marginal probabilities are known with at least some level of certainty, the
Gibbs sampling method is a means of sampling the posterior network distribution. The
Gibbs sampler is intuitive in its sequential method of sampling from a target distribution
within MCMC algorithms (Lynch, 2007). However, the Gibbs sampling algorithm
applies primarily to parametric or discrete parametric models. Alternatively, the joint
tree or rank correlation methods of sampling are also appropriate to the model proposed
here. Given that interval representation is an important element of the expert elicitation
process described in the following sections, these algorithms can be used to achieve more
informative priors by narrowing intervals that may otherwise widen as a result of
propagation (Borsotto et al., 2006). Readers are directed to Borsotto et al. (2006),
Bedford and Cooke (2002), Congdon (2003), Hanea, Kurowicka, and Cooke (2006),
Koller and Friedman (2009), Gelman et al. (2004), and Gamerman and Lopes (2006) for
more detailed descriptions of the sampling methodologies available for use in BBNs.
Examples of BBN use for probabilistic causal modeling in an aviation safety
context are few, and the review of literature on the subject revealed only one study with
substantial commonality to that proposed here. Lechner and Luxhøj (2005) conducted
case studies of three specific RI accidents using the Aviation System Risk Model
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(ASRM) described by Luxhøj and Coit (2006) and intended to supplement fault and
event tree models by representing interdependency and dynamic, interactive causation
using BBN modeling. Lechner and Luxhøj (2005) used the Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System to map influence diagrams and the structure of a BBN for the three
accident case studies of interest. The authors address the rarity of events by asserting that
the case study approach is in fact generalizable to the broader population of RI events.
While there is demonstrated merit to the case study method of evaluating causal structure,
it can also be construed that reliance on past events is inherently a reactive, forensic
process. In the case of Lechner’s and Luxhøj’s study, case studies are warranted because
the research sought also to evaluate the impact of mitigation strategies after the fact. In
the present research, where it is suggested that causal structures must first be understood
in a dynamic, holistic setting, case studies artificially restrict generalizability and limit the
extent to which uncertainty is accounted for in determining causal interactions of future
RI events. It is this differentiation that supports the need for methodology described here.
In addition to Lechner and Luxhøj’s work, a study by Morales, Cooke, and
Kurowicka (2008) stands out among the literature as having particular bearing on the
present research. In describing causal modeling methods for air transport, the authors
utilize BBNs, building the models, as did Wang (2007), on the basis of more traditional
PRA tools such as ET and FTA. Their use of BBNs focused primarily on human error
and probabilistic influence on error by a complex system of interdependent factors. This
is relevant not only because of the relationship of human error, but because of the
successful use of BBNs as a tool for causal inference in an air transportation setting.
Also focusing on causal modeling in transportation, Hanninen and Kujala (2010; 2012)
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sought to evaluate ship-ship collision causation using BBNs. The authors note in their
conclusions about the success of the model that “a Bayesian network causation
probability model also provides the means to examine how the underlying factors
influence the collision probability” (Hanninen & Kujala, 2012, p. 32). Although this
study addressed ships, not aircraft, the validity of BBNs as a tool for discovering paths or
nodes of influence among a complex web of variables and their underlying parameters is
clear.
Theoretical Considerations
Perhaps the element most often overlooked or underestimated in the creation of
probabilistic models, including BBNs, is the theoretical architecture underlying the model
itself. Theoretical concerns in the present research are in the form of defining the
construct of study, identifying and codifying causal theory, and understanding the
theoretical applications and limitations of the data generation process. These must each
be addressed comprehensively before a model can be developed, tested, or deployed with
any measure of success.
Causal theory. Causation is revealed in the conditional interdependencies that
characterize an underlying structure of data (Pearl, 2009). In frequentist statistical
analysis, covariation, not causation, is the basis upon which inference is made. In the
present context though, a more natural inferential model is proposed within the Bayesian
framework. Temporal precedence is a reasonable, if not implicit indicator of causation,
but it is not required. Intransitive dependencies also exist that reflect on the natural game
of induction the researcher is often forced to play (Pearl, 2009). The directed acyclic
graphs discussed previously serve as a foundation for discovering causal structure in this
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way, but the acyclic structure that defines the graph must be derived somehow from
observation, however limited. To inform the construction of the acyclic structure of
parent and child nodes, it is possible to employ a familiar technique from PRA, the fault
tree.
In FTA, an event sequence is represented based on the relationships between
pivotal events and consequences. In the context of fault trees (FTs), system perturbation
is captured by initiating events (IE), pivotal events (PE), and end states. Fault trees, as
shown in Figure 10, can be useful in modeling complex pivotal events, but non-binary
event outcomes make it infeasible to rely solely on FTs for modeling of dynamic system
behavior (NASA 2002; Roelen et al., 2003). It is not difficult to see the relationship
between the structure of the FT and a BBN, and the FT may be used as a basis for node
selection in a BBN, though it is by no means the only way to arrive at the structure of the
BBN.
Although the literature suggests that FTs may be used as a method of populating
the BBN acyclic graph, it is worth noting that FTs quite often are very heavily focused on

Figure 10. Fault tree.
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failure from an engineering perspective (NASA, 2002). In and of itself, this does not
dilute the effectiveness of an FT, but from the perspective of creating an inclusive causal
model, multiple domains must be considered as part of the construction of causal theory.
On the surface, this idea is simple enough, but one must bear in mind that it requires the
merging of two models that are philosophically different ( Mosleh, Dias, Eghbali, &
Fazen, 2004; Roelen et al., 2003). The engineering approach described in the discussion
on FTA is an effective structure for the identification of failure paths in a system, but it
does not account for what Reason (1997) calls organizational accidents.
To this end, the extension of the research by Joslin, Goodheart, and Tuccio (2011)
is appropriate in that it addresses a “holistic understanding of the contributory elements
of runway incursion incidents” outside of the ordinary constraints of ET and FTA (p. 2).
This holistic perspective addresses accident causation not only from the mechanistic
framework of discrete pathways of failure, but also from the perspective of management
factors, such as illustrated in Rasmussen’s (1997) model of functional abstraction (Figure
11). Of course, as Mohaghegh-Ahmadabadi (2007) and Roelen et al. (2003) prominently
note, the organizational and engineering approaches, which could arguably be described
as being qualitative and quantitative, respectively, must be somehow combined in the
model structure if it is to be truly encompassing of the explicit and latent factors that
interact to create an accident as is the objective here.
Wang (2007) discussed the importance of considering the total environment
within which a system operates in a comprehensive model. If dynamic interactions are
evaluated for risk and causal structure separately, how is one to combine disparate
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Figure 11. Migration of behavior toward unacceptable performance (Rasmussen, 1997).

methodologies? Wang (2007) proposes a hybrid causal model that captures the complex
interactions of a system with an environment comprised of regulatory, physical, and
socio-economic components as shown in Figure 12. To create such a model, Wang
(2007) began with basic PRA tools such as event sequence diagrams and extended them
to also interact with Bayesian networks. Pai and Dugan also proposed a hybrid causal
model that captured the complex interactions of a system with an environment comprised
of regulatory, physical, and socio-economic components as shown in Figure 12. Fault
trees and similar methods are a graphical representation of logical semantics that allow
reasoning about causal paths to failure, but as are many traditional PRA methodologies,
they are often static and limited to binary probability states (Dugan, Pai, & Xu, 2007).
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Figure 12. Interaction between systems and environment (Wang, 2007)

Used alone, and even in interaction with BBNs, traditional tools such as event and fault
tree analysis are not capable of analyzing causation dynamically and across domains. As
discussed previously and as illustrated in the literature, BBNs can accomplish this, and
they are flexible to inclusion of traditional PRA methodologies as a means of building the
model structure. Once a structure has been created, the matter of populating network
nodes with data must be addressed.
Data generation. Because obtaining data collected by authorities such as the
FAA is addressed in the Joslin et al. (2011) study design, it is unnecessary to expand
upon it in great detail here. The emphasis of the Joslin et al. (2011) methodology is on
reviewing data in a mixed-method framework, relying in part on expert raters to evaluate
pilot self-reported narratives and code them (but not rank) in terms of causal contributors.
This method is appropriate because it prioritizes qualitative information based on the
collection method, and uses it to enhance the inferences that would ordinarily be drawn
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only based on quantitative information. For more information on the data available
through the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and the methods for
extraction of RI data from this information, readers are directed to Joslin, et al. (2011).
While the coding scheme outlined by Joslin et al. (2011) is useful as a starting
point for RI study in that it identifies thematic causal elements, the resolution of the data
prove insufficient as a sole source for derivation of probability distributions as are
required in BBNs. As a means of achieving this level of granularity, the low frequency
of these events requires supplementation of data, and in this case, expert elicitation is
appropriate. In the Bayesian context, existing data is used to establish the prior belief
about the distribution of the unknown, and expert opinion is solicited to inform and
update posterior probabilities as the model is deployed. Expert opinion can of course be
used to establish a prior in the same sense as the FAA data can, and the specifics of this
implementation are beyond the scope of this paper. In either event, the method
by which expert information or opinion (purposely identified as distinct concepts, as in
Kaplan (1992)) is collected, structured, and aggregated must be carefully considered in
order to limit bias and propagation of erroneous data throughout the model.
Expert Elicitation
Insufficient or unobtainable data has led to the development and use of
probabilistic risk and safety assessment in a variety of fields, from nuclear power
(DeWispelare, Herren, & Clemen, 1995) to public health (Hoelzer et al., 2012; Knol,
Slottje, van der Sluijs, & Lebret, 2010), and security (Levine, 2012). Cooke (1991)
references Plato’s allegory of the cave in his description of expert elicitation as somewhat
of a contradiction in the scientific world (p. 3). In his parable of the cave, Plato describes
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the evolution of knowledge from its lowest orders of imagination and belief to episteme,
the highest levels of knowledge, separating these strata with his so-called divided line,
shown in Figure 13 (Heidegger & Sadler, 1988). Although the process of expert
elicitation could be supposed to deal predominantly with the visible realm of illusion of
belief, Plato himself reasons that in discussing these abstractions often and deeply
enough, it is possible to eventually achieve knowledge of what he often refers to as forms
(Heidegger &Sadler, 1988). With this in mind, this research and the body of knowledge
suggest that thorough expert elicitation knowledge can evolve toward new solutions
while maintaining scientific rigor.

Knowledge (Episteme)
Opinion (Doxa)
Intelligible Realm (Forms)
Visible Realm (Substance)
A
B
C
D
Pure thought
Reason (dianoia)
Belief (pistis)
Illusion (eikasia)
(gnosis)
Figure 13. Plato’s divided line (adapted from Heidegger and Sadler (1988)).

Support for expert elicitation. The limitations in both resolution and
availability of RI data discussed previously establish that in order to perform more
detailed analysis of the problem, data sources outside those conventionally used in this
regard must be explored. When data are sparse, the literature demonstrates that a
scientifically structured and mathematically transparent method is a robust means of
assessing uncertainty and cumulative probability, both of which are important elements in
the study or RI events and the causal factors and interactions that lead to them. Because
expert elicitation is a fundamentally “interdisciplinary” method, it is particularly well
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suited to the investigation of complex phenomena with causal influences that extend
across domains, such as is often the case for RIs (Knol et al., 2010, p. 27).
Its utility and multidisciplinary applicability notwithstanding, the true scientific
value of expert elicitation is, as it is with almost all analytical methods, dependent on
methodological appropriateness. Some current methodologies, such as the consensusbased methods used in the CAST studies discussed earlier, approach this issue directly
but remain open to scrutiny because of the somewhat black box nature by which expert
opinion is gathered and combined. Within the existing body of knowledge, alternative
means for elicitation and aggregation of expert opinion exist, and the following
discussion reviews techniques most applicable to the study of RI events in a Bayesian
network context.
The continuously variable structure of airspace, technology, system capacity, and
even training paradigms makes it impractical to assess the probability of RI events in the
frequentist sense, where probability is treated as the long-run tendencies of events that
will eventually converge upon the true proportion of a population. Instead, the Bayesian
interpretation of probability as a degree of belief is a uniquely appropriate method, where
past experiences and knowledge of the likelihood of events can be expressed in terms of a
prior distribution function.
In the context of the research presented here, these prior distributions are
established as an expert-elicited informative prior. Though some criticism has been
leveled at this technique (e.g. Brooker, 2011) on the basis of what Gill refers to as the
“supposedly personal-subjective nature of priors”, it is suggested that very few, if any,
would comfortably approach any model or its related specifications without at least some
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cursory prior understanding (Gill, 2008, p. 136). That said, priors vary from flat, noninformative (uniform distribution) to those that are strongly influential. In any case,
accounting for the existing scientific knowledge in the field is addressed in the present
study as a matter of scientifically structured expert elicitation.
Methodological review. Though Brooker (2011) and others have questioned the
mechanisms on which expert elicitation is based, the methodology has been empirically
established over a number of independent studies at the Technical University of Delft in
The Netherlands. The experiences there have shown the utility of the technique, and
have answered some of the questions that plagued the theories early on as a result of the
rarity of available studies for review. With the benefit of substantial experience in
elicitation and aggregation models, the following observations have been made (Cooke,
2004, p. 317):
1. Experts don’t mind performance measurement.
2. Experts are leery of ‘non-objective’ or psychologically based methods, and
are suspicious of the ‘academic sandbox’.
3. Experts have no problem understanding (subjective) probability and no
problem quantifying degree of belief in terms of quantiles of a subjective
probability distribution
4. Experts are not uniformly overconfident, though overconfidence certainly
does arise.
5. It is always possible to find suitable calibration variables.
6. In general, though not always, the performance based combination of expert
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judgments performs better, in terms of calibration and information, than an
equal weight combination and also better than the best expert.
A separate problem to the elicitation of information from multiple experts is
addressed by Wu, Apostolakis, and Okrent (1990), who note that “In PRA, an important
issue related to knowledge representation under uncertainty is the resolution of
conflicting information or opinions” (p. 170). Considering that the impetus for using
expert judgment is that substantial scientific uncertainty impacts on a modeling process,
it is reasonable to assume that the experts themselves are not certain. As such, agreement
among experts is almost certainly unattainable. However, some means by which
differing expert opinions may be translated into a structured consensus of sorts must be
specified if the elicited information is to be treated as data.
The elicitation and aggregation of expert opinion generally falls into two
methodologies: those characterized as behavioral approaches and those that rely on
mathematical calculus, whether in non-Bayesian or Bayesian models (Clemen &
Winkler, 1999). While behavioral approaches are useful from a broad, common-sense
perspective, they generally fail to satisfy the conditions of rational consensus that
scientific, structured expert judgment requires, more specific elements of which are
included in Appendix C and can be found in Cooke and Goossens, 2006. It is generally
agreed (Clemen & Winkler, 1999; Lin & Bier, 2008; Mosleh et al., 1988) that
mathematical methods for aggregation produce better results because of this adherence to
the principles of scientific inquiry.
The natural question that arises in the context of this research is whether or not a
Bayesian approach can also be used in the process of expert elicitation. Procedures that
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approach the problem of elicitation and aggregation from a Bayesian perspective have
been presented (Clemen, 1986; Clemen & Winkler, 1999; Ouchi, 2004); however,
Bayesian methods can be problematic in practice. As one example, many Bayesian
elicitation and aggregation models assume that experts are independent. Furthermore, the
use of the Bayesian paradigm in elicitation and aggregation requires that the practitioner
formulate joint distribution over the variables of interest, the seed variables used for
calibration, and the experts’ distributions over those seed variables and the variables of
interest (Cooke & Goossens, 2006). This is not an impossible task, but it is
mathematically complex, and is subject to the difficulties of overcoming resistance to the
group decision problems that arise because a group of rational individuals cannot be
treated as a single rational individual (Cooke, 2009). Though the Bayesian approach
meshes harmoniously with the present research from a theoretical standpoint, it is
impractical from an operational one. Instead, Cooke’s (1991) classical model provides a
more readily workable procedure for eliciting and combining expert opinion. Cooke’s
classical model has been applied in practice over dozens of studies conducted in
conjunction with the Technical University of Delft, and its value has been established
empirically (Cooke & Goossens, 2006).
The classical model. The classical model operationalizes the mathematical
principles for combination of probabilities such as those summarized by Genest and
Zidek (1986) and is perhaps the most widely used method by which expert judgments can
be combined (Clemen, 2008). Cooke (1991) borrows from Savage’s theory of Rational
Decision as a basis for the probability calculus that describes many of the ideas
surrounding uncertainty. The classical model has been demonstrated in a variety of
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applications including food safety (Brown et al., 1997), finance (Bakker, 2004; Qing,
2002), geologic and infrastructure erosion (Brown & Aspinall, 2004), public health
(Tyshenko et al., 2011; Winkler et al., 1995), volcanic eruption assessment (Aspinall &
Cooke, 1998), equipment failure (Bedford, Quigley, & Walls, 2006; Akkermans, 1989),
and nuclear risk assessment (Goossens & Harper, 1998). In some social science contexts,
the fact that Cooke’s model purposely does not capture consensus in its aggregation of
results may be viewed as a disadvantage (Albert et al., 2012); however, the present
approach fits well with the classical pooling approach that has “stood the test of time”
(French, 2011, p. 183). The classical model (Cooke, 1991) meets the theoretical and
operational requirements of the research at interest in that it uses real data to evaluate
experts and assign weights to their assessments (Clemen, 2008). Its unique approach to
empirical control and performance-based expert scoring lends an empirical formality to
the elicitation process, contributing to the transparency with which a model such as the
BBN discussed here may be developed. The algorithms for elicitation and aggregation of
opinion within the classical model are presented in detail as Appendix C.
Summary
RI occurrence in the U.S is a problem that has been well established in terms of
severity and frequency. While a number of mitigation strategies have been demonstrated
with promising results, the rate at which RIs occur in the U.S. airspace system has
increased over the past several years and continues to increase in the face of concerted
efforts to stem this trend. Investigation of RI causation has typically focused on
individual factors within isolated domains of knowledge, despite a general recognition
that these factors do not operate separately, instead interacting dynamically in the
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sequence of events leading to an undesired event (Vernaleken, Urvoy, & Klingauf, 2007).
As the literature demonstrates, existing studies are limited by the following gaps:
•

They generally address only one method of determination of causal factors
rather than examining causal interaction.

•

Research of RI causation is typified by a focus on one domain, rather than by
a holistic approach that addresses the needs of multiple stakeholders.

•

A reliance on case studies or deterministic estimates of frequency are common
in the RI literature, and most studies lack a probabilistic approach that
effectively captures uncertainty.

•

Many efforts at understanding RIs look at individual causal factors and map
intervention strategies that are equally limited to discrete events rather than
designed to work within a complex sequence of interacting factors.

To address the dynamic nature of RI causation despite limited data, stochastic
processes such as Monte Carlo simulation are useful. However, such methods do not
capture conditionality, nor do they incorporate uncertainty in the context or rare events or
sparse data. To this end, Bayesian belief networks are an appropriate tool for
investigating causal pathways to RI events. Such methods also support more robust
decision-making through sensitivity analysis and evaluation of intervention strategies.
Because RIs are relatively rare events from a statistical analysis standpoint, a
structured means of data generation is necessary so that a network model can function.
To accomplish this, expert elicitation is an appropriate methodology. Expert elicitation
can be used to express uncertainty in the language of probability, and it can be conducted
such that scientific scrutability is maintained. In combination, these methods provide a
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means of investigation into the causal interactions that lead to RIs that is integrative,
flexible, and dynamic, and that will allow more focused strategies to combat them
through a fuller understanding of their structure.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
A review of the relevant literature supports the use of modeling the complex and
dynamic interactions that lead to RI events. However, as has also been demonstrated in
the literature, many investigations into the causation of RIs are one-dimensional. As a
means of examining causal patterns across theoretical domains and in the face of
uncertainty and sparse data, predictive, simulation-based modeling through BBNs is a
more holistic method than what has been used to date, and it is flexible to system
variance and technological change. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the feasibility
and effectiveness of Bayesian belief network models, supported by structured expert
elicitation, as a tool to examine causal factors and dynamic causal paths to RI events in
the U.S.
As discussed previously, this study addresses two questions: What are the
interacting causal factors that lead to RIs in the U.S.? And, can runway incursions in the
U.S. and their dynamic causal factors and interactions be modeled through the use of a
Bayesian belief network supported by expert-elicited data? The methodology outlined
herein is directed at answering these questions as fully as possible.
Research Approach
The methods utilized here are more appropriately described as an algorithm,
wherein three structured phases of research are undertaken toward the eventual objective
of developing a functional predictive model. The phased approach described here is
iterative and additive in large part, though some elements of the research approach may
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be accomplished concurrently. While the following discussion addresses each phase
independently, these phases were naturally subject to some temporal overlap.
Phase 1: Runway Incursion Data and Causal Factors
Although quantitative data describing occurrences of RI exist, the resolution with
which these events are described is limited, and what information is available fails to
capture the emic, or insider, perspective. Whereas the more common etic perspective
looks at RI events in the more general sense, investigation of RIs from the emic
viewpoint provides a more specific understanding of the conditions and impact of RI
events and the causal interactions that lead to them (Ng & Earley, 2006). To facilitate
this emic view and to more holistically examine the causal structure of RI events, textual
data from open-ended narratives (ASRS reports) were evaluated by a panel of raters to
determine causal factors for each RI within the sample. This merging of emic and etic
perspectives toward a fuller contextual understanding of RI events was accomplished as a
mixed methods process, and in the context given here, was approached as an explanatory,
sequential element of the research as a whole. The qualitative rater data were combined
with quantitative FAA RSO data and the literature review and examined in a multimodal, quan→QUAL analytical process.
Data collection and generation. The data collection sites for this study were
from two sources of publically available U.S. historical data: RI pilot deviation (PD)
type incidents from the FAA RSO database, and pilot-reported pilot accounts of RI
incidents from the NASA ASRS database. Consistent with the sampling constraints
described herein (to limit the population to the period to which the current RI definition
applies), the data were considered only if they stemmed from an occurrence within the
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period inclusive of calendar year 2008 through calendar year 2012. Using basic database
query strings, the data were subjected to a specific, targeted search string in order to limit
the sample to PD-type RI incidents. Using a technique similar to Joslin, Goodheart, and
Tuccio’s (2011) expert rating of RI event causation and severity, the data were collected
via a spreadsheet template and drop-down menus were utilized to facilitate selection
accuracy. As in Joslin, Goodheart, and Tuccio (2011), the following procedure was
followed:
a) Unique text for identification was recorded for each ASRS case. This helped
ensure data entry accuracy by guarding against a rater recording data in the wrong
row.
b) Causal Factor Taxonomy of ICAO 9870, Appendix D, Manual on the Prevention
of Runway Incursions were used as the set of available causal factors for rater
selection.
c) ASRS cases were sorted using random number generation.
d) A limited number of ASRS cases were evaluated per day to prevent expert rater
fatigue.
e) Raters conducted their evaluation in a "single pass" for each case without going
back to change or re-evaluate causal factor assignment.
f) Raters were limited to a maximum of five causal factors per report as a means of
constraining the volume of data collected, and consistent with the pre-test results
of the Joslin et al. study.
g) Cases were marked as an “exception” if they did not meet the criteria
(FAA/ICAO definition) for a runway incursion or if insufficient data exist.
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Population/Sample. The data were drawn from the population of U.S. RI events
(regardless of Federal Aviation Regulations under which an aircraft was operated) as
recorded by the FAA RSO and in ASRS reports at airports within the U.S. These data
captured all reported RI events in the U.S. for the timeframe of interest and supplemented
them with all available narrative reports over the same frame, respectively. Operational
segment or regulatory part was not differentiated on the basis that a chief objective of this
research is to maintain a holistic perspective on RI causation, and purposive narrowing of
operational scope could have unintentionally limited capture of important data points.
The sampling frame, consistent with the definition of an RI at the time of this study, was
limited to data from January 2008 up to but not including January 2013. Within this
frame, quantitative RSO data included 6,185 RI cases for analysis, including primarily
ATC-reported RI events and quantitative descriptors. ASRS data included 87 cases
reported in qualitative, narrative form by flight crews (sufficient according to Cantor
(1996) for evaluating rater agreement using Cohen’s kappa) describing RI events to be
evaluated by subject matter experts for causation.
Sources of the data/Rater selection. Data used in this phase of the study existed
in three forms: RSO RI data and ASRS RI reports, rater-identified causal factors, and
expert-elicited judgments. The first data set is publicly available via ASIAS and the RSO
directly. Derivation of the expert opinion data is an element of this study, though in this
first phase it is not intended that expert data will be collected using the same structured
elicitation process outlined in the following phases. For this phase only, raters were
selected using the following criteria as guidance:
•

independence (from one another and the research),
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•

diversity of operational experience,

•

interest in and availability for the project,

•

flight qualifications and experience, and

•

familiarity with RI causation and mitigation strategies in place or in
development.

To reduce bias in the selection of the raters, scoring criteria shown in Appendix M was
used to evaluate potential SMEs and make rater selections based on the prospective
raters’ submitted biographical information, curricula vitae, and peer nomination. The
raters, as described previously, were asked to assign causal factors based on the ICAO
Taxonomy (ICAO, 2007) to narrative ASRS reports. In this phase of the research, three
raters were used as a measure against threats to reliability as experienced by Zuschlag
(2005) in his review of ASRS reports for a similar purpose.
Descriptive statistics. In the first phase, which involved identification of causal
contributions to RI events based on RSO data in combination with expert opinion,
descriptive statistical analysis was utilized in the form of a frequency count of each ICAO
causal category used by each rater as well as basic analysis of data from the FAA RSO on
RI events. A sort operation of these frequency counts will be used to gain insight into the
most common causal factors among ASRS reports examined. Descriptive frequency
counts also allowed for identification of causal codes not used by any rater in the ASRS
review process.
Interrater reliability. In the context of this study, reliability was applicable
insofar as it applied to the expert rating of causal contributors in the first phase of the
research. To establish interrater reliability, the expert-assigned causal factors were
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recoded to a numeric value, assessed for normality, and if necessary, transformed prior to
analysis for reliability using Cohen’s Kappa (Leech, Barrett, & Morgan, 2008). As in
Joslin, Goodheart, and Tuccio (2011) SMEs were used to examine the plain-language
narrative ASRS data and re-code the reporter’s comments into nominal, quantitative data.
Causal codes and the reliability with which they are assigned by expert reviewers were
assessed using three methods: union of causal factors, intersection of causal factors, and
Cohen’s Kappa as demonstrated in and for the reasons described in Joslin et al. (2011).
Cantor (1996) suggests that assuming an a priori rater agreement of roughly 50 percent,
and an error margin of 30 percent, 44 cases should be evaluated. Given that 87 RI cases
were initially considered by raters, that minimum sample size was met.
Cohen’s Kappa interrater reliability. Interrater reliability, the statistical measure
of agreement, or consistency, between the raters on the same variables, was evaluated
using a Kappa statistic. Cohen’s kappa provides a measure of interrater reliability of two
raters assigning one nominal code to a list of items and ranges between 0 and 1.00 with a
value of 0.70 generally considered satisfactory (Leech, Barrett & Morgan, 2008).
Cohen’s kappa is defined by Equation 3:

where:

𝜅=

𝑝−𝑝𝑒
1−𝑝𝑒

(3)

𝑝 is the proportion of units where agreement exists; and

𝑝𝑒 is the proportion of units that would be expected to agree by chance alone.
Thus, Cohen’s kappa is the agreement between observers (SMEs) adjusted for that
proportion of agreement that would ordinarily be expected to occur by chance. Though
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percent absolute agreement is also commonly used as a measure of agreement among
raters where multiple levels exist, no provision for level of disagreement or correction for
chance is available. Because three raters were presented with 47 possible codes to fill a
variable response space between 0 and 5 codes per case, the use of a traditional kappa
measure, such as Fleiss’ kappa or Cohen’s kappa, becomes computationally untenable in
its ordinary application. To overcome this issue, a Structured Query Language (SQL)
query was used to compare raters pairwise for each potential level of match (i.e. 1, 2, 3,
4, or 5 matching codes across the rater pair). The actual SQL code used to perform this
function is presented in Appendix G. Given the possibility that each rater selected a
unique set of causal codes, dummy variables were automatically inserted to meet the
requirement of the statistic that the number of codes being compared be the same. Using
the general procedure from Joslin, Goodheart, and Tuccio (2011) for reach rater pair, the
SQL operation was used to sequentially evaluate matching codes as independent
operations, with each generating a unique but matching character string between the
raters. When matches were not present, a unique string per rater was inserted as a
placeholder. At the end of the procedure, dummy ASRS records were inserted to comply
with Cohen’s procedural requirement of both raters using all possible codes. While this
method overcame some basic mathematical limitations of kappa in this application, it did
not capture the total domain of possible codes. It does maintain the basic tenet of kappa
in that chance is accounted for, however limited by the inability to account for all
possible causal factors.
To assist in describing the interaction and agreement (or disagreement) between
raters more accurately, SQL was also used to perform union and intersection functions
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from the rater responses. In this instance, union is intended as the total number of codes
that make up a set across all raters for one case – the number of unique codes.
Intersection describes the number of codes used by all raters across a single case.
Union of causal factors. Because each expert rater was asked to assign up to five
ICAO causal ratings per ASRS report (see Joslin, Goodheart, & Tuccio, 2011), it was
possible that many codes could be assigned – up to five codes per rater – if the codes
were considered as the union of the set. The union technique provided a distinct list of
total causal codes per ASRS report as well as a count of how many union codes were
used per ASRS report across the SME raters.
Intersection of causal factors. In contrast to the union operation per ASRS
report, an intersection of ratings was also assessed for each ASRS report. The
intersection identified only those codes used by all raters per ASRS report. The
intersection technique generated a list of distinct causal codes per ASRS report used by
all raters as well as a count of these codes.
Merging of data streams. To enable development of a model representative of
RI causation in the US, the data from the RSO and ASRS reports were combined with
results of the literature review in conjunction with SME input resulting in a pool of
potential causal factors. This set of causal factors of RI events is included in this study as
Appendix F. Descriptive quantitative statistics were weighed against review of ASRS
reports highlighted by the SMEs and with consideration of the existing body of research.
Phase 2: Belief Network Model Creation
The initial belief network model structure was generated based on the causal
contributors identified in the review of RI literature in combination with the causal
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factors and interactions identified within ASRS reports in the preceding phase. Once a
list of causal factors was identified from these sources, an influence diagram as discussed
in the literature review was developed in preparation for building the BBN. A panel of
three experts was utilized to iteratively validate an initial model structure by evaluating
the model for completeness and accurate causal interaction and direction. Because of
their familiarity with the model and purpose of the research, the SMEs used for ASRS
case review in phase one of the study were also used for review of the BBN model to
ensure it accurately reflected the combined knowledge of the relevant domains.
Constructing the network model. Building a BBN is a process of structuring
the graphical model and defining the causal dependencies within the graph itself, and this
process can be generally described as a qualitative one. As discussed, the model structure
began with an influence diagram. This process was a means of identifying the “causal,
functional, or information relations among the variables” (Kjaerulff & Madsen, 2008, p.
117). The variables of interest in the present research were identified from the literature
in conjunction with the first phase of the methodology outlined here. In the case of each
variable set to represent a node in the BBN model, a unique set of mutually exclusive
events was described. Examples of such events or states are found in the causal literature
and include items such as intersecting taxiways (yes or no), restrictions to visibility (yes
or no), AMASS system in place (yes or no), etc. Variables within the model were
identified as problem variables of interest, information variables for which data may be
known (background or outcome variables), and mediating or intervening variables, all of
which are connected by edges that represent notions of causality, or as previously
discussed, “the way the world works” (Koller & Friedman, 2009, pp. 52-53). Figure 16
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illustrates a simple, exemplar causal network with each of these variable types
represented in the general directionality of causation (Kjaerulff & Madsen, 2008; Pearl,
2009). Parenthetically noted in each node within Figure 14 are exemplar variables that
apply to RI causation. Special attention during the model building phase was paid to
inclusion of variables that may not be of direct interest, but that serve an important
mediating function and whose exclusion would adversely affect the accuracy of model
results (Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Kjaerulff & Madsen, 2008). Figure 14 contains an
example of this type of variable by including visibility restriction as a mediating variable
between rain and crew distraction and the outcome variable, the inadvertent crossing of
the hold short line. Where data were known for network model nodes, probability
distribution functions were fitted to the data and integrated into the model building
process (Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Darwiche, 2009; and Luxhøj, 2003). The

Background Variable
(Rain)
Problem Variable
(Crew Distraction)

Intervening Variable
(Visibility Restriction)

Outcome Variable
(Cross Hold Short
Line)

Figure 14. Basic BBN causal interaction.
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conditional probabilities that correspond to the random, unknown variables of interest in
the network model were elicited as described in phase three; however, if the model
structure informing the elicitation protocol is incorrect, the risk that elicited information
is inaccurate increases. This being the case, the model structure was finalized through the
iterative, expert review-driven process described here prior to elicitation of expert
opinion for model quantification (Kjaerulff & Madsen, 2008). This process followed the
sequential alpha-level, beta-level, and gamma-level model process described by Marcot,
Steventon, Sutherland, and McCann (2006) and the specification of dependence structure
described by Hanea, Kurowicka, and Cooke (2006). As suggested by Marcot et al., the
model was sequentially revised according to SME comments generated through formal
review based on the principles of the Delphi Method (Landeta, 2006). Like the Delphi
method process, SMEs confidentially reviewed the model structure and answered a set of
structured questions. They were provided feedback based on the combined responses of
other SMEs, and were given the opportunity to refine their opinions on the structure and
content of the model. Diverging somewhat from Kjaerulff and Madsen (2008) and
Marcot et al. (2006), model iterations were made successively more compact to allow for
more efficient verification and validation, as well as elicitation of probability and rank
correlation functions, with a parsimonious variable set and structure. Appendix H gives
the protocol utilized during the model review sessions. For the scope and purpose of this
study, and to minimize measurement errors and error associated with validation
traceability through the dependence structure, the model was condensed to its most basic
structure. While still maintaining adequate resolution, parsimony was achieved using
further input from SMEs coupled with the previously discussed RSO and ASRS data.
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This additional input was again drawn from a structured SME protocol as in the
construction of the more granular model.
Verification and validation of the BBN model. Once the BBN structure was
identified as in the preceding section, the variables were checked for conditionality and
directionality of the edges that connect them (Bedford & Cooke, 2001). In the present
study, the model structure as shown in Figure 14 was initially created by the researcher as
discussed previously, and the structure as well as the directionality of connecting edges
(dependence and independence relationships) was evaluated by domain experts to ensure
that posterior probabilities are correctly indicated. Construction of the model was
approached as a continuous process, wherein the structure underwent revision throughout
review of the literature and the data collection processes outlined in phase one. Structural
issues such as unintended directed cycles were evaluated within the UNINET software
package, though this was also a function of the progressive review process. In the
preceding discussion, moralization of the DAG was briefly discussed in the context of
examining conditional independence. In the present case, the inferential engine for
analysis of the network model is native to the software package and graphically
manipulating the model is unnecessary (Cowell, 1999).

The structure of the network

model was such that domain-specific nodes in the model could be separated within
UNINET, and the networks evaluated separately against available data and SME
judgment. This feature allowed for simplified error tracking across the BBN dependence
structure. Once the model was refined through SME input, it was tested using simple
probability distribution functions, dummy data ranges, and consistent sampling
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constraints (in this case, 30,000) to examine interacting nodes as well as the model output
under controlled, artificial conditions.
The BBN model was created in the UNINET software package, a screen shot of
which is given in Figure 15. UNINET has been used in a variety of modeling studies that
involve the creation of BBNs for simulation, including aviation safety applications (Ale
et al., 2009; Napoles, 2010). Other software packages for BBNs, HUGIN (Handling
Uncertainty in General Inference Network) Expert A/S and BayesiaLab, were evaluated
and salient features are summarized in Table 6. While Figure 15 shows the basic
workspace available in UNINET, Figure 16 is an example of the complexity of a model
with a large number of variables as well as fault and event trees inserted as part of the
BBN developed within the UNINET platform.

Figure 15. UNINET software for Bayesian belief networks.
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Figure 16. Sample BBN with many nodes and edges.

Table 6. Software Packages Evaluated for BBN Development.
Name
BayesiaLab
HUGIN Expert A/S
SamIam
UNINET

Graph Types
Undir/Directed
Undir/Directed
Directed
Undir/Directed

Inference
Joint Tree, Gibbs
Joint Tree
Recursive Conditioning
Vine-Copula/Gaussian

Continuous Nodes
Yes
Yes
Some
Some

The UNINET package used to facilitate this phase of the proposed research
utilized the copula-vine approach (Hanea, Kurowicka, & Cooke, 2006; Napoles, 2010) to
reduce the computational assessment burden ordinarily associated with large, complex
network models and to allow for sampling and analysis through Monte Carlo algorithms,
drawing 32,000 samples by default or as specified by the user (Lighttwist Software, n.d.).
The copula-vine approach was appropriate in this context because it generalizes the
Markov chains often used in high-dimensional problems, and it relies on rank correlation
(as discussed in phase three) as a dependence measure of the copula between two
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variables (Bedford & Cooke, 2002). In addition to simplifying the sampling process, this
removes assumptions of normality often associated with discrete BBNs, and more closely
follows the distributions found in factors associated with RI causation. The sampling
process generates an output from the network model, and though this falls within the
broad scope of the phase of research methodology described here, the sampling and
analysis of the BBN was not possible until the elicitation process was completed and
expert data was processed and populated in UNINET to quantify the model.
Phase 3: Expert Elicitation and Aggregation
Representing the third phase of the research is the selection and elicitation of data
from a group of experts. To enable this approach, Cooke’s classical model guided the
process of expert elicitation (Cooke, 1991). This model structures the elicitation process
such that expert judgment is treated as scientific data and is thus formalized in the
decision-making process through rational consensus. The Classical model is “essentially
a formal method for deriving the requisite weights for a linear pool in which…these
weights are expressed as the product of an individual’s calibration and information
scores” (Aspinall, 2011, p. 3). The aggregation process rewards performance, rather than
consensus, and through the application of a strictly proper scoring rule avoids the pitfalls
of experts who may intentionally or unintentionally attempt to game the system. This
formalization of the elicitation process is advantageous in its transparency, and Appendix
C details the mathematics that underlie the algorithm for combining the sometimes
dissimilar opinions of experts to derive a rationally-derived decision maker.
Data generation and sources. The first step in Cooke’s classical algorithm is the
selection of experts who, through the structured elicitation process of the classical model,
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provide probability-based estimates of uncertainty to quantify the BBN. For the purposes
of this research and as suggested by Cooke and Goossens (1999) and Renooij (2001),
experts were solicited for the study on the basis of the literature review and based on
cumulative experience in the field of aviation as well as on operational and theoretical
knowledge of the relevant domains that affect RIs. This initial identification of an expert
pool was supplemented as outlined in the following process description. Experts were
also expected to be conversant in basic probability calculus such that they are
comfortable expressing their opinions in terms of probability distributions by way of
quantile assessments.
Expert selection. While the meaning of the term expert may be subject to
interpretation, in the present context, Wood and Ford’s (1993) observations about the
differentiation in problem solving between so-called experts and amateurs offered some
guidance in this regard. In particular, Wood and Ford’s assertion that experts base their
opinions less on declarative knowledge than on perceived relationships was important
given that elicitation is presented here as an alternative or supplement to scarce data.
Cooke and Goossens (1999) suggested that an expert is “a person whose present or past
field contains the subject in question, and who is regarded by others as being one of the
more knowledgeable about the subject” (pp. 29-30). Expert selection was based on the
following general criteria suggested in the EU Procedures Guide for Structured Expert
Judgment:
•

reputation in the field of interest,

•

experimental experience in the field of interest,

•

number and quality of publications in the field of interest,
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•

diversity in background,

•

awards received,

•

balance of views, and

•

interest in and availability for the project (Cooke & Goossens, 1999, p. 30).

Though it is mentioned here, the nature of the expertise required for this study did
not lend itself to experts having a number of publications or experimental experience, and
thus these criteria were approached as guidelines, but not requirements. Once potential
experts were identified they were contacted by electronic mail and phone to gauge
interest in participation in the elicitation process. Experts for consideration in this
research consisted of both general practitioners of aviation and aviation safety and
specialists in RI causation and mitigation. During the recruitment process, expert
candidates were interviewed with respect to their own area of expertise as well as for
recommendations of other potential experts (James et al., 2010; O'Hagan et al., 2006).
Where it was not possible to achieve complete impartiality among experts, all practical
efforts were made to clarify any potential conflicts of interest. Cooke and Goossens
(1999) suggest that a minimum of four experts be chosen for any subject area, and that a
good rule of thumb for expert panel size is at least eight members with a representative
diversity among participants. Three domains were identified previously as primary to the
subject of RI research: infrastructure/organizational factors, human factors, and
technological or engineering factors. Consistent with Cooke and Goossens (1999)
recommendations, at least two experts with specific knowledge in each domain were
engaged for the expert judgment process. That three general domains emerged in the
literature review is misleading to an extent, at least as it effects selection of SMEs.
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Appendix D provides general biographical information for the experts used in this phase.
Review of this background information reveals that the panel of experts had extensive
and varied experience from the flight crew, aviation safety, airport operations, and air
traffic perspective. Though Cooke and Goossens (1999) suggest that a larger number of
experts is desirable, O'Hagan and Oakley (2010) caution against groups larger than five
because of the unnecessarily lengthy discussions that may result. In any event, the
minimum size of the expert panel identified herein was bound by the need for appropriate
diversity across relevant domains, and was the subject of evaluation by the researcher in
conjunction with other experts.
Once a pool of potential experts was identified, each was informed of the general
processes, procedures, and expected outcomes of the study, and a curriculum vitae (CV)
for each SME was obtained and retained by the expert as confidential, but available in deidentified format for review as necessary. Expert CVs were reviewed based on the
aforementioned criteria to determine a final list of potential panel members. Because
human subjects were involved in the elicitation process, Institutional Review Board
(IRB) approval was sought concurrently, and each potential expert was advised of the
conditions and risks of participation, including:
•

the subject areas for elicitation,

•

compensation structure,

•

confidentiality,

•

intended distribution of study results, and

•

feedback of elicitation results.
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IRB board approval was obtained in accordance with the most recently adopted
guidelines for Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and in accordance with the IRB
Human Subject Protocol Application Form included as Appendix A to this dissertation.
Appendix B is an unsigned copy of the informed consent form used in the recruitment of
raters and experts.
Upon agreement to participate, each expert was asked to execute a consent form
in accordance with IRB guidelines, and executed forms were retained by the researcher.
Related to the issue of confidentiality is the use of experts’ names within the study results
and associated material. Protection of experts’ reputations is a legitimate concern, and
the use of names and affiliations in the present research must be carefully weighed as a
balance between protection of identity and transparency of the elicitation process. To this
end, Cooke and Goossens (1999) propose the following in the EU Procedures Guide for
Structured Expert Judgment, which were, with the exception of publication of names and
affiliations due to privacy concerns, adopted in this study and communicated to SMEs:
•

Expert names and affiliations are published in the study.

•

All information, including expert names and assessments, is available for
competent peer review, but is not available for unrestricted distribution.

•

Individual assessments are available for unrestricted distribution, assessments
are not associated with names but identified as “expert A, B, C,…” etc.

•

Expert rationales are available for unrestricted distribution.

•

Each individual expert receives feedback on his/her own performance
assessment.
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•

Any further published use of the expert’s name requires the expert’s approval
(p. 31).

The EXCALIBUR software program, which was developed in conjunction with
and with support from the European Union, was used to facilitate the classical model of
elicitation and aggregation (Cooke & Probst, 2006; Ouchi, 2004). EXCALIBUR
processes parametric and quantile uncertainty estimates and calculates expert weights via
the classical elicitation technique. The software has been used extensively for high-level
elicitation studies, including such critical risk assessment exercises such as the evaluation
of eruption risk at Mount Vesuvius, a volcano with the potential to impact millions of
people (Neri et al., 2008). Tyshenko et al. (2011) also successfully used the
EXCALIBUR package in their investigation of the risk of iatrogenic prion transmission,
as did Dawotola, van Gelder, and Vrijling (2011) with respect to risk assessment for
crude oil pipelines. Other elicitation packages exist and were evaluated, including
SHELF (O'Hagan & Oakley, 2010), ELICITOR (Kynn, 2006), and Elicitator (James,
Low Choy, & Mengersen, 2010); however, EXCALIBUR provides the most direct
interface with the classical elicitation method and has seen long-term use in large,
complex, and varied risk assessment studies (Goossens et al., 2008).
Structured expert judgment. Next, each expert was elicited independently to
express their knowledge and degree of uncertainty regarding potential observations. It is
this process, structured as discussed in the preceding section, which allows a joint
probability distribution to be formulated on the basis of a person’s knowledge and beliefs.
After selection, experts were trained on basic probability calculus and logic so that they
were able to express opinions relative to the RI model via probabilistic estimation.
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Training familiarized experts with the expected format of elicited responses. Preelicitation training of experts also included expert completion of estimation training
questions, in which panel members were asked to provide probability estimates in a
variety of formats to prepare for the formal elicitation process. This training was crucial
to the effectiveness and reliability of the elicitation process, and was conducted as a
formal meeting between the researcher and selected experts either in person or through
the combined use of telephone and computer-based video conference (DeWispelare et al.,
1995; Mosleh et al., 1988).
Following training in the basic process of elicitation and in expressing uncertainty
in the form of probabilistic assessments, a facilitator, in this case the author, ascertained
explicit distributions for the selected elements of the model based on answers to specific
questions in the elicitation protocol attached here as Appendix E. In the classical model,
questions are based upon target variables, query variables, and seed variables. In this
study, target variables and query variables generally coincided, and they represented the
variables whose values were elicited for inclusion in the network model. In developing
these variables for elicitation, dependencies were evaluated and prepared for further
assessment by domain experts so that probabilistic dependence between variables could
be identified and accounted for. Seed variables were those for which values are known to
the researcher but not the expert, and that were used in the calibration and aggregation of
expert opinion (Cooke, 1991), and are included in the elicitation protocol in Appendix E.
Bias is a topic of considerable weight in the expert elicitation literature, beginning
largely with the seminal work of (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), which investigated the
implications of common heuristics employed in the judgment of probability and the
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biases to which they lead. Bias is certainly a topic of concern, but (Kynn, 2008) argues
that much of the statistical research on elicitation since Tversky and Kahneman published
their research has failed to address new knowledge in psychology that has refuted many
of the original heuristic-based concerns. This lapse in collaboration between the
statistical and psychological communities creates a form of bias in itself wherein
elicitation researchers may not adequately address the importance of framing elicitation
questions such that bias is systematically avoided ( Clemen & Lichtendahl, 2002;
Garthwaite et al., 2005). After providing quantile estimates for each question, experts
were allowed to evaluate the implied frequencies and distributions of their responses. No
attempt was made to encourage experts to change their estimates, but in some cases,
experts did alter their responses after they were presented with a distribution or after
reviewing frequency of events on various scales. Aside from providing process feedback
during elicitation to reduce bias, elicitation questions were framed to:
•

encourage rule-based approaches,

•

focus on an expert’s specific domain,

•

incorporate assigned confidence,

•

avoid extreme probabilities,

•

require repetitive sampling of knowledge, and

•

allow for deliberate practice (Kynn, 2008; Martin et al., 2012; O'Hagan et al.,
2006; Renooij, 2001; Renooij and Witteman, 1999; Speirs-Bridge et al.,2010)

Since probability distributions are the desired outcome of the elicitation process, and
direct elicitation of rare event probabilities has been shown to increase bias through
overconfidence (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kynn, 2008), questioning focused instead
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on interval elicitation. These intervals were elicited as a four-step procedure as outlined
by Speirs-Bridge et al. (2010), the defining feature of which is that experts were asked to
estimate their level of confidence that the interval captures the true value along with
assessing the lower bound, upper bound, and most likely values. This questioning format
was merged with the basic procedures suggested by Cooke (1991) and Cooke &
Goossens (1999), to maintain the integrity of the classical model.
Unique to the study here was the method by which rank correlation and
dependence information was elicited from SMEs. Ordinarily, the Classical model
specifies that rank and dependence information is gathered through questions that closely
follow the probabilistic calculus used to interpret it. While this has been demonstrated in
the literature (Cooke & Goossens, 2006; Morales, Kurowicka, & Roelen 2008), it is also
the case that experts in more operationally-focused research are uncomfortable answering
such questions or find the process cumbersome, potentially affecting the quality of
results. In this study, experts were first asked to address questions that conformed to the
typical, Classical format, as in Morales, Kurowicka, and Roelen (2008). These questions
took the general form of: What is the probability that w is above its qwth quantile given
that x is above its qxth quantile, y is above its qyth quantile and z is above its qzth
quantile? Their responses suggested that a more intuitive elicitation format might
improve expert understanding of the dependence structure under question, and the
protocol was modified to ask experts questions based to some extent on the format
suggested by Roelen, van Baren, Morales, and Krugla (2008) in their development of a
model for aviation maintenance behavior. Merging SME feedback with ideas from the
Roelen et al study, a new questioning format was developed and tested for elicitation of
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rank correlation information. The validity of the questioning protocol was assured
through the literature review, by consultation with researchers in the field (Dr. R. Cooke,
Dr. M. Wittmann, personal communication, 2013), and through comparison with the
body of research in structured expert judgment (see Goossens, et al., 2008). These
questions asked experts to rank variables by assigning an order to each variable
indicating influence in descending order. The most influential variable was then inserted
into a rank correlation question typical of the Classical model. Experts were then asked
to quantify the influence of the remaining variables as a percentage of the influence of the
highest weighted variable. Rank correlation values were then calculated based on these
responses using UNINET. Appendix E details the questions presented to SMEs.
On the basis that the overarching purpose of the elicitation process is to obtain a
prior distribution, distributions were fitted to the elicited intervals and available for
feedback to experts (Garthwaite et al., 2005). The EXCALIBUR software package was
used for this function along with MS Excel in real-time during the elicitation as well as
for post-elicitation analyses. The four-step process of obtaining intervals minimized the
possibility of overly-simplistic intervals by eliminating the untenable belief that the
parameter of interest lies at or close to the limits as may be suggested by only specifying
a range. This process of over-fitting allowed more accurate evaluation of elicitation data
once the collection and fitting of opinions was complete. Once elicitation was
accomplished and fit to a minimally informative distribution, the adequacy of the elicited
data was evaluated as an extension of the feedback process, by highlighting and
reframing to experts the implications of the elicited values and confirming for each
elicited value that these are satisfactory representations of the experts’ beliefs. (O'Hagan
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Figure 17. Expert elicitation process overview.

et al., 2006). Figure 17 illustrates the recursive process of elicitation as described here.
Assessment of the adequacy of elicited data has been mentioned briefly in
previous discussions of feedback and over-fitting, both of which serve as tools for
evaluation of expert- derived data. Feedback was presented to expert panelists to confirm
that the assumed distribution form is a reasonable representation of each expert’s ideas
(Garthwaite, Kadane, & O'Hagan, 2005; Kynn, 2008). When distributions were
inaccurate representations of an expert’s beliefs, he or she was given the opportunity to
revise earlier estimates. Humans are generally poor judges of probability by distribution
alone (O'Hagan et al., 2006), so while feedback was utilized, the concept of over-fitting
was used to expose inconsistent answers during the elicitation process. The four-step
elicitation procedure discussed previously allowed this opportunity by asking for more
information than is necessary to establish a parametric probability distribution. This not
only reduced expert overconfidence, it permitted testing for coherence and refinement of
the best-fit distribution to the elicited data (Garthwaite et al., 2005; Speirs-Bridge et al.,
2010).
Using the basic format described by Figure 17, reliability and validity were
continuously assessed. From the perspective of face and construct validity, iterative
review of the protocol for elicitation with outside experts in structured expert judgment
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ensured that the content and structure of the questions was sound. The four-step
procedure for elicitation and provision of feedback served as a means of assuring
reliability, and bias was also controlled in this way as previously discussed. Though in
the context of structured expert judgment, it is implausible to quantify these measures,
the steps outlined here were carefully constructed to limit threats to reliability and
validity, and the elicited data were found to be acceptable for further analysis.
Aggregation of elicited data. The literature review segment of this research and
supplemental information in Appendix C covers in detail the elements of Cooke’s
classical model for elicitation and aggregation of expert opinion. As was described, the
experts’ data was subjected to the classical model weighting scheme based on the seed
variable answers, and the weighted answers from all experts were pooled to provide a
rational consensus judgment (Cooke, 1991; Cooke, 2009). The key feature of the
Classical model is the performance-based aggregation of experts’ uncertainty
assessments, rewarding expert performance as opposed to consensus. As a measure of
both calibration and information, which are related to the concepts of precision and
accuracy, the Classical model prevents gaming the system through strictly proper scoring
and rewards only an expert whose assessments perform well, are informative, and are in
accordance with his or her true beliefs. Robustness analysis of calibration questions and
of expert influence on the decision maker was also performed using the remove one-at-atime method detailed by Cooke (1991). The elicitation and aggregation processes were
managed in the EXCALIBUR (Goossens et al., 2008) software package using the
Classical method algorithms discussed in more detail in Appendix C. The results section
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of this study presents in greater detail the aggregation of expert judgment using decision
maker (DM) optimization as well as equal weighting for comparison (Cooke, 1991).
Once expert data were obtained through the structured elicitation process,
minimally informative distributions fitted to the data, and aggregation of expert
judgments completed, the data were inputted into UNINET for quantification of the
model. Where data existed, as in the case of mechanical failure or some weather-related
nodes, those data were also fitted to a distribution and entered into UNINET. Once the
model was quantified within the software platform, sampling and subsequent analytic
conditioning was performed. In the case of UNINET, real-time analytic sampling was
conducted on a single value across probabilistic nodes, and sample-based conditioning
was also used to conditionalize on specific points or intervals as appropriate (Lighttwist
Software, n.d.).
Quantification and Interpretation of the Model
After completion of the first three methodological phases of the study, it was
necessary to combine the information collected through the structured expert judgment
process with the model structure developed in the second phase and informed by the first.
This process was accomplished using the UNINET software package described
previously, and expert-elicited uncertainty distributions and rank correlation information
were entered into the model created and iteratively validated in phase two of this
research. Following elicitation of uncertainty distributions and derivation of the DM for
model target variables, UNINET was once again used to input model quantification
parameters. Using the uncertainty analysis platform UNICORN (Kurowicka & Cooke,
2006) and Oracle Crystal Ball to analyze the output from EXCALIBUR following the
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structured expert judgment sessions allowed distributions shapes and parameters to be
evaluated and verified for entry in the BBN model. This allowed confirmation of
minimally informative distribution properties prior to entry in UNINET, and independent
samples from the distributions were compared between platforms to ensure accuracy in
data entry. Figure 18 shows a partial view of the distribution specification function
within the UNINET software package. Each variable was quantified using a similar
process within the program, with expected differences based on the type of distribution
and whether the variable was to be quantified by existing data or expert-elicited data.
Rank correlation scores were calculated separately and entered into UNINET to
support the model dependence structure. Figure 19 illustrates an example screen showing
the entry of rank and correlation information into the model. Readers should note that the
probabilities elicited from SMEs in the preceding phase differ from rank correlation,
which is calculated separately. Recalling that experts were asked to characterize

Figure 18. Partial screen capture of UNINET variable distribution entry.
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Figure 19. Entry window for rank and correlation information.

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-1

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Figure 20. Probability of exceedance (y-axis) versus rank correlation (x-axis).
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dependent relationships in the form of probabilities of exceedance, rank correlations were
required to be calculated based on the relationship with the normal copula as shown in
Figure 20. Because the conditional probability is transformed to rank correlation such
that for any q in the exceedance probability equation (Equation 4), the probability is
reflected as P1 = q-1, any value other than 0.5 for q limits P and makes the choice of
copula more impactful on conditional probability (Morales, Kurowicka, & Roelen, 2008).
Because elicited probabilities were in the interval (0,1), and only values above 0.5 (given
the choice of 0.5 for q) reflect as positively correlated, the absolute values given by
SMEs were converted to the scale imposed by the rank correlation transformation rather
than burdening experts with additional restrictions on their responses. In this process,
intentional negative correlation values were converted to the interval (0, 0.5) and positive
values were transformed to the interval (0.5, 1). This was confirmed with the SMEs to
maintain integrity of the probability assignment task and the relative values intended by
the experts. These values were then entered into UNINET as discussed here.
Figure 20 addresses only the issue of rank correlation when it is not conditioned
by additional parents. In the case of multiple parent nodes as were present in the model
in this study, conditional rank correlation must also be calculated from the exceedance
probabilities elicited from experts. In the present case, the highest rank correlation
identified in the elicitation was formulated as an exceedance probability question as a
means of determining:
𝑒

𝑒

𝑒

𝑖
𝑖
𝑅1 𝑖 = 𝑃�𝑋5 ≥ 𝑥5,𝑞50
|𝑋1 ≥ 𝑥1,𝑞50
�

The relationship between Equation 4 and rank correlation as plotted in Figure 20 was
computed by integrating the bivariate normal density over the quantile’s exceedance

(4)
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region, using Equation 5 to first determine product moment correlation, and then
transforming product moment correlation to rank correlation via Equation 6 (see also
Cooke, 1991; Cooke and Goossens, 1999; Kurowicka and Cooke, 2006; Morales,
Kurowicka, and Roelen, 2008; and Morales, Cooke, and Kurowicka, 2008):
1

1−𝑞

where:

∞

∞

∫Φ−1 (𝑞) ∫Φ−1 (𝑞) 𝜙(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝜌1,2 )𝑑𝑥1 𝑑𝑥2

(5)

Φ−1 is the inverse normal cumulative density function;
𝜙(𝑥1 𝑥2 , 𝜌1,2 ) is the bivariate normal density;
𝜌 is the product moment correlation; and

𝑞 is the selected quantile for exceedance.

𝜋

𝜌 = 2 sin �6 𝑟�

where:

(6)

𝑟 is the rank correlation.

The remaining rank correlations for each ratio exceedance question set in the elicitation
session were calculated as a function of their ratio with the next assessment in the rank
hierarchy, as in:
𝑒

𝑅2𝑖 =

where:

𝑒

𝑖
𝑟2,5
𝑒

𝑖
𝑟1,5

𝑒

𝑅2𝑖 is the elicited exceedance probability; and
𝑒

𝑟1,5𝑖 is the rank correlation calculated in Equations 4 through 6.
which was bounded by the next higher ranked estimate.

(7)
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The primary goal of the three fundamental phases of this research was to create
and analyze a quantified Bayesian belief network model representative of the dynamic
interaction of causal factors that lead to RIs. Essentially then, the desired outcome was a
model that supports sensitivity analysis, including that of the model parameters, though
such analysis was not completed in substantial depth here. In the scope of the present
research, the desire for sensitivity analysis is purposely constrained to identification of
those causal interactions, or paths, and factors that contribute most to the undesired
outcome, in this case an RI event. The software UNIGRAPH and UNISENS (both
developed in conjunction with UNINET and cooperatively with the Technical University
of Delft) supports evaluation of the BBN simulation via graphical analysis using cobweb
plots and through sensitivity measures including product moment correlation, rank
correlation, regression coefficient, correlation ratio, and partial regression coefficient in
conjunction with scatterplots (Lighttwist Software, n.d.). UNINET also allows
conditioning of models on specific values or intervals, and the model was conditioned to
evaluate causation in the ordinary sense, but also from the perspective of reverse
propagation, the results of which are presented in the following chapter. Using these
tools, the mechanics of the BBN model were evaluated to ensure that the model
adequately supported further research, which may include evaluation of mitigation
strategies or updating based on technological or infrastructural changes.
Methodological Validation
Several methods were used in an iterative process to develop the model described
here, and as such, validation followed a similarly iterative progression. In cases where
data were available, the population was used, and establishing the validity of the data was
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less concerning. However, where probabilistic data were used, it was generally infeasible
to separate the data into sets to allow testing and evaluation. Instead, each phase of the
modeling approach relied on several sources, including expert review and opinion, to
triangulate the structure of the model and the elicitation of data. As detailed in the
respective phases of the methodology, accepted mathematical algorithms exist for
evaluating the structure and quality of the BBN as well as the expert opinion. These
performance measures were carefully considered for each phase, and modeling processes
and rationale that extended beyond a single phase were continuously evaluated for fitness
of purpose and methodological transparency in cooperation with the expert panels used
throughout. Where within-phase processes could not be verified using the techniques
described, the phased approach was discontinued until such concerns were resolved and
documented. The results presented in the following section present these processes in
more detail for each phase of the study.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This study addressed the understanding of causal factors and interactions leading
to RI events in the U.S. In particular, attention was given to the lack of detailed data on
many identified causal elements and relationships. A BBN model was formulated to
combine sparse available data with data obtained through structured expert judgment and
allow updating as new knowledge becomes available. This research was conducted
through a mixed-method process of data acquisition, an iterative model building method,
and a structured approach to model quantification through expert elicitation. Based on
the phased methodological approach to this study and the differing outcomes of interest,
results are presented separately for each phase.
Phase 1: Runway Incursion Data and Causal Factors
Phase one of this study sought to triangulate data from multiple sources with
information gained through systematic literature review. As discussed previously, RI
event data were collected from ASRS and RSO sources to supplement findings from the
literature review. Table 7 summarizes the RSO data used by type of operation, including
breakdown by Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part. RSO data included 6,185
records for RI events after basic data screening operations. By contrast, using a search
string structured as shown in Table 8 yielded 81 ASRS valid records for SME review.
Seventy-one ASRS cases were retained after removal of reports where two or more raters
agreed the case was an exception and should be removed from further review. ASRS
reports were categorized according to type of operation as shown in Table 9.
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Table 7. RSO Data Summary of Operation Type.
Type Operation
91
N/A
121
135
129
Vehicle
Military
Maintenance
Pedestrian
125
Total

Count Percentage
2918
47.2
1592
25.7
1095
17.7
232
3.8
106
1.7
97
1.6
79
1.3
41
.7
18
.3
6
.1
6185
100.0

Table 8. ASRS Search String Criteria.
Search Field
Date/Report
Number:
Event Type:
Reporter Function:

Text Contains:

Search Criteria
January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2012
Ground Incursion: Runway or Taxiway
Flight Crew: Captain or Check Pilot or First Officer or Flight
Engineer / Second Officer or Instructor or Other / Unknown or
Pilot Flying or Pilot Not Flying or Relief Pilot or Single Pilot or
Trainee
“incursion” in ASRS narrative

Table 9. ASRS Reports Summary of Operation Type
Type Operation
121
91
Other
91K
Military
135
Total

Count Percentage
32
39.5%
30
37.0%
8
9.9%
5
6.2%
3
3.7%
3
3.7%
81

100.0%
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Over the study period, 2,918 Part 91 aircraft were involved in reported RI
incidents as opposed to 1,095 and 232 aircraft operating under Parts 121 and 135,
respectively. However, ASRS records indicated that these operation types were reversed
in their frequency of RI involvement, with 43.2 percent of cases involving Part 121 or
135 aircraft versus 37 percent attributed to Part 91 operators. In part, the literature and
SME input indicated that there is a higher incidence of self-reporting via ASRS reports
among commercial operators than for those involved in Part 91 operations. This is
confirmed through searching the entire ASRS database, which shows reports by Part 121
and 135 operators outnumber those by Part 91 operators by more than two to one. This
apparent underreporting by noncommercial operators was not unexpected, and was one
reason multiple streams of data were evaluated.
One such stream of data came in the form of SME identification of causal factors
in ASRS-reported RI events. SMEs were tasked with review of 71 ASRS cases after data
cleaning, and agreement between raters was evaluated by a modified application of
Cohen’s kappa as well as through union and intersection operations. Interrater reliability
remained higher than the widely accepted (Leech, Barrett, & Morgan, 2008) minimum of
0.70 (shown in Figure 21) for matches of one and two ICAO causal codes; however,
kappa decreased rapidly for cases of three, four, or five matching codes. This decreased
convergence between rater pairs was likely a function of the possible combinations
available to each SME for each ASRS case: up to 1,533,939 assuming five causal factors
were used in a case. Reliability measures were supplemented with intersection and union
operations to further understand rater responses. If all raters had used different, unique
codes across a single case, the union should have reflected the maximum number of 15.
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Pairwise Rater Agreement (Per Number of Matched Causal Codes)

Figure 21. Interrater agreement (kappa).

Instead, union most frequently ranged from three to five unique codes for a given case,
which indicated some level of consolidation of causation, even if not in perfect agreement
across raters as shown in Figures 22 and 23.
Among the raters, certain codes were used more than others, and in some cases
were not used at all. Whereas the code describing a failure to obtain Automatic Terminal
Information System (ATIS) details was used infrequently, crew failure to adhere to hold
short instructions from ATC was the most commonly appearing code. Table 10 lists
causal codes and gives count and percentage figures for each. A complete list of
available codes is provided in Appendix F.
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Figure 22. Union count by case.

Figure 23. Intersected code frequency.
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Table 10. Use Count by Causal Code.
Code Count Cum. Count
%
Cum. %
2.2.15
49
49 10.04
10.04
2.4.5
45
94 9.22
19.26
2.2.5
38
132 7.79
27.05
2.2.10
34
166 6.97
34.02
2.4.1
33
199 6.76
40.78
2.3.4
30
229 6.15
46.93
2.2.1
22
251 4.51
51.43
2.2.6
20
271 4.10
55.53
2.4.11
18
289 3.69
59.22
2.5.1
18
307 3.69
62.91
2.1.11
17
324 3.48
66.39
2.3.7
15
339 3.07
69.47
2.4.2
14
353 2.87
72.34
2.2.2
13
366 2.66
75.00
2.3.6
13
379 2.66
77.66
2.1.9
11
390 2.25
79.92
2.2.13
9
399 1.84
81.76
2.2.7
8
407 1.64
83.40
2.1.3
7
414 1.43
84.84
2.3.3
7
421 1.43
86.27
2.2.9
6
427 1.23
87.50
2.2.14
6
433 1.23
88.73
2.3.2
6
439 1.23
89.96
2.3.8
6
445 1.23
91.19
2.4.6
6
451 1.23
92.42
2.2.4
5
456 1.02
93.44
2.4.4
5
461 1.02
94.47
2.4.9
5
466 1.02
95.49
2.1.4
4
470 0.82
96.31
2.1.7
4
474 0.82
97.13
2.3.1
4
478 0.82
97.95
2.2.3
2
480 0.41
98.36
2.2.11
2
482 0.41
98.77
2.4.3
2
484 0.41
99.18
2.4.10
2
486 0.41
99.59
2.1.2
1
487 0.20
99.80
2.3.5
1
488 0.20 100.00
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In addition to assigning ICAO causal codes to ASRS reports, SMEs provided
comments on a many reports. These comments also added depth of understanding to
cases where raters agreed or disagreed, and as shown in ASRS report 939675, where
raters agreed on assignment of the 2.4.5 causal code, other themes were also apparent:
We were cleared to taxi via Taxiway D1, D, and A3, hold short of Runway 3/21 by
Ground Control and told to contact Tower upon reaching the hold markings on
Taxiway A3 at Runway 3/21. Upon contacting Tower we were instructed to hold
short of Runway 11L. Upon receiving this instruction I assumed there was a
separate hold line for Runway 11L and began taxiing across the hold line for
Runway 3/21 at Taxiway A3. When crossing this hold line I realized that there
was not a separate hold line for Runway 11L. I promptly turned right onto
Runway 3/21 to leave the extended centerline for Runway 11L. An aircraft on
final was asked to go-around. We had the airport diagram out as we were
taxiing, but it was unclear as to whether there was a hold line for Runway 11L at
Taxiway A3. Construction was occurring on Taxiway A, closing many of the exit
taxiways off of Runway 11L. Aircraft were having to back taxi on the active
runway to exit the runway at Taxiway D and Runway 11L thereby causing
confusion and crowded conditions at the intersections around where Runways
11L/29R and 3/21 intersected.
This particular report not only represented an example of agreement across experts on a
causal code, it also highlighted the complex causation that characterized RI events by
identifying lost situational awareness, airport unfamiliarity, construction, back-taxi, and
intersection complexity as contributing factors. Beyond the emic perspective of
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causation, reports also offered an insider perspective on how flight crews identified
avoidance procedures for the future, as in ASRS report 974660:
The corrective actions I need to take: Minimize distractions while in critical
phase of flight/taxi-only monitor one frequency at a time. If any doubt exists,
bring aircraft to an immediate stop and clarify instruction. Ensure both crew
members have their heads up looking outside during all critical phases.
SMEs also used the 2.2.5 causal code for unfamiliar airport layout with frequency, as in
ASRS report 969670, where all SMEs agreed on the code’s use:
Upon exiting Runway 15 at DCA, we were instructed by Tower to hold short of
Runway 19 at Taxiway M. The First Officer read back the instructions which I
then repeated to him. The hold short line for 15 and 19 are extremely close
together (there is insufficient room for larger aircraft to exit 15 fully and still
remain short of 19 on Taxiway M). By the time I had acknowledged the hold
short instructions we had cleared the first hold short line (exiting Runway 15),
and about to cross the hold short line for Runway 19. I had confused this hold
short line for the 15 hold short line, and passed the Runway 19 hold short line
before realizing my error. ATC repeated the hold short instructions. Once clear
of conflicting traffic, ATC cleared us to cross Runway 19 and taxi to the gate. My
limited familiarity with DCA airport and high workload caused the momentary
confusion which led to the incursion. The approach and runway exiting plan was
briefed thoroughly during the approach briefing. We had the airport diagram to
refer to and knew our taxi route, which included the 'Hot Spots' (one happens to
be at taxiway M on the other side of Runway 19 (the terminal side)). We still
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nevertheless managed to miss the hold short line, meaning that additional
vigilance was needed. I would suggest A 'Hot Spot' or a note on the 10-9 airport
diagram at Taxiway M between Runway 15/33 and 1/19 could provide an
additional safety measure. Additionally, it should be noted that there is
insufficient room for larger aircraft to exit 15 fully and still remain short of 19 on
Taxiway M.
As in the previous examples, the emic view of the event addressed important interactions
leading to the RI, and reviewing cases with universal SME agreement or comments
allowed for a more complete understanding of RSO data and findings of previous
research and a more intuitive approach to development of the model.
The frequency of code use was interesting in that it suggested certain
combinations of codes that grouped together thematically. Unused codes were also
telling in this way. Figure 24 illustrates the relative proportion with which codes were
assigned by raters. Figure 25 graphically presents some of the most commonly emerging
themes based on causal code assignment and rater comments, with word size within the
figure indicating the relative frequency with which certain words or phrases were
identified by the SME panel. The literature initially suggested that human factors,
organizational, and technological domains existed to describe RI causation. These
domains were confirmed by the emerging themes from ASRS review, and they were
expanded to include weather and the operational environment.
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Figure 24. Proportional ASRS causal code assignment by SMEs.

Figure 25. Word cloud of SME causal codes and comments.
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Phase 2: Belief Network Model
Review of the literature on RI occurrence and prevention provided a list of
domains, concepts, and factors relative to causation of incursion-type incidents. Analysis
of RSO data alongside the ASRS data and SME-coded, casewise causal factors and
comments allowed for a database of causal factors to be created on which to base the
influence diagram and network model. Using this set of variables, an initial model
structure was constructed from 58 variables within the organizational, operational, human
factors, weather, and technological domains, and after iterative review by SMEs, the
model was arranged as shown in Figure 26. This SME review was conducted
individually, with feedback and a structured series of questions following the general
principles of the Delphi method as outlined in the previous chapter. The parsimonious
representation of the model, which was derived from expert consensus and supported by
the literature and data reviewed in phase one, includes 27 nodes and is shown in Figure
27. This model retained the same basic dependence structure and thematic elements as
the complete model, and is compatible with the results from phase one while easing the
computational burden of verification and validation of what is demonstrably a new
representation of RI causation and dependence. Furthermore, this approach supports the
additive philosophy of this study in that verification and validation of the parsimonious
model leads naturally to expansion of such efforts into the more granular, detailed model.
Aggregating nodes within each domain were connected by converging directed edges to a
central, probabilistic node that addresses the requirement of the RI definition for the
“incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person” (EASA, 2011, p. v; ICAO, 2007, p.
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Figure 26. Full BBN model structure after SME review.

vii). Inter-domain edges connect related factors, illustrating the conditioning of one or
more nodes on the variable state of another node or nodes.
Aside from nodes capturing airport construction, 14 CFR Part 139, non-towered
airfields, darkness, visibility, precipitation, and mechanical failure, the model was
quantified with data generated through expert judgment, as outlined in the following
section. A complete list of variables and their definitions is included in the elicitation
protocol and in Appendix J. Appendix K includes more detailed figures of the domain
segments for each model. As discussed previously, the model was initially qualified with
artificial distributions and dummy rank coefficients to test for function and correctness of
dependence relationships. In this context, the model functioned as expected.
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Figure 27. Parsimonious BBN structure after SME review.

Phase 3: Structured Elicitation
Structured expert elicitation was conducted to determine marginal distributions
for variables where data were sparse or unavailable, to verify and validate model
structure, and to quantify dependencies among interacting variables. Experts were
presented with questions to which answers were known with certainty, and their
responses were used to calibrate expert performance weights, as described in detail in
Cooke (1991) and Cooke and Goossens (2000). Global and equal weight decision maker
(DM) performance and information scores for the six experts across the 10 calibration
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questions used for this study are given in Table 11. These weights were applied to the
marginal distribution and rank correlation elicitations within the scoring rules of the
Classical model to achieve rational consensus among the expert judgments and calculate
a DM based on the composite of expert performance and information. Decision maker
responses to the seed variable (calibration) questions are given as range graphs in Figure
28 with the realization for each question indicated by the red hash mark and the DM
range bounded by the 5th and 95th percentiles and the most likely value shown as the
asterisk within the range. Range graphs for all experts over all questions are shown in
Appendix I. Robustness analysis on seed items as well as on experts was completed, the
results of which are reported as Figures 29 and 30, respectively.
Of note, and discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, is that a single
expert was used in the derivation of the global-weight DM. Equal weighting, as the name
implies, treats all experts’ responses equally in calculating the DM. The results in Table
11 indicate that the Classical model global weighting and scoring method resulted in a
higher calibration score, which can be interpreted similarly to p-value, though it is
relative to 1 rather than 0 (values closer to 1 indicate better performance). In this way,
calibration score is a reflection of an expert’s assessments as compared to seed variable
realizations. It is a means of expressing the degree to which the data supports the
hypothesis that an expert’s probability estimates are accurate (Aspinall, 2011). In this
study, one expert (Expert B) was found to exhibit a relatively higher likelihood of
uncertainty distributions reflecting true values, as shown in the calibration score column
of Table 11. This result is discussed in more detail in the following chapter. The higher
calibration score of the global-weight DM compared to the equal-weight DM indicated
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Table 11. Results of Scoring Experts.
Expert Calibration
ID
Score
A
B
C
D
E
F
Global
Equal

.0750
.7069
.0471
.0008
.0063
.0471
.7069
.5503

Mean
Mean. Rel. Un-Norm.
Rel.
Realization
Weight
Total
1.8684
1.1045
0
1.0943
.9585
.6776
1.8177
1.2731
0
.8648
1.2680
0
1.8577
1.9258
0
1.7909
1.0974
0
1.0943
.9585
.6776
.3595
.2771
.1525

Norm.
Weight w/o
DM
0
1
0
0
0
0
---

Norm.
Weight w/
DM

Figure 28. Range graph of Global DM assessments of seed variables (calibration
questions).

0
.5
0
0
0
0
.5
.1469
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Figure 29. Item-wise robustness analysis.

Figure 30. Expert-wise robustness analysis.

that the global-weight DM performed best, and should be used in favor of an equalweight DM (or other methods of consensus) to quantify the BBN model. Though the
individual calibration scores are included in Table 11, they provide detail on the DM only
and were not used individually to quantify the model.
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On the basis of the global-weight pooling of the Classical model, a DM was
derived, and the uncertainty assessments of the DM are shown in Figure 28 with respect
to the true values, or realizations, of the seed variables. Readers will note that in two
cases, the DM failed to capture the true value of the calibration variables. This was
expected based on the responses of the most highly-weighted expert, as presented in
Appendix I, which also includes DM uncertainty distributions across the set of target
variables. Although this is the case, the DM correctly captures the seed variable value in
80 percent of the calibration questions.
Robustness analysis was performed on a case-wise and on an item-wise basis to
evaluate the impact of each question and expert on the global-weight DM. As shown in
Figure 29, removal of seed variable questions influences the DM calibration score. As an
example, removal of CQ3 from the 10-question seed variable pool reduced the calibration
score of the global-weight DM to 0.4792 from 0.7069. As higher calibration scores
(closer to 1.0) are more desirable, this was an indicator of the relative importance of CQ3
to the derivation of the DM. Figure 28 illustrates the results of a similar method of
analysis with focus on the influence of individual experts. The DM was based on the
assessments of Expert B as shown in Table 11, and the relative influence of this expert is
confirmed in Figure 30. Removal of Expert B from the analysis would have resulted in a
lowered calibration score for the global-weight DM from 0.7069 to 0.4735.
Model Quantification
Quantification of the model consisted in part of calculation and entry of rank
correlation data as well as evaluation, validation, and input of DM uncertainty
distributions into the model. A complete correlation matrix, which shows all correlation

108

(2)
(1)

(3)
(4)
Figure 31. Organizational /regulatory subnet with rank correlation coefficients.

Table 12. Dependence Information.
P1
P2
P3

Probability

0.65
0.55
0.46

r4,1
r4,2| 1
r4,3 | 1, 2

Rank Correlation

0.84
0.46
0.38

pairs and rank correlation values, is included as Appendix L. Illustrating the premise of
the rank correlation and the difference in coefficients are Figure 29 and Table 12, which
focus on the results of a single domain subnet.
Field data and data from the structured expert judgment phase were also entered
into the model as described previously. Figure 32 shows a high level overview of how
the model treats the uncertainty distributions and functions as a continuous, dynamic
network. Appendix M includes more detailed information on the quantified nodes and
rank correlation for each domain subnet. In Figure 32, the central nodes (child nodes) of
each domain, the node representing incorrect position, and the RI probability node are
represented as histograms. The baseline probability of the model for RI occurrence was
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0.000525, or roughly 525 RI occurrences per million flight operations. Relative to the RI
rate per million operations figures reported by the FAA, which was nearly 19 in the most
recent Runway Safety Report (see Figure 1), the model performance appears to
overestimate the occurrence of RI events by a substantial margin. However, a key feature
of the model is that it aims to predict occurrences at all airports and inclusive of all
operations types within the US, not solely those with an ATC facility, and thus this result
is not altogether unexpected or unusual. Given this, the model was acceptable in its baserate prediction, and was validated for the purposes of further analysis.

Figure 32. Final, quantified model with domain nodes, improper position, and runway
incursion as histograms.
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Figure 33 is a closer view of the central part of the model as shown in Figure 27,
though in Figure 33 the model has been conditionalized (analyzed based on a manually
selected point sample for one or more variables in the model) on the RI variable to
examine the effect of reverse propagation of RI occurrence on the causal, dependent
model structure. The updated histograms based on the conditioning show black while the
original, unconditionalized distributions are displayed as grey. The model was also
conditionalized to propagate evidence as it would normally occur. Based on the data and
SME input from earlier phases, complex intersections and task saturation were identified
as having strong correlation directly to RI events or to other causal factors. In Figure 34,
the results of conditionalizing on these two variables at values substantially above

Figure 33. Final model conditionalized on RI occurrence.
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Figure 34. Propagation of evidence through the model.

median are shown. At the extreme values entered for the variables of interest, the
probability of RI increased from 0.0005 to 0.0107. This attribute of propagating evidence
through the network is one of the defining characteristics of a BBN, as discussed earlier,
and allows both diagnostic and predictive reasoning. Some of the more telling results of
back propagating on the occurrence of an RI are illustrated in Table 13, which shows
selected relative increases from baseline resulting from conditionalizing on RI occurrence
for variables exhibiting high rank correlation within their domain. When an RI is forced
in the model, the variables in Table 13 increase as shown, indicating to some extent the
strength of association with an RI event.
Using UNISENS and UNIGRAPH, sensitivity analysis was performed to assess
the prominent interactions between model variables, with particular attention paid to
those interfaces that occurred across domains. Analysis of the entire model was
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Table 13. Effect on Selected Variables of RI Occurrence.
Variable
Inadequate Supervision/Climate
Complex Intersection
Airport Construction Present
Task Saturation
Failure to Hold Short
Sun Glare

Approx. % Increase from Baseline
92%
28%
62%
57%
164%
251%

consistent with data obtained during the literature review and in phases one and three of
this study, showing that human-centric errors such as lost situational awareness and task
saturation were influential individual factors. By looking at each domain in terms of
sensitivity analysis and identifying associations, however, causal paths became clearer.
Within the organizational and regulatory domain, procedural deviation was most
predictive of abnormal factors in that area. Procedural deviation was joined to task
saturation by a directed arc in the model, as were several other variables, indicating these
connections may warrant further investigation. Table 14 gives the most influential single
variable within each domain and presents linear least squares fitted regression coefficient
and correlation ratio, the squared product moment correlation that maximizes the
correlation value, for each. Correlation ratio was used here to interpret the ratio of
variance of variable Y given X and the variance of Y. As indicated in Table 14,
mechanical failure has an unusually high relative regression coefficient, though this is
explained by the combined effects that a failure in a braking or steering system may have,
combined with the rarity of these events.
To look at these interactions in more detail, and bearing in mind that human
factors were shown to have the strongest causal influence on RI events, additional
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Table 14. Regression and Correlation Coefficients for Selected Variables.
Predicted
Variable
Org_RegulatoryFactors
OperationalEnvironmentFactors
HumanFactors
WeatherFactors
Tech_EngineeringFactor

Base
Variable
ProceduralDev
AirportConst
FailedHoldShort
SunGlare
MechFail

Correlation
Ratio
0.5529
0.7906
0.5495
0.5747
0.5765

Regression
Coefficient
0.6636
0.8590
2.1218
0.7735
14679.6211

sensitivity analysis was performed on all other random variables as predictors of
abnormal human factors conditions. Mechanical failures ranked highest from a
regression standpoint, a result that was not surprising given the disruptive nature of
systems failures on operator performance noted in the literature and by SMEs. Somewhat
unanticipated however was that restrictions to visibility, including sun glare, had even
more strength of influence than factors and constructs such as airport construction or high
workload. Arguably, weather related factors are less variable and known with greater
certainty that the organizational and operational environment factors that follow them in
magnitude of association, and thus illustrate that sensitivity analysis alone does not
explain the model completely, which must instead be evaluated on the basis of many
factors within the model. It was used, however, to further validate the model by allowing
variable sensitivity and covariance to be evaluated once again for dependence and
retention in the model structure to verify that parsimony was achieved as intended.
UNIGRAPH output lent further illumination to the results discussed previously by
graphically presenting selected dependence information. In Figure 35, the left most
variable is runway incursion, with high values of runway incursion selected (above 0.75)
and the resultant values for additional model variables shown. Quite logically, the figure
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illustrates that for high values of RI occurrence, failure to hold short and incorrect
position are also high. Also worth noting in Figure 33 is that procedural deviation and
task saturation are also quite high. To a lesser extent, airport construction and
conflicting vehicle traffic are also elevated above median. However, darkness/twilight
and ATC equipment failure are both generally lower values (centered about the median)
when compared to high RI occurrence. Returning to the model with this information,
additional evidence propagation was implemented and is shown in Figure 34. For the
final round of evidence propagation, variables identified in the previous results were

Figure 35. Cobweb plot of selected model variables.
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conditionalized at their 95th percentile values, indicating that the SMEs would be
surprised if the true value was in excess of this number. Figure 36 shows the model with
conditionalized variables as grey blocks, and the target variable, runway incursion, as a
histogram. Conditionalizing on these variables showed the combined result of their
interaction, and represented what has been often referred to as a causal path in this study
The model and high-level sensitivity analysis completed in this study indicated
that the variables conditionalized in Figure 36 had the greatest impact in combination of

Figure 36. Model conditionalized on indicated variables to propagate evidence.
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those variables for which direct intervention is possible (as compared to weather or
construction, as examples of conditions that are not inherently controllable to the same
extent). By propagating 95th percentile values for these variables, the rate of occurrence
for RI events was observed to increase to approximately 99,000 per million operations.
This number was alarmingly high, and is a forced manipulation of the model. However,
the resultant probability provided some indication as to the strength of influence of the
variables in the parsimonious model acting in dynamic collaboration.
One of the most important points to be considered when evaluating the model was
that identification of causal paths and interactions between variables was not a static or
single-point process. Instead, assessing the model on the basis of rank correlation,
sensitivity analysis, and both forward and reverse propagation of evidence was a
requirement to achieve a holistic view of model performance and to evaluate the model
against what is known. By approaching the model in this way, validity was also
addressed, in that many results were evaluated in the course of drawing conclusions about
causal interactions.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The primary focus of this study was to develop and validate a holistic, systemlevel model for U.S. RI event causation that could serve as the basis for future model
development and evaluation of RI reduction proposals, particularly by agencies such as
the FAA. Two research questions refined this purpose, asking: What are the interacting
causal factors that lead to RIs in the U.S.; and, can runway incursions in the U.S. and
their dynamic causal factors and interactions be modeled through the use of a Bayesian
belief network supported by expert-elicited data? To that end, this research introduces a
mixed-method approach for informing the model content and structure, develops a BBN
representation of RI causation in an iterative, operationally-oriented process, and builds
upon established methodology for structured expert judgment to create an intuitive
protocol for quantifying the model. The following discussion addresses some of the
theoretical and practical implications of this study, and then presents conclusions and
recommendations for further research.
Discussion
Results of this study are reported in Chapter 3, and the following discussion offers
further interpretation of the results, with a focus on practical implications of the outcome
of the study.
Phase 1: Runway incursion data and causal factors. It is demonstrated that
some discrepancies between RSO and ASRS data exist, and these differences are largely
accounted for within the literature. As an example, RSO data indicates clearly that a
preponderance of RI events involved aircraft operating under 14 CFR Part 91as compared
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with commercial (14 CFR Parts 135 and 121) operations. Within the ASRS data, this
trend is reversed. The use of SMEs to review ASRS reports provides depth of
understanding when reviewing these differences, and reinforces the need to consider the
underlying sources and motivations that affect RI data. In the context of incorporating
emic, thematic perspectives from pilot-reported RI events, the model benefited as
domains were explored and expanded from an initial three (human factors, technology,
and environment) to five. Remembering that the number of possible causal factor
iterations per case was potentially over one million, achieving acceptable interrater
reliability for one and two causal matches across rater pairs (and relatively strong results
for three matches) is rather notable, and indicates consistency in interpretation of
causation. This agreement among raters leads to confidence in the identified causal
themes, and allows domains to be expanded and further specified to include human
factors, operational and regulatory elements, weather factors, technological and
engineering influences, and operational environment factors that may act independently
or in dynamic interaction to contribute to RI occurrence.
Phase 2: Belief network model. A secondary research question to the matter of
RI causation was whether or not RIs could be modeled using a continuous BBN
supported by structured expert judgment. The matter of expert judgment is addressed in
the following section, but the results presented here demonstrate that in fact, RI events
can be modeled for causal interpretation using BBNs. The review of literature clearly
reveals that RIs are not isolated or static events, but are instead the result of a complex
series of dynamic interactions. BBNs were proposed as an appropriate methodology for
investigating RI causation, not only because they support dynamic probabilistic
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reasoning, but because quantifying them with expert-elicited data is a natural feature.
The results of the study shows that this was indeed a critical component for
consideration, given that many of the constructs or factors that were identified in the first
phase were not supported through available and sufficiently detailed data, requiring
expert opinion for insertion into the model. An unstated, but important consideration of
this study is the operationalization of methods so that use of modeling methods such as
BBNs can be made more accessible to a greater number of users. From a practical
standpoint, the precision of the model is sufficiently accurate to reflect what is known
about RI events, and it achieves this accuracy over a broader scope of causation than
previous studies. Additionally, the model structure uncovers more detailed information
about the dynamic causation of such events, revealed through sensitivity analysis of the
BBN.
Phase 3: Structured expert judgment. Structured expert elicitation played a
pivotal role in the quantification of the BBN model, and the results achieved here do
more than validate the use of the Classical model in the context of RI causation. The
format used to elicit the rank correlation and conditional probability information from
experts appears to be the first use of such a technique to quantify a continuous BBN.
Confirming Cooke and Goossens (1999) assertion that experts are not opposed to
performance measurement and in fact react quite well to answering questions in a format
that captures uncertainty, the SMEs in the study unanimously commented that the
structured elicitation methods were productive, insightful, and generally supported
intuitive reasoning. In training exercises using probability assessment in lieu of
describing influence as a ratio, all six experts agreed that the ratio method allowed them
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to express the same ideas regarding rank correlation and conditionality, but in a more
natural way. As a result of this more instinctual assessment, the process was also
completed more quickly than when the more common, probabilistic elicitation of the
Classical model was used. Further extending the work of Roelen et al. (2008), which
used a single expert, probability assessments in the elicitation process were made in the
ordinary manner, but were normalized to function with the constraints of the normal
copula. By approaching the SMEs in this way, the need to provide feedback in terms of
rank correlation is reduced, which was helpful given the difficulty for experts to translate
the transformed numbers.
As noted in the earlier presentation of results, the DM derived from the structured
expert judgment sessions utilized only one of the six experts who took part in the
elicitation. Although in the context of a consensus-based method this may be considered
unacceptable, in this study, the scientific derivation of the DM provides support for the
identification of a single SME for inclusion in the DM, and this is not altogether unusual.
Van Der Fels-Klerx, Cooke, Nauta, Goossens, and Havelaar (2005), experienced a
similar outcome, and such results, though possibly underreported, are not problematic
(Dr. R. Cooke, personal communication, January 15, 2013). The purpose of the Classical
model is to provide a structured methodology for weighting experts based on accuracy
and precision. Just as a medical testing laboratory may only have a single instrument for
testing DNA, the resultant DM from this study contains only one SME. Like the lab,
which almost certainly would ensure a machine’s accuracy through careful testing and
calibration, the DM in the Classical model is also tested and calibrated to ensure accuracy
and optimal performance (Dr. M. Wittmann, personal communication, July 23, 2013).
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Essentially, when a DM is based on a single, or few, experts, it is often less an indication
that the other experts’ performance was subpar, but that their accurate responses are in
fact contained within the responses of the expert whose assessments form the DM.
Model completion, testing, and evaluation. The model developed in this study
represents the first known attempt to characterize RI causation in the US across all
domains using a BBN. From the perspective of causation, reverse propagation is
revealing in showing the adverse effects of interference with operator (flight crew of
vehicle operator) visibility. This is interesting, but not necessarily unexpected. The
effect of inadequate supervision and safety climate also exercised substantial influence in
the model, and affected procedural deviation probability as well as the occurrence of task
saturation because of interconnected edges, illustrating the multifaceted causation of RI
events. When examining the combination of variables that most affected RI occurrence,
human factors and organizational factors dominated, followed by the effects of abnormal
operational environment conditions. From a practical perspective, operational issues are
superficially easier to address, but treating the root causes of organizational and human
factors is a more complex and layered problem. The model supports investigation into
efforts to do so, however; and it allows end users to evaluate changing organizational
environments or training efforts to improve latent human factors inadequacies. At an
operational level, this model translates to a useful tool for evaluation of future mitigation
efforts by regulators or even operators with the requisite sophistication and data to do so.
Conclusions
Consistent with recommendations that RI research include pilot, ATC, and airport
influences (Torres, Metscher, & Smith, 2011), the model developed as a result of this
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study demonstrates that it is possible to gain important insight into causation of RI events
through holistic, dynamic modeling methodologies such as BBNs. As Hendrickson
(2009) suggests, a greater understanding of aviation accident factors, especially those that
are principally rooted in human error, can be uncovered through text analysis of operator
reports. The mixed-method approach to deriving cross-domain variables for inclusion in
the model presented in this study is shown to be effective, and is acceptable to experts
who evaluated the data through an incremental review process. This methodology
expands the current body of knowledge with respect to both RI investigation and model
building by enhancing current methods that often focus solely on quantitative
information. The specific methods presented here for review of ASRS narratives and
evaluation of rater responses creates a more refined and systematic process, improving
upon some of the more loosely-defined text analysis that appears in the literature. In
deriving supporting data for the model from varied sources that included ASRS pilot
reports, the emic and etic perspectives were combined to create a more inclusive picture
of RI causation than has been developed in past studies, especially considering the more
detailed model shown in Figure 21. From the perspective of addressing RIs as a complex
and interdisciplinary problem, the combining of quantitative and qualitative data here
enables a fuller understanding of the dynamic interactions and dependencies of complex
operational incidents such as RIs (Stroeve, Blom, & Bakker, 2013).
Developing the content and structure of the model iteratively allowed for the
model to be made sequentially more compact (as in Figure 25), easing the process of
verification and validation, quantification, and assignment of rank correlation for a
preliminary model. The general procedural guidance from Marcot, et al. (2006) formed a
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foundation for the construction of the model structure and refinement of content, but
certain liberty was taken given the lack of available data and a fundamental desire to
make creating such a model more operationally accessible. This development method
also resulted in a more comprehensive model (Figure 21), which was intended as a next
step in the quantification process and which allows a more detailed assessment of
variable interaction from the perspective of sensitivity analysis or what-if scenarios. The
ability to work with a more compact model in the initial stages of development makes
this study less theoretical in nature, and more translational, in that the iterative model
building is somewhat less resource-intensive than ordinarily academic BBNs and is
therefore more apt to be extended beyond systems-level application to the operator level.
The model developed in this study showed that human factors, as expected, play a pivotal
role in RI causation. Differentiating it from previous work in this area, however, is that
this research shows more intuitively and dynamically than previous studies how causal
factors within and across domains interact to affect the probability of an RI event.
The elicitation of marginal distributions showed that more specific, objective
variables are preferable whenever possible. Though it is clear that empirical data should
be used when they are available, it is the case in this study that many of the factors
identified as causal to RI events are constructs for which achieving objectivity is difficult
and some subjectivity must be accepted in the course of inquiry. As has been shown in
other studies (e.g. Roelen, van Baren, Smeltink, Lin, and Morales, 2007), a lack of
objectivity manifests itself in difficulty among experts in estimating the combined
influence of variables as in the present case. In this study, the method by which
marginal, rank, direction and strength of correlation were elicited was shown to alleviate
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this issue. In addition, this method of elicitation allowed for structured expert judgment
to be completed in less time and more intuitively while maintaining accuracy. Structured
expert judgment is an established methodology, but its use here is refined and extended,
and it shows that such methods lend more scientific scrutability to otherwise inaccessible
data, most notably in the organizational and human factors domains.
This research is purposely constrained to include only U.S. aviation operations
with respect to RI event analysis and prediction. The resultant model and expert
judgment information are both useful and clearly generalizable to that population.
Beyond aviation operations in the U.S., however, the methodology presented here for
structuring the model and for eliciting expert judgment is applicable to construction and
quantification of any continuous, nonparametric BBN that uses structured expert
elicitation. The particular protocol for expert judgment is relevant to a broad audience,
and even to applications outside aviation. Given the difficulty in quantifying
organizational and human factors data, expert knowledge plays an important role in
furthering study of these concepts through modeling. While previous studies have often
identified human factors as a critical causal element to RI events, this study extends these
observations by developing and validating a platform for causal inference across
domains, and with consideration of interacting causal components. Specifically, the
interactions between human factors, organizational influences, and factors within the
operational environment are evaluated in dynamic interaction to show the increased
threat of RI occurrence when these elements functioned in combination. Reverse
propagation of RI occurrence through the model also illustrates the effects of causal
factors such as sun glare and supervisory issued on RI causation. Most notably, the
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model stands as a basis for future investigation of RI mitigation efforts. This expansion
of the relevant knowledge of RI causation and reduction is accomplished while also
reducing the elicitation and model structuring burden to make the methods detailed here
more operationally relevant.
Recommendations
The scope of this study necessarily limited the extent to which the model
presented was analyzed, expanded, and revised. As such, extensions to this research
logically converge on a continuation of this study involving the complete model
presented here, or a variation of the models in this research. Validation of the complete,
detailed BBN model as respects frequency of occurrence and evaluation of causal
interactions of increased complexity would contribute meaningfully to the body of RI
knowledge, as suggested by Biernbaum and Hagemann (2012).
Extensions to the present study may also focus on more complete validation of the
elicitation methodology used here, with attention paid most closely to the question
structure used to obtain expert opinion of rank correlation and the mathematics involved
in assuring a positive definite correlation matrix as well as some of the other limitations
that arise in quantifying a continuous, nonparametric model through structured elicitation.
Verifying the information in the model presented here is tenuous in many cases because
insufficient data exists for many of the causal factors that make up the model. In part,
this points to the scarce availability of data describing the detailed factors that combine to
cause RIs and to a demand for availability of more specific causal data so that
subjectivity may be reduced to the greatest extent possible.
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Future research may also be directed toward converging frequency data with
severity, considering that the present study concerns itself only with the occurrence of an
RI, not to the extent with which a conflict manifests as an incident or accident. Research
may also be extended toward further testing of this methodology with the aim of reducing
subjectivity to the greatest extent possible. Primarily, efforts should be focused on
further development of the rank correlation elicitation methods and on quantifying the
complete model, or some variation of it, presented here. This need again underscores the
lack of data describing the detailed factors that combine to cause RIs (GAO, 2011) and to
a demand for availability of more specific causal data, a problem partially addressed by
this study, but a persistent issue to which further research should be focused.
Finally, additional work to validate potential factors for inclusion in the model is
warranted, as is evaluation of RI mitigation programs and technology. Given thorough
verification and validation of a more complete model, what-if analysis can be explored to
test the effectiveness of various strategies for RI reduction, reducing the need for testing
mitigation efforts in real time within the national airspace system.
This study has illustrated in a dynamic, intuitive platform the interconnected
nature of RI causation, and has validated a model for evaluating RI events across a
number of causal domains. BBN models are shown to be an appropriate means of
investigating RI causation, and structured expert judgment is demonstrated as a natural
and informative methodology in the presence of uncertainty and sparse data. Future
research should address causation in more detail, and should extend models to include
insertion of mitigation efforts to evaluate effectiveness in stemming the growing potential
for RI events in the U.S.
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APPENDIX A
Operational Example of a Bayesian Belief Network
Suppose we wish to evaluate the probability of an unintentional runway overrun
in a particular type of aircraft utilized frequently by a theoretical flight department. In
traditional PRA, a series of contributing factors to runway overruns may be identified
through the study of past accidents, hazard reports and through elicitation of expert
opinion. Considering these pieces of information, an estimate of the risk of overrun may
be made. However, this estimate is first deterministic, and second addresses the risk of
an undesired event only as a point estimate with no accommodation for uncertainty.
Furthermore, this method, which has arguably been oversimplified for the purpose of
discussion here, ignores the inherent suitability of the problem to Bayesian methods.
This is evident in the monotonic behavior of deductive reasoning as is generally used in
the formulation of estimation of risk. In a deductive logic-based system, there is no
provision for dynamically asserting or retracting assumptions as knowledge of the
domain changes. The conditional nature of contributing factors and their interaction is
generally acknowledged, but is ignored in simplified computations of risk. In a Bayesian
model-based system, revisable degrees of belief account for the ever-changing state of
domain knowledge and allow a much more commonsense approach to reasoning about
the outcome of a postulated risk. It is beyond the scope of this example to create a full
model, much less one that has been populated with probabilistic distributions or that
addresses the full range of contributing factors. Instead, the following discussion
addresses the basic process of model creation as an example of the power of Bayesian
models for probabilistic inference. As in traditional PRA, contributing factors to an
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Table 15. Example Contributing Factors to Runway Overrun.
Contributing Factors
Raining
Snowing
Low visibility
Brake system malfunction
Auto braking disengaged
Brake over-temp
A/C over weight
Wildlife on runway

undesired event must be identified. For the purpose of this discussion, an abbreviated list
of such factors is provided as Table 15.
After identifying contributing or causal factors, conditional probability tables
must be created for each node in the network. It is helpful to first create a directed
acyclic graph of the network in order to identify child-parent dependencies. One may
find that it is useful to begin with the node being assessed and work backward to develop
parent nodes and dependencies as appropriate. In Figure 37, a simple Bayesian network
is presented for selected factors identified in Table 15. Generally, useful BBNs will have
many more nodes and may have multiple-level parent-child dependencies; however, the
model in Figure 19 is sufficient for demonstrating the basic principles of the analysis.
Worth noting here is that if the entire sequence of potential contributing factors to the
example event were to be modeled in any other way, the result would likely be a
computationally impossible problem. However, as was previously discussed, BBNs
circumvent this issue and can model the problem compactly through the assumption that
each variable becomes independent of its non-descendants once the value of the parent
node is known (Darwiche, 2010).
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Figure 37. BBN assessing the probability of a runway overrun.

This network graph, as would any well-advised risk assessment, relies on
verification of the model, generally via domain experts who can verify that the
conditional independencies and influence paths in the diagram are valid assumptions.
Where no consensus on node relationship or interdependency can be reached, the graph
and conditional interdependencies must be revised. It is beyond the scope of this
literature review to discuss the mechanics of this procedure beyond describing the broad
idea that implicit dependencies can be assessed by creating a moral graph, as shown in

Figure 38. BBN (a) and its associated moral graph (b) (Jensen, 2009).
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Figure 38, to accompany the belief net, and adjustments may be made for the imperfect
way influence paths represent conditional independence. For more detailed descriptions
of this process, readers may consult the Methodology section to follow as well as
Darwiche (2009), Bedford and Cooke (2001), Kelly and Smith (2011), or Jensen (2009).
Returning to the network graph in Figure 37, the computational advantage of the
BBN approach to the model becomes clearer upon examination of the joint distribution,
which is specified in full as:
(8)

𝑃(𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑛 ) = ∏𝑖 𝑃 (𝑥1 |𝑝𝑎1 )

where:
𝑃 is probability;

(𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑛 ) is the values for some variables X1 to Xn;

∏𝑖 𝑃 is the product notation for the conditional distribution; and
𝑝𝑎1 is the set of values for the parents of X1.

And as specified in the Figure 37 example as:

(9)

𝑃(𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 , 𝑥4 , 𝑥5 , 𝑥6 ) = 𝑃(𝑥1 ) 𝑃(𝑥2 |𝑥1 ) 𝑃(𝑥3 |𝑥1 ) 𝑃(𝑥6 |𝑥2 , 𝑥3 ) 𝑃(𝑥6 |𝑥4 ) 𝑃(𝑥6 |𝑥5 )

In this example, the computational compactness previously discussed becomes apparent,
as the number of parameters required increases in a linear fashion, whereas the joint
distribution grows exponentially (Pearl & Russell, 2003). Also discussed earlier is the
property of Bayesian network graphs such that independence is maintained only for
parent nodes as nondescendants are eliminated as in Equation 10:
𝑃(𝑥6 |𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 ) = 𝑃(𝑥6 |𝑥2 , 𝑥3 )

(10)

Assuming creation of a network structure and appropriate validation is complete;
a practitioner must assign probabilistic values to each node. This may be accomplished

151
by way of conditional probability tables where some value of prior probability is known,
or by a probability distribution function from which values can be sampled in the case of
uncertainty. Each method is reviewed briefly here to illustrate the basic principles, and
readers are directed to Gamerman and Lopes (2006), Kelly and Smith (2011), Bedford
and Cooke (2001), and Darwiche (2009) for more detailed information.
In the model presently discussed, there are six nodes. For each node, the states
must be defined, and conditional probability given parent nodes must be established. As
an example, in Node 1, brake malfunction takes the states yes and no. Node 2 has the
states yes or no as does Node 3, and so on. Tables 16 and 17 illustrate how conditional
probability may be presented as a conditional probability table (CPT). It is important to
note that the probability estimates in these tables appear as point estimates; however, a
probability distribution accounting for uncertainty could be framed similarly. Figure 39
appropriately presents a visualization of the probability distribution of runway stopping
location.

Table 16. Conditional Probability of Brake Over-temp Given Brake Malfunction.
Brake Malfunction Brake Over-temp ΘX2|X1
Yes
Yes
.50
No
Yes
.01

Note: Θx2|x1 is CPT for variable X2 and its parent,X1 in this and following CPTs.

Table 17. Conditional Probability of Runway Overrun given x2, x3.
Brake Over-temp
Yes
Yes
No
No

Auto-braking Off
Yes
No
Yes
No

Runway Overrun
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Θx6|x2, x3
.1200
.0010
.0004
1*10-6
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Figure 39. Probability distribution of runway stopping distance (Valdes et al., 2011).

Though the example suggested here is brief by necessity, it illustrates the intuitive
design of BBNs in aviation PRA settings, where the development of event sequences and
fault trees is commonplace. From a practitioner’s point of view, the process must be
undertaken in much the same way as the building of a database or even the design of an
SMS. That is, the bulk of the effort is confined to the design phases of the model, and
with modern software and hardware developments, the model can be run and evaluated
with relative ease once the necessary framework has been laid.
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APPENDIX B
Human Subject Protocol Application Form
INSTRUCTIONS
Please answer the 10 questions on the Human Subject Protocol Application Form as
completely and thoroughly as possible. Include more lines where necessary. Upon
completion, email to hollerat@erau.edu at the Pre-Award office.
Include any supporting documentation along with a complete copy of your InformedConsent Form, any other tests, instruments, or surveys, as well as any proposal for
funding. It is incumbent upon the researcher to demonstrate that the Principal Investigator
is qualified to perform the study, every possible step has been taken to reduce risk to the
participants, and that adequate benefit will come from the study to offset the risks.
The answers to the questions need not be long, but they should be sufficiently detailed so
that the reviewer can accurately assess the risks and benefits associated with your study.
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Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Human Subject Protocol Application Form
Project Title:
__________________________________________________________________
Principal Investigator:
_________________________________________________________
(If student, list advisor’s name as investigator)
List all Other Investigators:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Submission Date: _______________________
Beginning Date: _____________________ Expected End Date: ________________
Type of Project:
_____________________________________________________________
Type of Funding Support (if any):
_______________________________________________
Please answer the following questions and provide a brief explanation of the answer for
each. Include more lines where necessary.
1. Briefly describe the background and purpose of the research.
__________________________________________________________________
2. Describe in detail each condition or manipulation to be included with the study.
__________________________________________________________________
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3. What measures or observations will be taken in the study? If any questionnaires,
tests, or other instruments are used, provide a brief description and include a copy
for review (computer programs may require demonstration at the request of the
IRB).
__________________________________________________________________
4. Describe the possible risks and benefits (if any) to the subjects and describe how
the experimental design will limit risks.
__________________________________________________________________
5. Describe the methods to be used in securing the informed consent of the subjects.
If an informed consent form is to be used, attach to this form. See Informed
Consent information sheet for more information on Informed Consent
requirements.
__________________________________________________________________
6. Will participant information be anonymous (not even the researcher can match
data with names), confidential (names or any other identifying demographics can
be matched, but only members of the research team will have access to that
information. Publication of the data will not include any identifying information),
or public (names and data will be matched and individuals outside of the research
team will have either direct or indirect access. Publication of the data will allow
either directly or indirectly, identification of the participants). Justify the
classification and describe how privacy will be ensured/protected.
__________________________________________________________________
7. If video/audio recordings are part of the research, please describe how that data
will be stored or destroyed.
__________________________________________________________________
8. Are students being required to participate in this research as part of a class project
or as a class assignment? What are the alternatives to be offered in the event that a
student(s) choose not to participate? If so, please list the class(es) and faculty
members involved and justify this situation in light of APA ethical guidelines of
the APA Publication Manual.
__________________________________________________________________
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9. Are participants going to be paid for their participation? If yes, describe your
policy for dealing with participants who 1) Show up for research, but refuse
informed consent; 2) Start but fail to complete research.
__________________________________________________________________
10. Approximately how much time will be required of each participant?
__________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX C
Cooke’s Classical Model: Elicitation and Aggregation
Within the classical model, two quantitative measures of expert performance
exist: information and calibration. Whereas information is a measure of the
concentration of the distributed expert opinions, calibration is a measure of the likelihood
that s set of experimental results would correspond to those assessed by the experts
(Cooke & Goossens, 2006). In determining calibration, Cooke (2009) suggests that each
expert be asked to provide 5%, 50%, and 95% values. The range for each quantity is
divided into four inter-quartile intervals such that p1 = 0.05: less than or equal to the 5%
value, p2 = 0.45: greater than the 5% value and less than or equal to the 50% value, p3 =
0.45: greater than the 50% value and less than or equal to the 95% value, and p4 = 0.5:
greater than the 95% value and less than or equal to the 100% value:
p= (0.05, 0.45, 0.45, 0.05)
s1(e) = #{ i | xi ≤ 5% quantile}/N
s2(e) = #{ i | 5% quantile < xi ≤ 50% quantile}/N
s3(e) = #{ i | 50% quantile < xi ≤ 95% quantile}/N
s4(e) = #{ i | 95% quantile < xi }/N
s(e) = (s1,…s4)
Cooke (1991) notes that the sample distribution depends on expert e and assuming
independent draws from a distribution with the quantiles described previously by the
expert is a chi-square test statistic for goodness of fit with three degrees of freedom as in
the following, in which I(s(e)|p) denotes relative information of distribution s with
respect to pfor expert e:
2NI(s(e)|p) = 2N ∑i=1..4 si ln(si/pi)

(6)

158
where:
e is the expert;
s is the distribution;
p is probability of concurrence
The decision maker in the classical model scores each expert e as the likelihood of the
hypothesis, “the inter-quantile interval containing the true value for each variable is
drawn independently from probability vector p” (Cooke, 2009). The calibration score is
calculated by:
Calibration score(e) = p-value = Prob{2NI(s(e)|p) ≥ r | He}
where:
r is the value from (6) based on the observed values of x1...xN;
He is the hypothesis that a deviation at least as large as r is observed on
N realizations id the hypothesis is true; and
s is the sample distribution.
The information element of the expert score weighting requires a density be
associated with each of the quantile assessments gained from the experts (and discussed
in the preceding section). The classical model offered by Cooke (2009) uses the k%
overshoot rule: “for each item we consider the smallest interval I = [L, U] containing all
the assessed quantiles of all experts and the realization, if known” (p. 265). Cooke
extends this interval to:
I* = [L*, U*]; L* = L – k(U-L)/100; U* = U + k(U-L)/100.

(7)
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where:
I is the interval;
U is the upper interval limit;
L is the lower limit;
k is the overshoot value chosen by the researcher.
In the discussion that follows, mention is made of the role that analyst experience
plays in the quality of the weighting process. In Equation 7, the value of k is chosen by
the researcher, and Cooke notes that a large value tends to “suppress the relative
differences in information scores” (2009, p. 265). With this in mind, the process
continues, with the information score calculated for each rater as by:
Inf (e) =average relative information with respect to background = (1/N) ∑i = 1..NI(fe,i|gi)
where:
gi is the background density for I and fe,i is expert e’s density function for item i.
The combination of the information and calibration scores serves as a weighting
mechanism for each expert and is dependent upon the value of α, as shown in Equation 8
(Cooke, 1991, 2009).
wα(e) = Cal (e) × Inf (e) × 1α(Cal(e) ≥ α)

(8)

The classical model, and the evaluation of the quality of expertise is essentially a
function of linear pooling and the derivation of weights as a product of information and
calibration. To avoid what Cooke and Goossens (2006) refer to as “haphazard” influence
on the decision maker by an individual expert, a set of scoring rules is also imposed
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within the classical model (p. 7). Performance of the weighting scheme (more
information on the details of which can be found in Cooke (2004 & 2009) and Cooke &
Goosens (2006)) is largely dependent on the experience of the researcher in practical use
(Cooke & Goossens, 2006). As such, the research proposed herein must account for bias
and performance issues in this regard, and it is likely that this limitation will propagate
through the model results, creating a limitation to the generalizability of the data. To
attempt to limit this potential shortcoming, the software package EXCALIBUR, which
accomodates the elements of the classical model and will calculate information and
calibration scores to assign weights after the elicitation results are inserted, can be used.
Structured expert judgment requires:
•

Scrutability/accountability: All data, including experts' names and assessments,
and all processing tools are open to peer review and results must be reproducible
by competent reviewers.

•

Empirical control: Quantitative expert assessments are subjected to empirical
quality controls.

•

Neutrality: The method for combining/evaluating expert opinion should
encourage experts to state their true opinions, and must not bias results.

•

Fairness: Experts are not pre-judged, prior to processing the results of their
assessments (Cooke & Goossens, 2006, p. 3).
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APPENDIX D
Structured Expert Judgment Subject Matter Expert Profiles
Expert A is a Captain for a 14 CFR Part 121 regional airline operator. He has extensive
line pilot experience in airline operations at large primary commercial airports. He has
over 7700 hours of flight time and 18 years of aviation experience. His aviation
background includes 14 CFR Part 135 cargo operations and 14 CFR Part 141 flight
instruction. He also holds a bachelor’s degree in Aviation Science and a minor in
Aviation Safety.
Expert B Is a Designated Pilot Examiner in Northern California. He conducts check rides
for Private, Instrument, Commercial, ATP, and instructor licenses and certificates. He is
also a Chief Pilot for an International Charter Operator and has extensive background in
developing and writing manuals and training courses. He has 20 years of aviation
experience with over 5500 flight hours. He instructs actively as well as currently flies
multiple types of aircraft in 14 CFR Part 91 and 14 CFR Part 135 operations. His
background also includes intensive operations in 14CFR91 Subpart K.
Expert C is the Operations Training Supervisor for a large hub airport where one of his
duties is overseeing the 14 CFR Part 139.329 driver certification program at the airport.
He has worked in airport operations for the last 7 years and in aviation training for the
last 12. He has participated in a number of Runway Safety Action Teams and has been a
Subject Matter Expert in FAA SRM panels on airfield safety. He also has been the lead
airport representative in Airport/FAA study focusing on the airfield driver human factors.
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He has presented on Runway Safety both in the US and Internationally. He is a CFI/CFII
and holds a MEL pilot certificate.
Expert D is an airline captain for a large regional carrier in the United States. He is also
the Safety Management System (SMS) Program Manager tasked with development and
implementation of the SMS within his organization. He has an extensive background in
safety management, incident/accident investigation, and human factors. He has over
4,300 hours of flight experience and was previously a training center evaluator (TCE ) for
a major flight university conducting practical tests for Private, Instrument, Commercial,
and instructor certificates.
Expert E has been involved in military and civilian aviation for 45 years, serving as a
pilot and engineer prior to joining the FAA in 1985. He acted within the FAA as an
airport engineer, program and technical manager, and as a Region Runway Safety
Manager as well as the Acting Director for Runway Safety at the national level.

Expert F has been working in the Air Traffic Control and Airport Management field since
1984. During the past 28 years, he has managed the research, development, and
implementation of several national aviation projects for the FAA. He is the inventor of
several new tools for pilots, airports and aircraft worldwide. He has instructed
internationally on aviation related materials and is in high demand for this field. He has
been instrumental in designing and redesigning airport layout plans. Many new
enhancements to the XXXXX International Airport can be attributed to his fuel
savings/efficiency modifications.
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APPENDIX E
Structured Expert Judgment Elicitation Protocol

Structured Expert Judgment
Elicitation Protocol
for

IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSAL PATHS AND PREDICTION OF RUNWAY INCURSION RISK
USING BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORKS

by

Benjamin Jeffry Goodheart

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Daytona Beach, Florida
Transportation Research Board
Airport Cooperative Research Project
Washington, D.C.
July 2, 2013
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Experts,
Thank you for your participation in this study, which attempts to probabilistically
model the factors that contribute to runway incursions in the U.S.
In quantifying the probability distribution of the variables in the network model
developed in this study, structured expert judgment is used, following the Classical
Model developed by Cooke (1991).
The questions that follow relate to aviation operations in the United States, and
are intended to include ground, ATC, and flight operations as appropriate. U.S. aviation
metrics are generally expressed per 100,000 operations, and unless otherwise noted,
this rate may be assumed throughout.
Throughout the following exercise, you will be asked to provide our estimate of
the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of a particular measure. As a brief review, these
percentiles correspond to a probability density function as in the figure below, and
describe the bounds of a distribution (not necessarily normally distributed as shown
below) using the basic concepts of:
• The 50th percentile (median) of the distribution, i.e. given 100 samples of a
variable value, 50 would be expected to fall below and 50 would fall above the
median value.
• The 5th percentile value, which can be interpreted as: it would surprise you if
more than 5 out of 100 samples have a value lower than this value.
• The 95th percentile value, which can be interpreted as: it would surprise you if
more than 5 out of 100 samples have a value higher than this value.

Figure 1. Normal distribution with percentiles.
Included in the elicitation are variables whose actual values are known. These variables
are used to assist in measurement and validation of expert performance in quantifying
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uncertainty. A good assessment of uncertainty is statistically accurate and informative,
two characteristics that are evaluated relative to the known variables and expert
responses.
Use the accompanying spreadsheet, which describes the model variables and
provides additional information, to support your responses to the following questions.
To understand how probabilities and dependencies will be assessed from your
responses, consider the following example. If we assume a population of airline flight
crew employees having a median age is 45 years old, a median gross salary of $90,000,
and a median experience on three different aircraft within the current fleet, we can
perform some basic estimates. If we look at the portion of the population that lies
below the median, that is younger than 45, we can reasonably expect their mean salary
to reflect a value lower than the median for the whole population. An appropriate
question might be: Suppose we have 1,000 employees who are younger than 45 years
old, how many of those would have an annual salary of less than $90,000. If your
answer is 700, then the probability is expressed as:
P(annual salary≤x50=$90,000|pilot age≤y50=45) = 0.70
Investigating further, we may want to look at the probability that the crewmember’s
salary is less than the median value given that the pilot is younger than 45 and has
experience on fewer than three aircraft types, the median experience level given above.
We would now express that probability as (where X, Y, and Z represent flight crew
salary, age, and experience, respectively):
P(X≤x50|Y≤y50, Z≤z50)
As part of the process of ranking variable interaction, you will be asked to
express your opinion in terms of correlation. Recall that correlation can be positive or
negative, and can vary in strength of association, as shown here:
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Expert Profiles
Expert A is a Captain for a 14CFR121 regional airline operator. He has extensive line pilot
experience in airline operations at large primary commercial airports. He has over 7700 hours of
flight time and 18 years of aviation experience. His aviation background includes 14CFR135
cargo operations and 14CFR141 flight instruction. He also holds a bachelor’s degree in Aviation
Science and a minor in Aviation Safety.
Expert B Is a Designated Pilot Examiner in Northern California. He conducts check rides for
Private, Instrument, Commercial, ATP, and instructor licenses and certificates. He is also a Chief
Pilot for an International Charter Operator and has extensive background in developing and
writing manuals and training courses. He has 20 years of aviation experience with over 5500
flight hours. He instructs actively as well as currently flies multiple types of aircraft in 14CFR91
and 14CFR135 operations. His background also includes intensive operations in 14CFR91
Subpart K.
Expert C is the Operations Training Supervisor for a large hub airport where one of his duties is
overseeing the Part 139.329 driver certification program at the airport. He has worked in airport
operations for the last 7 years and in aviation training for the last 12. He has participated in a
number of Runway Safety Action Teams and has been a Subject Matter Expert in FAA SRM
panels on airfield safety. He also has been the lead airport representative in Airport/FAA study
focusing on the airfield driver human factors. He has presented on Runway Safety both in the US
and Internationally. He is a CFI/CFII and holds a MEL pilot certificate.
Expert D is an airline captain for a large regional carrier in the United States. He is also the Safety
Management System (SMS) Program Manager tasked with development and implementation of
the SMS within his organization. He has an extensive background in safety management,
incident/accident investigation, and human factors. He has over 4,300 hours of flight experience
and was previously a training center evaluator (TCE ) for a major flight university conducting
practical tests for Private, Instrument, Commercial, and instructor certificates.
Expert E has been involved in military and civilian aviation for 45 years, serving as a pilot and
engineer prior to joining the FAA in 1985. He acted within the FAA as an airport engineer,
program and technical manager, and as a Region Runway Safety Manager as well as the Acting
Director for Runway Safety at the national level.
Expert F has been working in the Air Traffic Control and Airport Management field since 1984.
During the past 28 years, he has managed the research, development, and implementation of
several national aviation projects for the FAA. He is the inventor of several new tools for pilots,
airports and aircraft worldwide. He has instructed internationally on aviation related materials
and is in high demand for this field. He has been instrumental in designing and redesigning
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airport layout plans. Many new enhancements to the XXXXX International Airport can be
attributed to his fuel savings/efficiency modifications.
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Calibration Questions
CQ1

General

During the period between 1988 and 1999, the total number of runway incursions
reported in the U.S. increased by what percent? (Not limited to 100% maximum)
Answer: 171%
Source: NASA ASRS Callback Summary Issue No. 263
(http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/ callback/cb_253.htm)
5th percentile

50th percentile

CQ2

General

95th percentile

During the period between 1988 and 1999, the number of U.S. runway incursions
resulting from pilot deviations (PD) increased by what percent? (Not limited to 100%
maximum)
Answer: 267%
Source: NASA ASRS Callback Summary Issue No. 263
(http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/ callback/cb_253.htm)
5th percentile

50th percentile

CQ3

General

95th percentile

How many airline departures per year occurred in the U.S. during the period from April
1, 2012 through March 31, 2013?
Answer: 8,796,000
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics (http://www.transtats.bts.gov/)
5th percentile

50th percentile

CQ4

General

95th percentile

What was the reported General Aviation accident rate for FAA FY2011 expressed as
accidents per 100,000 flight hours?
Answer: 6.51
Source: NTSB 2011 Annual Aviation Safety Statistics (http://www.ntsb.gov/news/
2012/120427.html)
5th percentile

50th percentile

95th percentile
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CQ5

General

For the same period in CQ4, what was the reported Part 121 airline accident rate
expressed as accidents per 100,000 flight hours?
Answer: 0.175
Source: NTSB (http://www.ntsb.gov/data/table5_2012.html)
5th percentile

CQ6

50th percentile

95th percentile

General

The FAA identifies airport “hot spots” as “a location on an airport movement area with a
history of potential risk of collision or runway incursion, and where heightened
attention by pilots and drivers is necessary.” Considering there are approximately 5,170
public-use airports (503 with Part 121 airline service), how many hot spots have been
identified
Answer: 601
Source: FAA (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/hotspots/hotspots_list/)
5th percentile

CQ7

50th percentile

95th percentile

General

How many Runway Incursions were reported in the U.S in the period from January 1,
2013 through June 30, 2013?
Answer: 569
Source: FAA Office of Runway Safety (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/
statistics/year/?fy1=2013&fy2=2012)
5th percentile

50th percentile

CQ8

General

95th percentile

Of the Runway Incursions reported in CQ7, what percentage of these were pilot
deviation events?
Answer: 62%
Source: FAA Office of Runway Safety (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/
statistics/year/?fy1=2013&fy2=2012)
5th percentile

50th percentile

95th percentile
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CQ9

General

Of the Runway Incursions reported in CQ7, what percentage of these were
vehicle/pedestrian deviation events?
Answer: 20%
Source: FAA Office of Runway Safety (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/
statistics/year/?fy1=2013&fy2=2012)
5th percentile

50th percentile

CQ10

General

95th percentile

What percentage of aviation accidents may be attributed, at least in part, to human
error?
Answer: 70%
Source: Shappell, et al, 2005 (http://www.hf.faa.gov/docs/508/docs/gaHFACS2005.pdf)
5th percentile

50th percentile

95th percentile
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Elicitation Questions
Q1

Procedural Deviation

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flights within the U.S. under the general model
conditions. On how many of these flights will a DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE be
committed by the flight crew? Express your uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th, and
95th percentile of your estimated distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q2

Inadequate Supervision

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flight operations within the U.S. under the general
model conditions. In what proportion these operations might INADEQUATE
SUPERVISION, as defined in the materials provided, be observed? Express your
uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimated distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q3

High Workload

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flight operations within the U.S. under the general
model conditions. What percentage of these operations involves HIGH WORKLOAD as
defined in the materials provided? Express your uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th,
and 95th percentile of your estimate.
5th percentile

50th percentile

95th percentile

Q4

Organizational/Regulatory Factor

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flight operations within the U.S. under the general
model conditions. What percentage of these operations will experience an abnormal
ORGANIZATIONAL/REGULATORY FACTOR as defined in the materials provided? Express
your uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimate.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q5

Complex Intersection

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flight operations within the U.S. under the general
model conditions. What proportion of these operations involves navigating an airport
intersection defined as a COMPLEX INTERSECTION? Express your uncertainty by
providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimated distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

95th percentile
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Q6

Irregular or Noncompliant Signs or Markings

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen operations within the U.S. under the general model
conditions. What proportion of these operations experiences IRREGULAR OR
NONCOMPLIANT SIGNS OR MARKINGS during movement to or from the runway area?
Express your uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimated
distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q7

Airport Construction

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flight operations within the U.S. under the general
model conditions. On how many of these operations might an operator encounter
AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION IN PROGRESS, as defined in the materials provided? Express
your uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimated
distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q8

Part 139

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flight operations within the U.S. under the general
model conditions. How many of these operations might utilize a 14CFR PART 139
AIRFIELD? Express your uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of
your estimated distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q9

Non-Towered Airfield

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flight operations within the U.S. under the general
model conditions. How many of these operations might utilize an NON-TOWERED
AIRFIELD? Express your uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of
your estimated distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q10

Conflicting Vehicle Traffic

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flight operations within the U.S. under the general
model conditions. What proportion of these operations might experience CONFLICTING
VEHICLE TRAFFIC, as defined in the materials provided? Express your uncertainty by
providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimated distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

95th percentile
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Q11

Operational Environment Factor

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flight operations within the U.S. under the general
model conditions. What percentage of these operations will experience an abnormal
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FACTOR as defined in the materials provided? Express
your uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimate.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q12

Task Saturation

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen aviation operations within the U.S. under the
general model conditions. On how many of these operations might TASK SATURATION,
as defined in the materials provided, be observed? Express your uncertainty by
providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimated distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q13

Failure to Hold Short

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flight/airport vehicle operations within the U.S.
under the general model conditions. On how many of these operations might a FAILURE
TO HOLD SHORT, as defined in the materials provided, be observed? Express your
uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimated distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q14

Lost Situational Awareness

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen operations within the U.S. under the general model
conditions. On how many of these operations might a LOSS OF SITUATIONAL
AWARENESS, as defined in the materials provided, be observed? Express your
uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimated distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q15

Human Factors

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flight operations within the U.S. under the general
model conditions. What percentage of these operations will experience an abnormal
HUMAN FACTOR as defined in the materials provided? Express your uncertainty by
providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimate.
5th percentile

50th percentile

95th percentile
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Q16

Sun Glare

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen operations within the U.S. under the general model
conditions. On how many of these operations might SUN GLARE, as defined in the
materials provided, affect the operator(s)? Express your uncertainty by providing a 5th,
50th, and 95th percentile of your estimated distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q17

Weather Factors

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flight operations within the U.S. under the general
model conditions. What percentage of these operations will experience an abnormal
WEATHER FACTOR as defined in the materials provided? Express your uncertainty by
providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimate.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q18

ATC Equipment Failure

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen operations within the U.S. under the general model
conditions. On how many of these operations might an ATC EQUIPMENT FAILURE, as
defined in the materials provided, occur? Express your uncertainty by providing a 5th,
50th, and 95th percentile of your estimated distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q19

In-Vehicle Display

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen operations within the U.S. under the general model
conditions. On how many of these operations might an IN-VEHICLE DISPLAY, as defined
in the materials provided, be used by an operator(s)? Express your uncertainty by
providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimated distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q20

Radio Congestion

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen operations within the U.S. under the general model
conditions. On how many of these operations might RADIO CONGESTION, as defined in
the materials provided, occur? Express your uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th, and
95th percentile of your estimated distribution.
5th percentile

50th percentile

95th percentile
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Q21

Technical/Engineering Factors

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen flight operations within the U.S. under the general
model conditions. What percentage of these operations will experience an abnormal
TECHNICAL/ENGINEERING FACTOR as defined in the materials provided? Express your
uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of your estimate.
5th percentile

50th percentile

Q22

Incorrect Presence

95th percentile

Consider 100,000 randomly chosen airport surface operations within the U.S. under the
general model conditions. What percentage of these operations will, during movement
on the airfield surface, occupy an INCORRECT PRESENCE as defined in the materials
provided? Express your uncertainty by providing a 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile of
your estimate.
5th percentile

50th percentile

95th percentile
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Rank Correlation Questions
Incorrect Presence Factor Rank
Variable
Organizational/Regulatory
Operational Environment
Human Factors
Weather
Technological/Engineering
RQ1

Relative Rank

Incorrect Presence Rank Correlation

If 50,000 flight operations from the sample in Question 22 are randomly chosen, then
the number of those operations where an INCORRECT PRESENCE occurs should be
approximately half the median value from Question 22. Instead of randomly selecting
these operations, suppose that only flights where XXXXXX is above its median value are
chosen (Question X). Given this situation, what is the probability that instances of
INCORRECT PRESENCE will be above half the 50th percentile estimate from Question 22?
Given these conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will experience more than the
median number of instances of INCORRECT PRESENCE in Question 2?
Probability

Portion (Count)

Incorrect Presence Factor Influence
Variable
Rank Influence as a % of highest
ranked variable
(Does not need to add up to
100%)
Organizational/Regulatory
Operational Environment
Human Factors
Weather
Technological/Engineering

Direction of correlation
(positive/negative)
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RQ2
Procedural Deviation Rank Correlation
If 50,000 flight operations from the sample in Question 1 are randomly chosen, then the
number of those operations where a DEVIATION FROM PROCEDURE occurs should be
approximately half the median value from Question 1. Instead of randomly selecting these
operations, suppose that only operations where INADEQUATE SUPERVISION is above its
median value are chosen (Question 2). Given this situation, what is the probability that the
number of DEVIATIONS FROM PROCEDURE will be above half the 50th percentile estimate
from Question 1? Given these conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will commit more
than the median number of DEVIATIONS FROM PROCEDURE in Question 1?
Probability
Portion (Count)

Organizational/Regulatory Factor Rank
Variable
High Workload
Inadequate Supervision/Climate
Procedural Deviation

Relative Rank

RQ3
Organization/Regulatory Factors Rank Correlation
If 50,000 flight operations from the sample in Question 4 are randomly chosen, then the
number of those operations where an ORGANIZATIONAL/REGULATORY error occurs should
be approximately half the median value from Question 4. Instead of randomly selecting
these operations, suppose that 50,000 operations where XXXXXXX is at or above its median
value are chosen (Question X). Given this situation, what is the probability that the number
of ORGANIZATIONAL/ REGULATORY errors will be above half the 50th percentile estimate
from Question 4? Given these conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will commit more
than the median number of ORGANIZATIONAL/REGULATORY errors in Question 4?
Probability
Portion (Count)

Organizational/Regulatory Factor Influence
Variable
Rank Influence as a % of highest
ranked variable
(Does not need to add up to
100%)
High Workload
Inadequate
Supervision/Climate
Procedural Deviation

Direction of
correlation
(positive/negative)
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RQ4
Complex Intersection Rank Correlation
If 50,000 flight operations from the sample in Question 5 are randomly chosen, then the
number of those operations where a COMPLEX INTERSECTION is encountered should be
approximately half the median value from Question 5. Instead of randomly selecting these
operations, suppose that 50,000 operations where AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION is above its
median value are chosen (Question 7). Given this situation, what is the probability that the
number of COMPLEX INTERSECTION encounters will be above half the 50th percentile
estimate from Question 5? Given these conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will be
required to navigate more than the median number of COMPLEX INTERSECTIONS in
Question 5?
Probability
Portion (Count)
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RQ5
Non-Towered Airfield Rank Correlation
If 50,000 flight operations from the sample in Question 9 are randomly chosen, then the
number of those operations at an NON-TOWERED AIRFIELDS airfield should be
approximately half the median value from Question 9. Instead of randomly selecting these
operations, suppose that 50,000 operations where PART 139 is below its median value are
chosen (Question 8). Given this situation, what is the probability that the number of
operations at NON-TOWERED AIRFIELDS will be above half the median value from Question
9? Given these conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will be at more than the median
number of NON-TOWERED AIRFIELDS in Question 9?
Probability
Portion (Count)

RQ6
Vehicle Traffic (I) Rank Correlation
If 50,000 flight operations from the sample in Question 10 are randomly chosen, then the
number of those operations where CONFLICTING VEHICLE TRAFFIC is encountered should be
approximately half the median value from Question 10. Instead of randomly selecting these
operations, suppose that 50,000 operations where NON-TOWERED AIRFIELDS are
encountered at above the median value are chosen (Question 9). Given this situation, what
is the probability that the number of CONFLICTING VEHICLE TRAFFIC encounters will be
above half the 50th percentile estimate from Question 10? Given these conditions, what
portion of these 50,000 will be required to navigate more than the median number of
CONFLICTING VEHICLE TRAFFIC interactions in Question 10?
Probability
Portion (Count)

RQ7
Vehicle Traffic (II) Rank Correlation
If 50,000 flight operations from the sample in Question 10 are randomly chosen, then the
number of those operations where CONFLICTING VEHICLE TRAFFIC is encountered should be
approximately half the median value from Question 10. Instead of randomly selecting these
operations, suppose that 50,000 operations below the median value of PART 139 airfields
are chosen (Question 8). Given this situation, what is the probability that the number of
CONFLICTING VEHICLE TRAFFIC encounters will be above half the 50th percentile estimate
from Question 10? Given these conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will be required to
navigate more than the median number of CONFLICTING VEHICLE TRAFFIC interactions in
Question 10?
Probability
Portion (Count)
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Operational Environment Factor Rank
Variable

Relative Rank

Complex Intersections

Irregular Signs/Markings
Non-towered Airfield
Airport Construction
Conflicting Vehicle Traffic
RQ8
Operating Environment Rank Correlation
If 50,000 operations from the sample in Question 11 are randomly chosen, then the number of
those operations where an OPERATING ENVIRONMENT factor is present should be
approximately half the median value from Question 11. Instead of randomly selecting these
operations, suppose that only flights where XXXXX is above its median value are chosen
(Question X). Given this situation, what is the probability that OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
factors are above half the 50th percentile estimate from Question 11? Given these conditions,
what portion of these 50,000 will be above the median from Question 11?
Probability
Portion (Count)

Operational Environment Factor Influence
Variable
Rank Influence as a % of highest ranked
variable
(Does not need to add up to 100%)
Complex Intersections
Irregular Signs/Markings
Non-Towered Airfield
Airport Construction
Conflicting Vehicle
Traffic

Direction of
correlation
(positive/negative)
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Task Saturation Factor Rank
Variable
High Workload
Procedural Deviation
ATC Equipment Failure
Radio Congested
Conflicting Vehicle Traffic
RQ9

Relative Rank

Human Factors Rank Correlation

If 50,000 flight operations from the sample in Question 12 are randomly chosen, then
the number of those operations where TASK SATURATION occurs should be
approximately half the median value from Question 15. Instead of randomly selecting
these operations, suppose that only flights where a XXXXX is above its median value are
chosen (Question X). Given this situation, what is the probability that instances of TASK
SATURATION will be above half the 50th percentile estimate from Question 1? Given
these conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will experience more than the median
number of instances of TASK SATURATION in Question 12?
Probability

Portion (Count)

Task Saturation Factor Influence
Variable
Rank Influence as a % of highest
ranked variable
(Does not need to add up to
100%)
High Workload
Procedural Deviation
ATC Equipment Failure
Radio Congested
Conflicting Vehicle
Traffic

Direction of correlation
(positive/negative)
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Lost Situational Awareness Rank
Variable
Weather
Complex Intersections
Irregular Signs/Markings
RQ10

Relative Rank

Lost Situational Awareness Rank Correlation

If 50,000 flight operations from the sample in Question 14 are randomly chosen, then
the number of those operations where LOST S/A occurs should be approximately half
the median value from Question 14. Instead of randomly selecting these operations,
suppose that only flights where a XXXXXX is above its median value are chosen
(Question X). Given this situation, what is the probability that instances of LOST S/A will
be above half the 50th percentile estimate from Question 14? Given these conditions,
what portion of these 50,000 will experience more than the median number of
instances of LOST S/A in Question 14?
Probability

Portion (Count)

Lost Situational Awareness Influence
Variable
Rank Influence as a % of highest
ranked variable
(Does not need to add up to
100%)
Weather
Complex Intersections
Irregular Signs/Markings

Direction of correlation
(positive/negative)
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RQ11

Failure to Hold Short Rank Correlation (I)

If 50,000 flight operations from the sample in Question 13 are randomly chosen, then
the number of those operations where a FAILURE TO HOLD SHORT occurs should be
approximately half the median value from Question 13. Instead of randomly selecting
these operations, suppose that only flights where LOST S/A is above its median value are
chosen (Question 14). Given this situation, what is the probability that FAILURE TO
HOLD SHORT will be above half the 50th percentile estimate from Question 13? Given
these conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will experience more than the median
number of instances of FAILURE TO HOLD SHORT in Question 13?
Probability

RQ12

Portion (Count)

Failure to Hold Short Rank Correlation (II)

If 50,000 flight operations from the sample in Question 13 are randomly chosen, then
the number of those operations where a FAILURE TO HOLD SHORT occurs should be
approximately half the median value from Question 13. Instead of randomly selecting
these operations, suppose that only flights where MECHANICAL FAILURE is above its
median value are chosen. Given this situation, what is the probability that FAILURE TO
HOLD SHORT will be above half the 50th percentile estimate from Question 13? Given
these conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will experience more than the median
number of instances of FAILURE TO HOLD SHORT in Question 13?
Probability

Portion (Count)
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Human Factors Rank
Variable
Task Saturation
Failed to Hold Short
Lost Situational Awareness
RQ13

Relative Rank

Human Factors Rank Correlation

If 50,000 flight operations from the sample in Question 15 are randomly chosen, then
the number of those operations where a HUMAN FACTORS error occurs should be
approximately half the median value from Question 15. Instead of randomly selecting
these operations, suppose that only flights where a XXXXX is above its median value are
chosen (Question X). Given this situation, what is the probability that instances of
HUMAN FACTORS error will be above half the 50th percentile estimate from Question
15? Given these conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will experience more than the
median number of instances of HUMAN FACTORS error in Question 15?
Probability

Human Factors Influence
Variable

Task Saturation
Failed to Hold Short
Lost Situational
Awareness

Portion (Count)

Rank

Influence as a % of highest
ranked variable
(Does not need to add up to
100%)

Direction of correlation
(positive/negative)
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Weather Factor Rank
Variable
Darkness/Twilight
Sun Glare
Visibility Restriction
Precipitation
RQ14

Relative Rank

Weather Rank Correlation

If 50,000 operations from the sample in Question 17 are randomly chosen, then the
number of those operations where a WEATHER FACTOR occurs should be approximately
half the median value from Question 17. Instead of randomly selecting these
operations, suppose that only flights where XXXXXX occurs at above median value are
chosen. Given this situation, what is the probability that instances of WEATHER FACTOR
will be above half the 50th percentile estimate from Question 17? Given these
conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will experience more than the median number
of WEATHER FACTORS in Question 17?
Probability

Portion (Count)

Organizational/Regulatory Factor Influence
Variable
Rank Influence as a % of highest
ranked variable
(Does not need to add up to
100%)
Darkness/Twilight
Sun Glare
Visibility Restriction
Precipitation

Direction of correlation
(positive/negative)
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RQ15

Visibility Rank Correlation (I)

If 50,000 operations from the sample for RESTRICTIONS TO VISIBILITY are randomly
chosen, then the number of those operations where a RESTRICTED VISIBILITY occurs
should be approximately half the median value. Instead of randomly selecting these
operations, suppose that only flights where SUN GLARE occurs at above median value
are chosen (Question 16). Given this situation, what is the probability that instances of
RESTRICTED VISIBILITY will be above half the 50th percentile value? Given these
conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will experience more than the median
RESTRICTED VISIBILITY?
Probability

RQ16

Portion (Count)

Visibility Rank Correlation (II)

If 50,000 operations from the sample for RESTRICTIONS TO VISIBILITY are randomly
chosen, then the number of those operations where a RESTRICTED VISIBILITY occurs
should be approximately half the median value. Instead of randomly selecting these
operations, suppose that only flights where PRECIPITATION occurs at above median
value are chosen (Question 16). Given this situation, what is the probability that
instances of RESTRICTED VISIBILITY will be above half the 50th percentile value? Given
these conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will experience more than the median
RESTRICTED VISIBILITY?
Probability

RQ17

Portion (Count)

Radio Congestion Rank Correlation

If 50,000 operations from the sample for RADIO CONGESTION are randomly chosen,
then the number of those operations where RADIO CONGESTION occurs should be
approximately half the median value. Instead of randomly selecting these operations,
suppose that only flights where an ATC EQUIPMENT FAILURE occurs at above median
value are chosen (Question 18). Given this situation, what is the probability that
instances of RADIO CONGESTION will be above half the 50th percentile value? Given
these conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will experience more than the median
RADIO CONGESTION?
Probability

Technical/Engineering Factor Rank
Variable
ATC Equipment Failure
Radio Congestion
In-Vehicle Display
Mechanical Failure

Portion (Count)

Relative Rank
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RQ18

Technical/Engineering Rank Correlation

If 50,000 flight operations from the sample in Question 21 are randomly chosen, then
the number of those operations where a TECHNICAL/ENGINEERING FACTOR occurs
should be approximately half the median value from Question 21. Instead of randomly
selecting these operations, suppose that only flights where XXXXX is above its median
value are chosen. Given this situation, what is the probability that
TECHNICAL/ENGINEERING FACTORS will be above half the 50th percentile estimate from
Question 21? Given these conditions, what portion of these 50,000 will experience
more than the median number of TECHNICAL/ ENGINEERING FACTORS in Question 21?
Probability

Portion (Count)

Technical/Engineering Factor Influence
Variable
Rank Influence as a % of highest
ranked variable
(Does not need to add up to
100%)
ATC Equipment Failure
Radio Congestion
In-Vehicle Display
Mechanical Failure

Direction of correlation
(positive/negative)
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Domain
Organizational/Regulatory

Causal/Contributory Factors
Procedural Deviation

Inadequate Supervision (Climate)

High Workload

Operational Environment

Complex Intersections

Irregular Signs/Markings
Construction
Conflicting Vehicle Traffic

Human Factors

Lost S/A

Description
Describes deviation from
established corporate,
organizational, or regulatory
procedures by an operator
Describes absence of
supervisory input or pressure
from the supervisory or
organizational level to perform
tasks motivated by factors
inconsistent with a climate of
compliance and safety
Describes workload levels that
affect individual performance
negatively by amplifying
inattention or lack of focus
Describes the probability that
an airport has complex
intersections - those taxiway
or runway intersections where
number of intersecting
surfaces, signage, lighting, or
aircraft geometry may
combine to create unusually
high confusion for operators
Describes irregular or non
ICAO-compliant signs and
markings on an airport surface
Describes the presence of
construction in the airport
movement area
Describes the presence of
conflicting vehicle traffic in the
airport movement area
Describes a loss of flight crew
or vehicle operator situational
awareness, meaning that
inappropriate mental
representations are activated
in spite of real world evidence.
People then act “in the wrong
scene,” and seek cues
confirming their expectations,
a behavior known as
confirmation bias.
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Failed to Hold Short

Task Saturation

Describes an aircraft or vehicle
failure to remain in place
behind a hold short line
despite instructions by a
controlling authority or
regulatory requirement to do
so
Describes an operational
condition of no awareness of
input from various sources, so
decisions might be made with
incomplete information and
the possibility of error
increases

Weather

Sun Glare

Describes the presence of sun
glare that interferes with
vision of ATC, flight crew, or
ground vehicle operator

Technical

Radio Congestion

Describes occurrence of radio
congestion that requires
operators to initiate multiple
calls or wait to call or respond
to ATC instruction
Describes the presence of
technology in a flight deck or
vehicle that displays the
airport layout or combination
of layout and vehicle or
aircraft position in real time

In-Cockpit Technology (Moving
Map w/ Ownship. Etc.)
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APPENDIX F
Causal Codes Available for SME Review of ASRS Narratives
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Appendix F (Continued)
Causal Codes Available for SME Review of ASRS Narratives

2.5

Expert Rater-Developed Codes

2.5.1
2.5.2

Crew Coordination
Failure to Readback Clearance
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APPENDIX G
SQL Code for Interrater Computations
Note to readers: The following code does not represent the complete SQL input for the
interrater reliability, union, and intersection functions. Rather, based on space
limitations and the repetitive nature of the code, it shows the input for one of the five
iterations necessary to complete the function.
set nocount on
declare @icao table (id int identity(1,1),rating varchar(50))
declare @BG table(asr varchar(30), apt varchar(30),r1 varchar(30),r2 varchar(30),
r3 varchar(30), r4 varchar(30), r5 varchar(30), dq varchar(255), comment
varchar(255),
exc varchar(30), sev varchar(20))
declare @GJ table(asr varchar(30), apt varchar(30),r1 varchar(30),r2 varchar(30),
r3 varchar(30), r4 varchar(30), r5 varchar(30), dq varchar(255), comment
varchar(255),
exc varchar(30), sev varchar(20))
declare @JT table(asr varchar(30), apt varchar(30),r1 varchar(30),r2 varchar(30),
r3 varchar(30), r4 varchar(30), r5 varchar(30), dq varchar(255), comment
varchar(255),
exc varchar(30), sev varchar(20))
declare @asrs table (asr varchar(30))
declare @interR table (asr varchar(30), who varchar(30), rating varchar(30),
codedRating int)
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '836163','2.3.6','2.3.3','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '836163','2.3.3','2.3.4','2.3.6','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '836163','2.3.4','','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '789540','','','','','','Yes'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '789540','2.5.1','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '789540','2.2.15','2.5.1','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '817153','2.4.5','2.4.1','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '817153','2.1.4','2.2.5','2.3.2','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '817153','2.3.4','2.2.5','2.4.1','','','Yes'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'824311','2.4.5','2.4.2','2.2.7','2.2.1','2.4.1','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '824311','2.2.1','2.1.9','2.2.7','','',''
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insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '824311','2.2.7','2.1.9','2.4.5','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '856792','2.4.5','2.4.1','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '856792','2.4.1','2.2.7','2.4.5','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '856792','2.4.1','2.4.5','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'812538','2.4.5','2.2.5','2.2.2','2.2.1','2.1.9','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '812538','2.2.2','2.2.15','2.5.1','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '812538','2.2.2','2.2.15','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'942802','2.4.5','2.4.1','2.4.2','2.1.7','2.1.4','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '942802','2.1.7','2.4.1','2.4.5','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '942802','2.4.1','2.1.4','2.1.7','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '979222','2.4.2','2.4.6','2.4.1','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '979222','2.1.9','2.2.1','2.4.1','2.4.2','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '979222','2.4.2','','','','','Yes'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '785382','2.4.5','2.3.7','2.2.1','2.2.5','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '785382','2.2.5','2.2.10','2.3.3','2.5.1','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '785382','2.2.5','2.3.4','2.3.7','2.2.15','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '792763','2.4.5','2.2.1','2.2.2','2.2.7','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '792763','2.1.9','2.2.1','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '792763','2.1.9','2.2.2','2.2.7','2.4.5','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '784979','2.4.5','2.2.2','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '784979','2.2.15','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '784979','2.2.15','','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '856457','2.3.4','2.3.6','2.2.10','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '856457','2.2.6','2.3.4','2.3.6','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '856457','2.3.4','','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '776226','2.2.5','2.3.3','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '776226','2.2.1','2.2.13','2.3.4','2.4.2','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '776226','2.3.4','2.2.1','2.2.13','2.4.2','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '884378','2.2.5','2.3.7','2.3.1','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '884378','2.2.13','2.3.8','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '884378','2.3.4','2.3.7','','','','Yes'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'867483','2.2.6','2.2.1','2.2.2','2.2.10','2.2.15','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '867483','2.2.1','2.2.9','2.4.5','2.5.1','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '867483','2.2.1','2.2.9','2.2.15','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '792259','2.4.11','','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '792259','2.2.11','2.5.1','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '792259','2.2.11','2.4.11','2.5.1','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '837821','2.4.11','2.2.15','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '837821','2.4.11','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '837821','2.1.9','2.1.11','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '793916','2.4.5','2.4.3','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '793916','2.2.9','2.2.15','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '793916','2.2.9','2.2.15','','','','No'
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insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '831760','2.3.2','2.2.10','2.2.5','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '831760','2.3.2','2.3.6','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '831760','2.3.4','2.3.8','','','','Yes'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '840502','2.2.15','2.4.11','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '840502','2.2.15','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '840502','2.2.15','','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '858253','2.3.1','2.2.10','2.2.2','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '858253','2.3.6','2.2.5','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '858253','2.3.6','2.2.2','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '859637','','','','','','Yes'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '859637','2.2.10','2.2.5','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '859637','2.2.6','2.2.1','2.2.10','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '829659','','','','','','Yes'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '829659','2.2.13','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '829659','2.4.1','2.3.4','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '969670','2.4.5','2.2.5','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '969670','2.2.5','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '969670','2.1.9','2.2.5','2.3.4','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '978488','2.4.5','2.2.5','2.4.1','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '978488','2.3.4','2.2.5','2.1.9','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '978488','2.2.5','2.3.4','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '790954','2.2.15','2.1.11','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '790954','2.1.11','2.2.3','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '790954','2.1.11','2.2.15','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'974660','2.4.1','2.4.2','2.4.4','2.1.9','2.2.1','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '974660','2.2.1','2.2.4','2.4.1','2.5.1','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '974660','2.2.4','2.2.1','2.2.15','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '882759','2.4.1','2.4.5','2.4.6','2.2.1','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '882759','2.2.1','2.4.6','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '882759','2.2.1','2.4.6','2.2.15','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '847101','2.4.11','','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '847101','2.2.15','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '847101','','','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '939675','2.4.5','2.4.1','2.2.10','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '939675','2.2.5','2.2.10','2.4.2','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '939675','2.2.5','2.2.15','2.4.5','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '782334','2.2.15','2.3.2','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '782334','2.2.15','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '782334','2.2.15','2.3.1','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '839671','2.4.1','2.1.3','2.1.11','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '839671','2.1.3','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '839671','2.4.1','','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '790028','2.2.10','2.2.15','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '790028','2.2.10','2.4.11','2.5.1','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '790028','2.4.4','2.5.1','','','','No'
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insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '895524','2.4.5','','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '895524','2.4.5','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '895524','','','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '979457','2.1.2','2.2.15','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '979457','2.4.11','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '979457','2.4.11','','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '808374','2.2.15','2.1.11','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '808374','2.2.4','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '808374','2.2.4','','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '796225','2.4.5','2.3.6','2.2.15','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '796225','2.2.13','2.3.7','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '796225','2.3.4','2.3.8','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '964667','2.3.4','2.4.11','2.4.5','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '964667','2.3.2','2.4.5','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '964667','2.3.2','2.2.15','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '796451','2.4.9','2.2.6','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '796451','2.4.1','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '796451','2.4.9','2.2.15','2.4.11','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '885530','2.4.1','2.4.6','2.4.5','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '885530','2.4.5','2.4.1','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '885530','2.4.1','2.4.5','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '924416','2.4.5','2.4.1','2.2.14','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '924416','2.4.1','2.4.6','2.1.11','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '924416','2.4.5','2.5.1','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'963731','2.4.4','2.4.5','2.2.10','2.2.14','2.2.5','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '963731','2.2.5','2.2.10','2.2.14','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'963731','2.2.14','2.2.10','2.4.4','2.4.5','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '785071','2.3.6','2.3.5','2.4.5','2.2.5','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '785071','2.3.3','2.3.4','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '785071','2.3.4','2.2.5','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'792103','2.4.1','2.4.5','2.2.13','2.3.4','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '792103','2.4.5','2.2.6','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '792103','2.2.5','2.2.15','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '773565','2.2.6','2.2.10','2.3.8','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '773565','2.2.5','2.3.7','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '773565','2.3.8','','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '902776','2.3.4','2.3.7','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '902776','2.3.6','2.3.4','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '902776','2.3.4','2.3.7','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '848283','2.1.11','2.2.15','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '848283','2.1.11','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '848283','2.1.11','2.2.15','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '809047','2.2.6','2.2.14','2.2.5','','','No'
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insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '809047','2.2.14','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '809047','2.5.1','2.2.1','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'781972','2.4.5','2.4.1','2.2.9','2.2.10','2.2.5','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '781972','2.4.5','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '781972','2.2.6','2.4.2','2.5.1','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '808596','2.2.6','2.2.5','2.4.2','2.5.1','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '808596','2.2.6','2.5.1','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '808596','2.5.1','2.2.15','2.2.6','2.4.2','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'848426','2.2.6','2.2.5','2.4.2','2.4.5','2.2.15','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '848426','2.2.6','2.2.15','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '848426','2.2.15','2.2.5','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '926377','2.4.11','','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '926377','2.4.11','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '926377','2.2.15','2.4.3','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'891040','2.1.3','2.4.5','2.2.7','2.2.15','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '891040','2.4.1','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '891040','2.1.3','2.2.15','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'917147','2.3.6','2.2.10','2.2.2','2.2.15','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '917147','2.2.10','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '917147','2.2.2','2.1.9','2.3.8','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '846943','2.4.1','2.1.11','2.2.15','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '846943','2.4.11','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '846943','2.4.11','','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'873641','2.3.6','2.2.10','2.4.5','2.2.5','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '873641','2.3.7','2.2.10','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '873641','2.3.7','2.2.5','2.2.10','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '1001233','2.4.10','2.2.6','2.2.10','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '1001233','2.2.10','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '1001233','2.4.10','2.2.5','2.2.10','','','Yes'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '840082','2.2.15','2.2.13','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '840082','2.2.15','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '840082','2.2.15','2.3.1','2.1.11','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '998522','2.4.9','2.2.6','2.2.5','2.3.4','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '998522','2.3.4','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '998522','2.3.4','2.2.6','2.2.10','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '823433','2.4.11','2.4.2','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '823433','2.4.11','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '823433','2.4.11','','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '840535','2.1.11','2.2.13','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '840535','2.2.3','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '840535','2.2.15','2.2.13','','','','No'
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insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '949123','2.2.15','2.1.11','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '949123','2.1.11','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '949123','2.1.11','2.2.15','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '813384','2.1.11','2.2.4','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '813384','2.4.1','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '813384','','','','','','Yes'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '845126','2.3.4','2.4.5','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '845126','2.3.4','2.3.6','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '845126','2.3.4','','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'818774','2.4.5','2.2.10','2.3.7','2.3.3','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '818774','2.2.9','2.2.10','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '818774','2.2.5','2.2.2','2.3.7','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '906346','2.3.3','2.4.1','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '906346','2.1.4','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '906346','2.3.4','2.4.1','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '955078','2.2.6','2.2.10','2.4.4','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '955078','2.1.7','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '955078','2.2.10','2.2.15','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '971495','2.4.5','2.2.6','2.4.5','2.3.7','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '971495','2.3.7','2.2.5','2.4.5','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '971495','2.3.7','2.2.10','2.2.6','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'844690','2.4.9','2.2.10','2.2.5','2.2.15','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '844690','2.2.10','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '844690','2.2.6','2.4.9','','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select
'1019890','2.2.1','2.2.5','2.2.7','2.2.10','2.5.1','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '1019890','2.2.10','2.4.1','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '1019890','2.2.1','2.2.2','2.5.1','','','No'
insert @BG(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '838570','2.1.3','','','','','No'
insert @GJ(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '838570','2.1.3','','','','',''
insert @JT(asr,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,exc) select '838570','2.1.3','','','','','No'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.1.1'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.1.10'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.1.11'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.1.2'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.1.3'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.1.4'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.1.5'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.1.6'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.1.7'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.1.8'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.1.9'
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insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.1'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.10'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.11'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.12'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.13'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.14'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.15'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.2'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.3'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.4'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.5'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.6'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.7'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.8'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.2.9'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.3.1'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.3.2'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.3.3'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.3.4'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.3.5'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.3.6'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.3.7'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.3.8'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.4.1'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.4.10'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.4.11'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.4.2'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.4.3'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.4.4'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.4.5'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.4.6'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.4.7'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.4.8'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.4.9'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.5.1'
insert @icao(rating) select '2.5.2'
--cleanup
set nocount off
delete @BG where rtrim(ltrim(asr))=''
delete @JT where rtrim(ltrim(asr))=''
delete @GJ where rtrim(ltrim(asr))=''
set nocount on
update @BG set exc='No' where exc=''
update @JT set exc='No' where exc=''
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update @GJ set exc='No' where exc=''

insert @asrs(asr) select distinct asr from @BG

insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'GJ',asr,r1 from @GJ
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'GJ',asr,r2 from @GJ
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'GJ',asr,r3 from @GJ
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'GJ',asr,r4 from @GJ
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'GJ',asr,r5 from @GJ
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'JT',asr,r1 from @JT
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'JT',asr,r2 from @JT
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'JT',asr,r3 from @JT
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'JT',asr,r4 from @JT
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'JT',asr,r5 from @JT
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'BG',asr,r1 from @BG
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'BG',asr,r2 from @BG
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'BG',asr,r3 from @BG
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'BG',asr,r4 from @BG
insert @interR (who, asr, rating) select 'BG',asr,r5 from @BG
update @interR set codedRating=i.ID from
@interR r inner join @icao i
on r.rating=i.rating
--looking at rating congruence
--select * from @interR order by asr,who
--unique rating counts
/*
select unqratings=count(distinct rating),totratings=count(*),asr
from @interR where rating!=''
group by asr
order by count(distinct rating) desc
*/
/*
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APPENDIX H
SME Structural Model Review Protocol
Your (SMEs) input, data from ASRS and RSO records, and a systematic review of the literature
shaped the development of the model shown here. While data exist for some of the nodes,
others will be populated with conditional, probabilistic estimates based on input from SMEs.
For this phase of the research, I will ask you to review the structure of the models below. This
structure is important because it attempts to capture how and why RIs occur in a dynamic
setting. The arrows between nodes, called directed edges, indicate a causal connection
between variables called parent and child nodes. In subsequent sessions, you may be asked to
identify the strength of association between nodes or the probability of a certain node state;
however, in this phase, you need only focus on the direction of causality and the connections
between nodes both within and across domains (identified by color coding).
Please take a few moments to review the model below, asking questions as they arise.
Remember, this model is a mode detailed “landscape view” of the problem space. Once you
have familiarized yourself with this model, we will move on to a more parsimonious version for
your review.
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Note that the model below is not fundamentally different from the first model. Instead, it is a
more compact version. On this basis, we will begin the exercise of evaluating structure here,
expanding our review to the more granular model next. As we work through this exercise, keep
in mind the definition of a runway incursion (RI) is: “Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving
the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface
designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft” (FAA, 2007, para. 2).
Let’s review the model below beginning with the node labeled “Incorrect Position”. This node is
intended to capture the requirement that an aircraft or vehicle arrives at a position on an
airfield, specifically in the runway protected zone, in an incorrect or unintended manner. The
radiating nodes are essentially conditions that necessarily lead to this incorrect presence, but
may not be sufficient to create the incorrect presence.

Now that we have discussed the interaction between domain-specific causal factors and the
instance of an improper position combining to create an RI event, let’s look at the causal
relationships indicated by directed edges, starting with the unconditioned nodes (nodes without
parent nodes) in the Organizational/Regulatory domain, and then moving inward before moving
counter-clockwise to the next domain, and so on.
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In this process, it may be helpful to refer back to the more granular model to gain a better
understanding of the factors leading to the more general nodes.
Questions for SMEs:
•

In your opinion/experience, does the node capture the relevant construct?

•

What are the possible states of the node?
• Yes/No
• Correct/Incorrect

•

Is the node sequenced properly?

•

Is the node necessary to a complete causal sequence?

•

Does the node have true, causal influence on its child nodes?

•

Are the data to populate the node available?
• If so, what is your assessment of the quality of the data?

•

What causal factors have not been accounted for?
• Why do you believe their inclusion is supported?

•

Are the inter-domain links (directed edges) appropriate and necessary?

•

Do you have any other comments/input?
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APPENDIX I
Range Graphs by Question/Expert with Equal/Global Weights
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APPENDIX J
Variable Names and Definitions
Causal/Contributory Factors
Procedural Deviation

Description
Describes deviation from corporate, organizational,
or regulatory procedures by an operator

Inadequate Supervision (Climate)

Describes absence of supervisory input or pressure
from the supervisory or organizational level to
perform tasks motivated by factors inconsistent with
a climate of compliance or safety.
Describes workload levels that affect individual
performance negatively by amplifying inattention or
lack of focus
Describes abnormal factors in the organizational or
regulatory domain such as those included in the
model that are of sufficient influence so as not to be
discounted as a potential contributing factor if an
accident or incident were to occur

High Workload
Organizational/Regulatory Factors

Complex Intersections

Irregular Signs/Markings
Construction
Non-Towered Airport
Part 139

Conflicting Vehicle Traffic
Operational Environment Factors

Describes the probability that an airport has
complex intersections - those taxiway or runway
intersections where number of intersecting surfaces,
signage, lighting, or aircraft geometry may combine
to create unusually high confusion for operators
Describes irregular or non ICAO-compliant signs
and markings on an airport surface
Describes the presence of construction in the airport
movement area
Describes whether an airport has an operational
ground control or not
Describes whether an airport is subject to
compliance with 14CFR Part 139 regulatory
compliance or not; 14 CFR Part 139 requires FAA
to issue airport operating certificates to airports that-- Serve scheduled and unscheduled air carrier
aircraft with more than 30 seats; Server scheduled
air carrier operations in aircraft with more than 9
seats but less than 31 seats; and The FAA
Administrator requires to have a certificate.
Describes the presence of conflicting vehicle traffic
in the airport movement area
Describes abnormal factors in the operational
environment domain such as those included in the
model that are of sufficient influence so as not to be
discounted as a potential contributing factor if an
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accident or incident were to occur

Lost S/A

Failed to Hold Short

Task Saturation

Human Factors

Precipitation
Sun Glare
Darkness/Twilight
Restrictions to Visibility

Weather Factors

Radio Congestion
In-Cockpit Technology (Moving
Map w/ Ownship. Etc.)

Describes a loss of flight crew or vehicle operator
situational awareness, meaning that inappropriate
mental representations are activated in spite of real
world evidence. People then act “in the wrong
scene,” and seek cues confirming their expectations,
a behavior known as confirmation bias.
Describes an aircraft or vehicle failure to remain in
place behind a hold short line despite instructions by
a controlling authority or regulatory requirement to
do so
Describes an operational condition of no awareness
of input from various sources, so decisions might be
made with incomplete information and the
possibility of error increases
Describes abnormal factors in the human factors
domain such as those included in the model that are
of sufficient influence so as not to be discounted as
a potential contributing factor if an accident or
incident were to occur
Describes presence of precipitation at the airport
surface
Describes the presence of sun glare that interferes
with vision of ATC, flight crew, or ground vehicle
operator
Describes probability of operation during darkness
or twilight
Describes reduction in visibility at the airport
surface by smoke, haze, fog, mist, or other
phenomena that reduces visibility to under 1500
RVR
Describes abnormal factors in the weather domain
such as those included in the model that are of
sufficient influence so as not to be discounted as a
potential contributing factor if an accident or
incident were to occur
Describes occurrence of radio congestion that
requires operators to initiate multiple calls or wait to
call or respond to ATC instruction
Describes the presence of technology in a flight
deck or vehicle that displays the airport layout or
combination of layout and vehicle or aircraft
position in real time
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ATC Equipment Failure
Mechanical Failure
Engineering/Technological
Factors

Describes the operational failure of ATC equipment
such that normal communications or direction is
interrupted
Describes aircraft mechanical systems failure
Describes abnormal factors in the engineering or
technological domain such as those included in the
model that are of sufficient influence so as not to be
discounted as a potential contributing factor if an
accident or incident were to occur
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APPENDIX K
BBN Model Details

Figure 40. Compact model, organizational and regulatory domain.

Figure 41. Compact model, operational environment domain.
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Figure 42. Compact model, human factors domain.

Figure 43. Compact model, weather domain.
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Figure 44. Compact model, technological and engineering domain.
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APPENDIX L
BBN Rank Correlation Matrix
Tech/
Org/
Ops.
Radio
Irregular
A/P
Weather Human
Darkness Visibility Precip Part 139
Regulatory Engineering
Environment Congestion Signs Construction

RI
RI
Org/Regulatory
Tech/Engineering
Weather
Human
Ops. Environment
Radio Congestion
Irregular Signs
A/P Construction
Darkness
Visibility
Precip
Part 139
Nontowered
Complex Int.
Conf. Vehicle Traffic
Mechanical Failure
In-Vehicle Display
ATC Equip Failure
Sun Glare
Inad. Supervision
Procedural Deviation
High Workload
Lost S/A
Fail to Hold Short
Task Saturation
Incorrect Position

1.000
0.181
0.209
0.577
0.705
0.225
0.038
0.076
0.193
0.129
0.467
-0.017
-0.021
0.021
0.210
0.031
0.249
-0.001
0.037
0.520
0.131
0.141
0.195
0.585
0.488
0.247
0.900

0.181
1.000
0
0
0.187
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.840
0.927
0.213
0
0
0.468
0.200

0.209
0
1.000
0
0.389
0
0.382
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.750
-0.190
0.465
0
0
0
0
0
0.605
0.080
0.231

0.577 0.705
0 0.187
0 0.389
1.000 0.349
0.349 1.000
0 0.167
0 0.069
0 0.096
0 0.128
0.218 0.079
0.800 0.283
-0.029 -0.011
0 -0.017
0 0.015
0 0.157
0 0.036
0 0.467
0
0
0 0.066
0.896 0.315
0 0.115
0 0.121
0 0.333
0.650 0.527
0.248 0.700
0 0.388
0.638 0.780

0.225
0
0
0
0.167
1.000
0
0.177
0.910
0
0
0
-0.086
0.093
0.924
0.084
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.302
0.117
0.008
0.248

0.038
0
0.382
0
0.069
0
1.000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.800
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.171
0.042

0.076
0
0
0
0.096
0.177
0
1.000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.177
0.069
0
0.084

0.193
0
0
0
0.128
0.910
0
0
1.000
0
0
0
0
0
0.800
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.235
0.091
0
0.212

0.129
0
0
0.218
0.079
0
0
0
0
1.000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.145
0.056
0
0.143

0.467
0
0
0.800
0.283
0
0
0
0
0
1.000
0.191
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.950
0
0
0
0.525
0.202
0
0.515

-0.017
0
0
-0.029
-0.011
0
0
0
0
0
0.191
1.000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0.020
-0.008
0
-0.019

-0.021
0
0
0
-0.017
-0.086
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.000
-0.850
0.000
-0.462
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0.043
-0.024

Parent-Child Corr.
5 Highest Non ParentChild Correlations

Nontowered
RI
Org/Regulatory
Tech/Engineering
Weather
Human
Ops. Environment
Radio Congestion
Irregular Signs
A/P Construction
Darkness
Visibility
Precip
Part 139
Nontowered
Complex Int.
Conf. Vehicle Traffic
Mechanical Failure
In-Vehicle Display
ATC Equip Failure
Sun Glare
Inad. Supervision
Procedural Deviation
High Workload
Lost S/A
Fail to Hold Short
Task Saturation
Incorrect Position
Parent-Child Corr.
5 Highest Non ParentChild Correlations

0.021
0
0
0
0.015
0.093
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0.850
1.000
0
0.400
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.037
0.023

Complex Conflicting Mechanical In-Vehicle ATC Equip Sun Inadequate Procedural
High
Lost
Fail to
Task Sat.
Int.
Vehicle Traffic Failure
Display
Failure Glare Supervision Deviation Workload S/A Hold Short
0.210
0.031
0.249
-0.001
0.037 0.520
0.131
0.141
0.195 0.585
0.488
0.247
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.840
0.927
0.213
0
0
0.468
0
0
0.750
-0.190
0.465
0
0
0
0
0
0.605
0.080
0
0
0
0
0 0.896
0
0
0 0.650
0.248
0
0.157
0.036
0.467
0
0.066 0.315
0.115
0.121
0.333 0.527
0.700
0.388
0.924
0.084
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0.302
0.117
0.008
0
0
0
0
0.800
0
0
0
0 0.000
0
0.171
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0.177
0.069
0
0.800
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0.235
0.091
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0.145
0.056
0
0
0
0
0
0 0.950
0
0
0 0.525
0.202
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 -0.020
-0.008
0
0
-0.462
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 -0.043
0
0.400
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.037
1.000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0.289
0.112
0
0
1.000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.089
0
0
1.000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.800
0
0
0
0
1.000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.165
0
0
0
0
0 1.000
0
0
0 0.586
0.224
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.000
0.945
0
0
0
0.286
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.945
1.000
0
0
0
0.301
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.000
0
0
0.850
0.289
0
0
0
0 0.586
0
0
0 1.000
0.373
0
0.112
0
0.800
0
0 0.224
0
0
0 0.373
1.000
0
0
0.089
0
0
0.165
0
0.286
0.301
0.850
0
0
1.000
0.232
0.034
0.275
-0.001
0.041 0.575
0.144
0.155
0.215 0.646
0.538
0.272

Incorr.
Pos.
0.900
0.200
0.231
0.638
0.780
0.248
0.042
0.084
0.212
0.143
0.515
-0.019
-0.024
0.023
0.232
0.034
0.275
-0.001
0.041
0.575
0.144
0.155
0.215
0.646
0.538
0.272
1.000
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APPENDIX M
ASRS Reviewer Selection Criteria
Expert Initials: ______
Resume or CV: 
Contact Information: 
Signed Consent Form: 

Date: _____________

1. Independence
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Notes:__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
2. Diversity of Experience
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Notes:__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
3. Interest
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Notes:__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
4. Flight Experience
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Notes:__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
5. Familiarity with Current RI Mitigations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Notes:__________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

